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Abstract 
Since the handover, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has experienced 
four Legislative Council elections. In the elections, candidates of the pro-democracy 
camp, the chief opposition force the state, exercised electoral coordinations in 
different levels. Among them, the strategic coordination of the 2004 Legislative 
Council is of no doubt the most eye-catching one. However, the most important 
observation is, the democrats conducted different levels of electoral coordination in 
the four elections. It is what this research tends to look into. 
Basically, this research is servIng three purposes: (1) to examIne the validity of 
existing explanations about electoral coordination of democrats in LegCo elections; (2) 
to articulate possible factors leading to different levels of coordination among 
democrats in LegCo elections; (3) to describe patterns of coordination among 
democrats, if exist, in LegCo elections. 
To establish argument of the research, political context of Hong Kong is the point to 
discuss. Hong Kong is neither totally democratic nor totally authoritarian. This 
research argues that Hong Kong should be regarded as a competitive authoritarian 
regime, in which election is one of the most important arenas of contestation for the 
pro-democracy camp. 
"Through comprehensive study of the four Legislative Council elections after the 
handover, the research tries to explore factors determining level of electoral 
coordination of the democrats, and more importantly, it intends to enrich discussion 

















影響「混雜政體 J (Hybrid regime) 中反對力量的整合，仍然未有充分的探討，
本研究也希望在此作出貢獻。
x 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Research Background and Objective 
The pro-democracy camp is one of the main forces fighting for democratic 
development in Hong Kong. Simultaneously, it is the opposition against the ruling 
executive. The Legislative Council (LegCo) is an important arena for the camp to 
carry out the democratic movement of Hong Kong by exerting pressure on the 
government and expressIng public opInIon. Thus whether the democrats can 
coordinate well in the LegCo election to maximize their winning opportunity is a 
significant issue. 
Since the handover in 1997, the electoral method has been changed from the 
Single-Member Plurality System (SM) to the Proportional Representation system 
(PR). Based on the comparison of the performance of candidates in 1995 and 1998, 
some argue that the electoral method is a major obstacle to the coordination of the 
camp (Choy & Ma, 1999). Yet, after the first two LegCo elections since the 
establishment of the SAR, in 2004, a comprehensive strategic coordination of 
democrats took place. However, such coordination was no longer found in the 
election of 2008. Whether intentionally planned or not, different coordination of the 
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democrats was shown in the four elections. 
Indeed, to study electoral coordination of the opposition, Hong Kong's political 
context should not be overlooked. Hong Kong is not a mature democratic polity like 
other western democracies. Though there is election for the legislature, victory in the 
election does not entail any substantive ruling power. Despite the lack of de facto 
ruling power, the occupancy of seats in the legislature is nevertheless an indispensible 
part of the democratic movement. Therefore it is reasonable to argue that democrats 
are subject to a more complicated motivation than other candidates of conventional 
democracies thus resulting in their different electoral performance. 
So, should Hong Kong be regarded as a democratizing polity? Logically, yes. Yet, 
under the prolonged experience of "partial democratization" (Lau & Kuan, 2000), it is 
unconvincing to subject Hong Kong to the standard of the conventional study of 
democratization, which focuses on the sequence of a regime's openIng, its 
breakthrough and consolidation (Carothers, 2002). Instead, in this research, I would 
argue that it is more appropriate to regard Hong Kong as a competitive authoritarian 
regime (Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2003, 2006), which is a refinement following the 
discussion of "democracy with adjectives" (Collier & Levitsky, 1997) and hybrid 
regime (Diamond, 2002; Karl, 1995), and that it is against this background where the 
pattern of the opposition's electoral coordination should be analysed. 
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According to Levitsky and Way, competitive authoritarian regImes refer to 
"regimes in which democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary 
means of gaining and maintaining power, but in which incumbents violate democratic 
rules to such a degree that the regime cannot be labelled a democracy" (2003, p. 4). 
More specifically, competitive authoritarian regimes cannot be regarded as democratic 
because they do not fulfil the standard "procedural minimum" definitions of 
democracy suggested by Diamond (1999).1 As a result, the electoral battle between 
the ruler and the opposition is remarkably uneven. However, the uneven competition 
does not mean abuse of political power. Instead, the opposition forces can make use of 
arenas of contestation to challenge the ruling power occasionally. Also, to maintain a 
certain degree of political legitimacy, incumbent would not repress the opposition 
forces too severely (Greene, 2007; Levitsky & Way, 2003). 
With reference to the determined feature of competitive authoritarian regimes, 
this thesis argues that the study of electoral coordination of the democrats should be 
focusing on Hong Kong's political context as a competitive authoritarian regime. 
Focusing on this concept, the LegCo election is being regarded as one of the arenas of 
contestation suggested by Levitsky and Way (2002).2 Being an arena of contestation, 
I The four criteria are: (1) executives and legislatures are chosen through elections that are open, free 
and fair; (2) virtually all adults posses the right to vote; (3) civil and political liberties are broadly 
protected; and (4) elected authorities are not subject to the tutelary control of military or clerical 
leaders. 
2 The four arenas of contestation suggested by Levitsky and Way (2002) are the legislature, election, 
media, and judiciary. More detail of the ",renas will be discussed in coming chapters. 
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hypothetically, other factors affecting general atmosphere of the democratic 
movement would also affect performance of electoral coordination. 
Research Design 
Looking into the vast amount of literature, there have been numerous discussions 
on problems of the development of the pro-democracy camp; Ma and Choy (1999, 
2004) also conducted studies on effects of electoral methods on the competition 
pattern of candidates, inter alia democrats. Yet, studies on electoral coordination of 
pro-democracy are in fact short and disorganized. Therefore, as an exploratory 
research, this study serves the following purposes: 
1. To examine the validity of existing explanations about electoral coordination 
of democrats in LegCo elections; 
2. To articulate possible factors leading to different levels of coordination 
among democrats in LegCo elections; 
3. To describe patterns of coordination among democrats, if exist, in LegCo 
elections. 
Categorizing Hong Kong as a competitive authoritarian regIme, this research 
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explores the variables affecting coordination performance of democrats in the LegCo 
elections by using the four post-handover LegCo elections as case studies. I would 
focus on political dissatisfaction, economic performance, and prospect of democracy 
as independent variables of the study. Moreover, I would conceptualise electoral 
coordination, the dependent variable, in terms of level of cohesion of the opposition. 
As in relation to political dissatisfaction, people's perception of economic 
performance and popular support of various political groups of different periods, the 
Public Opinion Programme of the University of Hong Kong is the main source of 
database for this research. 
In this case study research, vanous sources of information are approached. 
Besides the Public Opinion Programme noted above, different promotion materials of 
candidates, video clips of election forums, newspaper clips are collected, interviews 
with certain candidates have been conducted in supplementary to the statistics of the 
four elections. 
Research Significance 
First and foremost, in a competitive authoritarian regime, the opposition exerts 
pressure on the ruling party through participation in the election game challenging the 
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incumbent as well as the dominant party. Though the effectiveness of an opposition 
coalition in leading to a democratic state is debatable, the role of the opposition 
cannot be underestimated (Greene, 2007; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Levitsky & Way 
2003, 2006). Following this vein, studies on factors influencing the opposition 
coalition's strength is inadequate (Greene, 2007; Howard & Roessler, 2006). Thus, in 
the broadest sense, this research aims at contributing to the insufficient discussion on 
factors influencing the strength of the opposition coalition through looking into the 
performance of the pro-democracy in the four LegCo elections. 
Secondly, most studies on the behaviour of democrats either regard Hong Kong 
as a conventional saying of democratizing polity (Lo, 1997a, 1997b; Sing, 2003, 
2004b) or simply assume Hong Kong to be indifferent from western democracies in 
electoral arena (Choy & Ma, 1999, 2004). Indeed, both perspectives distort the real 
political context of Hong Kong. Thus, by appropriately diagnosing Hong Kong as a 
competitive authoritarian regime, this research articulates a more satisfactory picture 
of the behaviour of the opposition. 
Thirdly, referring to the discussion of Levitsky and Way (2002), though their 
introduction on the four arenas of contestation is insightful, they did not provide any 
elaboration on the role and effectiveness of particular context. In a word, the idea is 
insightful but still ambiguous. Therefore, adopting Hong Kong as the case study and 
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taking the electoral arena as the chief field of study, the author tries to substantiate the 
discussion and make it more applicable for similar study in other cases of competitive 
authoritarian regimes. 
Last but not least, this research tried to examine validity of institutional analysis, 
which is probably the most dominant approaches in studying behaviour of the 
opposition in election (Choy, 2002; Choy & Ma, 1999, 2004). Through a 
comprehensive study of all the four LegCo elections of the SAR, the author tried to 
explore if there is any factor leading to the variation of performance of electoral 
coordination of the opposition in the four elections, added to the effect of the electoral 
method. 
Plan of Dissertation 
In Chapter Two, I would introduce the background of this research. It includes 
the general concept of the pro-democracy camp, the relations between electoral 
coordination and Hong Kong's democratic movement, plus the literature review on 
explanations of electoral coordination among the democrats. Chapter Three gives the 
conceptualization and the operationalization of key concepts and variables. Then, 
evidence of the four elections will be presented in Chapters Four, Five and Six. 
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Afterwards, Chapter Seven is the analysis and implications drawn from the four 
elections. Lastly, Chapter Eight is the conclusion of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 2 Electoral Coordination: Background of Further 
Exploration 
This chapter will first introduce the essential in the study of Hong Kong politics: 
the opposition, i.e. the pro-democracy camp. Then, the importance of electoral 
coordination in the democratic movement will be explained while regarding Hong 
Kong as both a democratizing state and a hybrid regime. Lastly, the chapter will 
review explanations of such coordination based on the current situation. 
What is the Pro-democracy Camp? 
According to Sing (2003, 2004b), the Hong Kong pro-democracy camp is an 
unconsolidated group of political parties and social organizations representing the 
general public and academia. As a camp [italics added], different parties of the camp 
can be regarded as various factions (Lo, 1997c). Conceptually, both definitions imply 
that the pro-democracy camp is not a stable unit. Cooperation and conflicts among 
pro-democracy parties can co-exist in the camp, and this affects the performance of 
the camp as a whole. 
Historically, the pro-democracy camp referred to social activists fighting for civil 
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rights and social welfare outside institution in the 70s (Lui, 1993). Based on their 
common expenence In organIzIng social movements, there was certain kind of 
affiliation binding them under the same umbrella of pro-democracy: 
, ... these political groups can be kept on identified as the pro-democracy camp 
because of certain degree of "affiliation" among them .... More directly, this 
"affiliation" was collective experience among these groups in continuous 
participation in social movement and political development. First, in 70s, many 
members of the pro-democracy camp used to participate in pressure groups and 
social movement and tried to refute some government policies outside 
institution. This expenence enhanced and consolidated collaborative 
relationship among them .... Second, most members of the pro-democracy camp 
had actively participated in election since there was political reform in 80s. 
Based on the collective experience and prolonged support for more opened 
political system, there was closed idea about democratisation among members 
of the pro-democracy camp (1993, p.9). 
In the 80s, democratisation during the transition period and the post-handover 
Hong Kong was an issue with keen debate. Since then, the label of the pro-democracy 
camp had appeared to distinguish certain political groups from those of the 
conservative camp and the pro-Beijing camp. In 1986, more than a hundred 
organizations, including the Meeting Point (MP), the Hong Kong Affairs Society 
(HKAS) and the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood 
(ADPL), which were significant political groups in the year, supported the "190-rnan 
proposal" which proposed a popular election of the Chief Executive (CE) as well as a 
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direct election of at least half of the seats in the LegCo. Later, the organizations 
formed a big alliance, the Joint Committee in Promotion of Democratic Reforms 
(JCPDR). According to Choy (2003), political groups which supported the "190-man 
proposal" and the JCPDR became the basis of the pro-democracy camp. However, 
since the beginning of democratisation in the 80s, the civil society and the political 
society had become more distinctive from each other (Sing, 2004b). 
Focusing on the pro-democratic force of the political society, the substance of the 
pro-democracy camp varies depending on the emergence of new parties and the 
integration among them. For instance, in the early 90s, the MP, the HKAS, and the 
ADPL were seen as main pro-democracy estates. Then the United Democrats of Hong 
Kong (UDHK) was formed. Later, the UDHK merged with the MP to form the 
Democratic Party (DP), which was regarded as the flagship of the camp. After the 
handover, more pro-democratic parties were formed, and the leading role of the DP 
was challenged. In spite of the changing substance, Ma defines the camp as a "loose 
pro-social-democratic coalition" which was "anticommunist, Hong Kong-centred and 
rising pro-reform and pro-democracy sentiments in Hong Kong" (2002b, p. 114). 
Obviously, even though the details of the cleavage pattern of the camp varied in the 
decade, i.e. pro-democracy, anti-China and anti-government, identification with the 
pro-democracy camp was made with the prolonged stood political cleavage, 
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pro-democracy vs. conservative, of Hong Kong (Lau & Kuan, 2000; Ma, 2002b), 
regardless of different ideas of negotiation strategy or attitudes towards the PRC from 
particular parties/ candidates. 
Furthermore, with reference to the "five functions of the opposition" proposed by 
Stepan (1990)3, the camp is also more or less performing the role of "the opposition" 
in the democratic movement. Firstly, most parties of the camp have been resisting 
from integrating into the regime by keeping distance from the executive body like the 
Executive Council (ExCo). Secondly, various parties of the camp are preserving their 
zones of autonomy against the regime with different means. Unlike some 
pro-government political groups which had sources of revenue from nationalist bodies, 
pro-democracy groups were trying to keep independent resources for sustainable 
participation in the movement. Thirdly, in different incidents, parties of the camp keep 
reminding the public that Hong Kong is ruled by an illegitimate executive. Fourthly, 
by controlling proportion of seats in the LegCo and mobilizing different kinds of 
protests, parties of the camp increase the ruling cost of the SAR executive. Last but 
not least, by conducting policy researches and running in the CE election, certain 
parties of the camp try demonstrate that they could be credible alternatives to the 
current SAR executive, regardless of the result. 
3 The five key functions of the opposition proposed by Stepan are: '1. resisting integration into the 
regime; 2. guarding zones of autonomy against it; 3. disputing its legitimacy; 4. raising the costs of 
authoritarian rule; and 5. creating a credible democratic alternative' (1990, p. 44). 
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Electoral Coordination in a Competitive Authoritarian Regime 
Why is electoral coordination of the pro-democracy camp a worthy issue to study? 
This section is going to demonstrate that the LegCo election is an important war field 
for the camp, especially when Hong Kong is regarded as a competitive authoritarian 
regIme. 
Is Hong Kong A Democratising Polity? 
Since universal suffrage had been installed in a certain proportion of the 
legislature in the late 80s, Hong Kong can be regarded as being under a progress of 
democratization. Although Hong Kong's trail of democratization can, to a certain 
extent, be applied to certain typical literature (Lo, 1997a), it is at the same time an 
exception to conventional democratization theories (Kuan, 1991; Sing, 2004b). 
Considering Hong Kong to be a state under democratization, the chief goal of 
democrats would be either to make pact with the state or to mobilize the civil society 
to overthrow the regime (Stepan, 2001). While the latter is infeasible in Hong Kong, 
the meaning of the former is significant. As argued by Rustow (1970), only when 
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there are new elites who are able to provoke leaderless and depressed social groups 
into certain actions in order to get rid of the status quo, the "preparatory phase" can be 
found. To Huntington (1993), whether democratization of state is a transformation or 
"transplacement" depends very much on the power of the opposition. To Przeworski 
(1991), whether democratization could be achieved is to a large extent determined by 
the negotiation between the opposition and the ruler. Though the role of the 
opposition is largely examined in important democratization theories, the concept of 
the opposition is in fact vague, in spite of the elaboration made by Stepan (1990). 
Indeed, nearly a decade after the third wave democratization, the theoretical ideal 
of democratization was questioned. Observations like "delegative democracy" 
(O'Donnell, 1994) and "hybrid regimes" (Karl, 1995) were raised. If a successful 
democratization refers to a path from "closed hegemony" to "polyarchy" (Dahl, 1971), 
the fact is, quite a number of democratization experiences are going otherwise; just as 
how Diamond (2002) described, "one of the most striking features of the 'late period' 
of the third wave has been the unprecedented growth in the number of regimes that 
are neither clearly democratic nor conventionally authoritarian" (p. 25). 
More specifically, assumptions of the "transition paradigm" challenged by 
Carothers (2002) could also be applied to the experience of Hong Kong. First, the 
transition paradigm regards democratization as simple and direct transition of moving 
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away from dictatorial or authoritarian rule towards democracy, together with political 
liberalization. Actually, the validity of the assumption is doubtful, as many cases 
merely "have taken on a smattering of democratic features but show few signs of 
democratizing much further and are certainly not following any predictable 
democratization script" (Carothers, 2002, p. 14). The lesson of Hong Kong also shows 
that such an assumption is questionable. In terms of political development, after the 
handover, following the political reform endorsed by Governor Patten, there was a 
backlash of democratic development with the establishment of the Provisional 
Legislature. Though a certain proportion of the LegCo was elected by universal 
suffrage, it is unable to challenge the institutional coalition of the state and the 
business sector (Ma, 2007). On the other hand, the Basic Law clearly indicates that 
both the CE and the LegCo would be elected by universal suffrage eventually. Yet, it 
is undeniable that the schedule is being "protracted" (Eisenstadt, 2000). About the 
perspective of political liberalization, various incidents show that people's freedom is 
less protected after the handover. And the state is moving towards a kind of "soft 
authoritarianism" (So, 2002). 
Second, conventional discussion of democratization assumes a kind of sequence 
of democratization. After the opening of authoritarian regime, a breakthrough follows. 
It is after the collapse of the regime when there appears a rapid emergence of a new, 
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democratic system (Carothers, 2002, p. 7). Yet, Carothers (2002) argues that, in many 
cases, it is an extremely gradual and incremental process. Hong Kong fits in the latter 
argument. Ever since there was direct election in the 80s, Hong Kong has been 
undergoing democratization for twenty years. Thus, it is reasonable to doubt if the 
conventional theory of democratization is still the most appropriate concept to be 
applied to Hong Kong. 
Third, the transition paradigm emphasizes too much on the role of election in 
democratization. In many cases, democratic election does not directly bring 
democratic legitimacy or political accountability. Also, political participation of civil 
society may not become active in the movement except for voting regularly 
(Carothers, 2002). Similar observations could also be found in Hong Kong. Though 
there are regular elections of the DC and the LegCo, it brings little role in securing 
political legitimacy of the executive. Besides, there is also a wide gulf between the 
pro-democratic political parties and the civil society of Hong Kong (Ma, 2007). In the 
1 July Rally in 2003, although there were massive participants, less than half of the 
participants agreed that they were mobilized by political parties (Chan, Chung & Lee, 
2004). 
The above arguments show that the transition paradigm is insufficient for a 
satisfactory explanation. On the contrary, this research argues that it IS more 
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appropriate to regard Hong Kong as a competitive authoritarian regime for the sake of 
meaningful understanding of electoral coordination of democrats. 
Hong Kong as a Competitive Authoritarian Regime 
Basically, a competitive authoritarian regIme IS one type of hybrid regIme. 
Frankly, the concept could be understood by respective dimension of "competitive" 
and "authoritarian". 
Competitive authoritarian regImes are civilian regImes In which formal 
democratic institutions are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining 
power, but in which fraud, civil liberties violations, and abused of state and 
media resources so skew the playing field that the regime cannot be labeled 
democratic. Such regimes are competitive, in that democratic institutions are not 
a fa<;ade: the opposition forces can use legal channels to seriously contest for 
(and occasionally win) power; but they are authoritarian in that the opposition 
forces are handicapped by a highly uneven - and even dangerous - playing field. 
Competition is thus real but unfair (Levitsky & Way, 2006, p. 4). 
Empirically, in categorising different kinds of hybrid regimes, Diamond (2002) 
asserts that about 10.9% countries in the world are competitive authoritarian regimes; 
they include Russia, Malaysia, Iran, etc. He finds that "one defining feature of 
competitive authoritarian regimes is the significant parliamentary opposition" (2002, 
p. 29), as a relatively less repressive political atmosphere allows "more political 
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pluralism and civic space" (2002, p. 32). 
In a competitive authoritarian regime, though its autocratic incumbents control 
various means that enable them to manipulate the election results, it is still a bitterly 
fight and the result may be surprising. Actually, it is not a new saying to regard Hong 
Kong as hybrid regime (Scott & Leung, 2004), specifically a competitive 
authoritarian regime (Ma, 2007a, p. 226). Compared with other hybrid regimes, what 
Hong Kong lacks is the "competitive election" and the "democratic quality", while 
other indicators regarding liberty and rule of law are basically satisfied (Ekman, 2009, 
p. 11). Then, in what sense could Hong Kong be regarded as a competitive 
authoritarian regime? Of course, it is undeniable that elections in Hong Kong are 
clean and that the executive does not intervene the elections directly. Yet, when 
talking about "competition is real but unfair", we could argue that, the unfairness 
could be observed from two dimensions. 
First, the institutional constraints refraining the opposition from exerting pressure 
on the executive are unreasonably high. For instance, Article 74 of the Basic Law is 
restraining LegCo members from tabling significant private member's bills in the 
Legislature. Moreover, the "voting-by-group" arrangement is further weakening the 
power of democratic LegCo members, who are mostly elected through the GC, in 
amending any bills proposed by the executive, while members of the FC are elected 
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by undemocratic elections (Ma, 2007a, pp. 117-9). 
On another hand, there is also a high barrier against the opposition running the 
CE election. Instituted in Annex I of the Basic Law, the Electoral Committee is 
responsible for nomination and election of the CE. The Committee is formed by 800 
members, and most of them belong to conservative professionals and business sectors. 
It means that the nomination and the voting of the CE are dominated by pro-Beijing 
representatives. More importantly, members of the Committee have to disclose their 
identity in the nomination of the CE. This further discourages them from nominating 
candidates of the opposition. 
Second, there are obstacles hindering the opposition from bringing their 
advantage into the election game, which could be direct or indirect. For instance, in 
competitive authoritarian regimes, mass media is one of the main arenas of 
contestation. In the regimes, media is often controlled by the state. The opposition 
could only spread their messages through independent and less formal media 
(Levitsky & Way, 2002). Similar experience is also found in Hong Kong. Though 
most media are neither directly controlled by the SAR nor the PRC, their bonding 
with the Mainland is becoming much stronger after the handover, in terms of both 
media ownership and source of revenue. Consequently, stronger self-censorship as 
well as self-restraint is found among the Hong Kong media (Lee, 1998; Lee & Chu, 
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1998; Ma, 2007b). It means that democrats are becoming less able to promote their 
ideas through mainstream media. 
Other than the self-restraints from displaying pro-democratic stance among local 
media, the election regulations also restrict the opposition from making use of their 
advantage such as social appeal of democracy. For instance, the Electoral Affairs 
Commission imposes restrictions upon political promotion in electronic media. This 
restriction is unfavourable for democrats, because pro-government parties such as the 
DAB are relatively stronger in networking and mobilizing grassroot bodies. 
In spite of the unfairness that the opposition is facing, the role of elections as 
well as the legislature In a competitive authoritarian regIme still should not be 
underestimated. Levitsky and Way (2002, 2006) indicate the electoral arena and the 
legislative arena as important spheres of democratic contestation in competitive 
authoritarian reginies.4 As noted. 
In competitive authoritarian regimes, legislatures tend to be relatively weak, but 
they occasionally become focal points of the opposition activity. This is 
particularly likely in cases in which incumbents lack strong majority parties .... 
Even where incumbent executives enjoy large legislative majorities, the 
opposition forces may use the legislature as a place for meeting and organizing 
and (to the extent that an independent media exist) as a public platform from 
which to denounce the regime (2002, pp. 55-6). 
4 Another two arenas are the judicial arena and the media, but they are not included in the discussion. 
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Focusing on Hong Kong, subject to the obstacles against the opposition, there is 
room for them to exert pressure on the executive. First, according to the Basic Law, it 
needs endorsement of a two-thirds majority of the LegCo on any amendment on the 
selection method of the CE as well as the formation of the LegCo. In other words, 
winning a majority of the LegCo is a necessary step for democrats to pursue 
democratization. Also, though the Hong Kong political system is described as 
"executive-led", the role of the LegCo is not as powerless as described (Ma, 2002c). 
At least, institutionally, the passage of bills introduced by the government requires 
endorsement of the LegCo with simple majority votes. It means that if the 
pro-democracy camp wins more than half of the seats in the LegCo, including both 
GC and FC, they could exert substantial pressure on the government by the power to 
veto bills. Third, a victory of the pro-democracy camp in election implies the social 
condemnation against the pro-government camp. Parties of the pro-government camp 
who failing the election may then try to get rid of the negative image of being 
pro-government. The legitimacy crisis experienced by the executive is no less than 
that brought by a mass rally. 
In competitive authoritarian regimes, election and legislature are two important 
arenas of contestation where the oppositions participate. They are the arenas where 
hope and threat co-exists. Subject to various constraints, the opposition could still 
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exert pressure, "liberalize electoral outcome" (Howard & Roessler, 2006), or even 
take over the executive through the election game (Greene, 2007). Thus, the 
meaningful point to discuss is whether the opposition could make use of the arenas 
well, as Howard & Roessler (2006) argue, 
... the strategic decisions made by the opposition - in particular, the decision to 
create a coalition or to jointly support a single candidate, despite significant 
regional, ethnic, or ideological differences and divisions - can have a 
tremendous effect on the electoral process and it result (p. 380). 
When it is proved that there is a significant importance for victory in the LegCo 
election, the next question is, "what is electoral coordination?" According to Cox 
(1997), electoral coordination is of two dimensions: "strategic voting" and "strategic 
entry". Generically, the former is the dimension of voters, while the latter is the 
dimension of candidates. "Strategic voting" refers to the strategy that induces and 
persuades voters to vote for the candidate who has greater chance of winning, rather 
than the candidate whom voters prefer most. "Strategic entry" refers to the 
coordination to minimize the number of candidates to the optimum level. What is 
more, the two dimensions are not mutually exclusive, for instance, persuasion of 
strategic voting could be more successful only when coordination of "strategic entry" 
is achieved. 
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In this research, more emphasis would be given on the dimension of candidates, 
as strategic voting is actually not a common practice by Hong Kong electorates (Ma, 
2002d), and the candidate level is more controllable to the candidates. Detailed 
conceptualization of electoral coordination would be given in Chapter Three. 
Literature Review: Factors behind Performance of Electoral Coordination 
If focus IS only put on the discussion of electoral coordination of the 
pro-democracy camp, it would not be fruitful. Extracted from various literatures, 
factors affecting successfulness of electoral coordination can be categorized as 
followed: effect of the electoral method, constitutional constraints against 
development of political parties, and ideological differences. 
Effect of the Electoral System 
In Political Parties, Their Organization and Activities in the Modern State, 
Duverger (1959) argues that the single winning voting system favours the emergence 
of the two-party system, while PR system makes it less likely. The idea is influential 
and it is also applied in Hong Kong. After the handover, the electoral method of the 
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LegCo election was changed from the SM system to the PR system. Electoral law 
affects the competition strategy and the behavior in an election. Under the PR system, 
because of a larger size of the constituency and the numerous lists of candidates, 
candidates are difficult to distinguish themselves by every dimension of issues. Rather, 
they tend to label themselves by relevant ideologies. Also, under the PR system, 
parties tend to take defensive strategies, as they are more concerned with keeping 
their existing share of votes than taking risks to appeal new marginal voters. 
Consequently, it increases competition among parties with similar stance. As Katz 
(1980) states: 
Under PR each party is rewarded with seats in proportion to its share of the votes. 
Hence its candidates may be expected always to be attempted to maximize that 
share in the easiest way possible. Therefore, they should focus their campaigns 
against the parties whose platforms are most similar to their own (pp. 24-5). 
Since the 1998 LegCo election, the electoral method has been reformed from SM 
system to PR system. Under the PR system, Hong Kong is divided into five 
constituencies. Three to eight seats are to be elected in each constituency in the four 
LegCo elections. Under this system, a candidate list is basic unit of candidate. That is, 
electorates vote on the candidate list, not a particular candidate.5 For each list, seats 
5 For the PR system practiced in Hong Kong, it is possible for list of only one candidate 
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are allocated according to the share of votes and ranking of candidates in the list. The 
greater the share, the larger number of seats are allocated; the higher the candidate is 
ranked, the earlier he/she will have a seat. Furthermore, The Largest Remainder 
method, which is more favourable to small parties and independents, is adopted in the 
PR system. 
Concerning the effect of PR system, Choy and Ma (1999, 2004) made a 
comparison between the two LegCo elections of 1995 and 1998, while the former 
adopted the SM and the latter adopted the PR system. They found that the PR system 
brought intra-camp competition to the pro-democracy camp. Democrats competed 
with each other by claiming their comparative advantages, inducing strategic voting to 
voters and even hostile attack among each other. Then, in the second LegCo election 
of SAR, Choy (2002) and Ma (2001, 2002a) found that the PR introduced divisive 
effect from intra-camp to intra-party, as internal dispute of the DP was more or less 
because of the PR system. For instance, it led to disagreements on the ranking of 
candidate list, quarrels on the number of candidate list, disputes on responsibility zone, 
etc. In other words, the PR system gives no help to facilitate coordination of 
democrats in elections; instead, it makes coordination more difficult and leads to 
internal dispute of the camp. 
Concerning the effect of the electoral method, Kreuzer (2000) argues that, the 
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higher the engineering cost under the given electoral method, the more the candidates 
rely on the political parties. However, Choy and Ma (2004) observed a reverse case. 
They argue that, the Largest Remainder method accompanying the PR system favours 
independents to run election instead of large parties, while it is very difficult for a 
candidate at the second place of the candidate list to get enough remaining votes to 
get a seat. Also, regulations of the Election Affairs Commission do not recognize the 
importance of political parties during elections (Ma, 2007a, pp. 145-7). 
In spite of its common use, the problem with the explanation by electoral method 
is also worth discussing. It assumes that the democrats are merely an object of the 
electoral method. Indeed, this explanation is backed up by one basic question, "if 
rational candidates were designing a party with no aim in mind other than maximizing 
their own chances of election and reelection, what would it be like?" (Katz, 1980, p. 
17). Apparently, this assumption is more valid in conventional democratic states. In 
the situation of Hong Kong, winning in the LegCo election never means winning the 
real executive power. Being a state where democratization is restrained, democrats are 
simultaneously fighting for democracy as well as seats in LegCo. And, obviously, the 
former is expected to weigh more than the latter. As some democrats believe, taking 
seats in the LegCo is a means of fighting for democracy. Under this context, it is 
unconvincing to assume that winning in election is their sole purpose. 
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Plus, if taking this structure-determined explanation, any coordination should be 
expected to be a failure. However, as argued in the following chapters, there is 
variation in the level of coordination among democrats in different elections. It means 
that, though the explanation of electoral method can explain the differences in 
coordination compared to those before the handover, it is not enough to be the only 
factor, facing the variations in different elections. 
Lastly, going back to initiation of the rule setting, the PR was in fact not a 
preferred option for members of the Preparatory Committee and some senior Chinese 
officials. To them, the Multiple-seats, One vote system was much better for dividing 
the democrats, and they even worry that the PR would strengthen party solidarity 
(1999b). Therefore, from various perspectives, explaining the level of coordination of 
the pro-democracy camp by electoral method only is inadequate. 
Constitutional Constraints against Political Parties 
Another factor affecting coordination of the pro-democracy camp begins with the 
anti-party stance of the PRC. Since the Basic Law was being drafted in late 80s, the 
PRC had tried to limit the role of political parties in Hong Kong politics, in order to 
restrict development of popular parties which were anti-communist enthusiasts. 
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According to the Chief Executive Election Ordinance, any candidate winning to be 
the CE is required to publicly declare that he is not a member of any political party. In 
order words, the CE is not allowed to have any political affiliation. Plus, the CE 
would not appoint party members to be major officials. In case they were appointed, 
they would be suggested to withdraw from the party. These arrangements ensure 
political parties to be distant from real executive power. 
The constraints against the development of political parties hinder successful 
electoral coordination of the pro-democracy camp in the follow dimensions. First, the 
constraints imply that a seat in the LegCo is the highest position which members of 
pro-democracy parties can achieve. Unless senior members of the parties are willing 
to withdraw from LegCo election, otherwise they need to put big effort to handle 
potential discontent from the less senior party members. Second, the measures 
separating political parties from executive power discourage the business sector and 
the public from donating to the parties. To explain why the pro-democracy camp 
faced more severe internal struggle than pro-government camp did in LegCo elections, 
Choy and Ma (2004) argue that the scarce resource of the pro-democracy camp is a 
possible reason. 
However, if the pro-democracy camp is identified as an activist group fighting 
for democracy, the above argument is rather strange. Indeed, common sense tells us 
28 
that no authoritarian ruling regime would actively open executive power for the 
opposition. Being an undemocratic ruling regime, it is normal for the PRC to make 
the pro-democracy camp distant from the executive power. Thus, following the track, 
a more appropriate issue to study should be whether the pro-democracy camp has 
sufficient incentive to gain larger negotiation power in bargaining for more executive 
power in the government. 
Ideological Difference of Pro-democracy parties 
Parties and political groups of the pro-democracy camp are described as full of 
ideological differences, and the differences are one of the factors discouraging 
successful electoral coordination of the pro-democracy camp. 
In the study of power struggle of the DP in the 2000 LegCo election, Ma (2001, 
2002a) explained that ideological conflict between the Mainstreamers and Young 
Turks was one of the key factors leading to the internal split of the party, while the 
former was more inclined to interests of middle class, the latter was more 
pro-grassroots. Then, in the study of strategic coordination of the pro-democracy 
camp in the 2004 LegCo election, Ma (2006) also suggests that ideological difference 
of different parties and candidates is one of the factors making the coordination not so 
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successful. 
To justify the ideological difference of democrats, Lau and Kuan (2000) put 
emphasis on "foundation moment" of the parties which was introduced by Panebianco 
(1988). In the analysis of institutionalization of political parties, he focused on how 
history affects party's organizational characteristics: 
A party's organizational characteristics depend more upon its history, i.e. on how 
the organization originated and how it consolidated, than upon any other factor. 
The characteristics of party's origin are in fact capable of exerting a weight on its 
organizational structure even decades later. Every organization bears the mark of 
its formation, of the crucial political-administrative decisions made by its 
founders, the decisions which "molded" the organization (1988, p. 50). 
Besides, LaPalombara and Weiner (1966) concerned that historical moment even 
affects evolution of party system: 
It has been suggested that the way in which political elites copy with such 
crises ... may determine the kind of political system which develops. The point we 
shall stress is that such historical crises not only often provide the context in 
which political parties first emerge but also tend to be a critical factor in 
determining what pattern of evolution parties later take (p. 14). 
Lau and Kuan (2000) argued that, ideological characteristics of parties, which 
were molded by their "foundation moment", was constraining them from adapting to 
a new political environment. For instance, when the DP was established with political 
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cleavage with strong anti-communist sentiment, it was difficult for them to adapt to a 
new environment of which socio-economic cleavage was more significant. 
So, with ideological difference of political parties which was justified by the 
"foundation moment" argument (Lau & Kuan, 2000), explanation of unsuccessful 
coordination among democrats by ideological difference (Ma 2001, 2002a, 2006) 
seems to be reasonable. 
Yet, though the argument could explain why a party stands for particular 
ideology, it gives no direct relation whether the pro-democracy camp would make 
successful electoral coordination or not. In fact, ideology of party could be merely 
claimant than actual motivation behind their actions (Kim, 1997). So, ideological 
difference may be merely a justification for democrats to be uncooperative in the 
coordination. 
Plus, even though there may be ideological differences among parties, it IS 
doubtful whether Hong Kong political spectrum is large enough to have room for 
political groups to take different stances. On this view, Lo (1998a) argues that 
political spectrum of Hong Kong is really narrow, and potential differences among 
parties are not as large as claimed. 
Last but not least, the composition of the pro-democracy camp in 2004 showed 
more complicated ideological difference than that in 1998, but their coordination in 
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2004 was more successful than that in 1998.6 Following this logic, consistency of the 
above argument was doubtful. 
Summary 
This chapter serves to set out the basis of discussion. Basically, activists under 
the label of the pro-democracy camp has found for more than twenty years. From the 
transition period to the post-handover Hong Kong, they were urging for adoption of 
democracy as soon as possible. Being a competitive authoritarian regime, democrats 
are subject to electoral game which is real but unfair in certain dimensions. But still, it 
is one of the chief arenas of contestation. And, well-practiced electoral coordination is 
essential for victory In the contestation. Concerning performance of electoral 
coordination, the role of the PR, the constitutional constraints and ideological 
difference are discussed. Indeed, they are all insufficient to be convIncIng 
explanations. In the next chapter, there is more detailed conceptualization of electoral 
coordination, and some independent variables would be identified, in order to explore 
more satisfactory explanations for the varying degree of electoral coordination of the 
pro-democracy camp. 
6 The difference of level of coordination between 1998 LegCo election and 2004 LegCo election was 
to be discussed in following chapters. 
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Chapter 3 Theory and Hypotheses 
This IS an exploratory research, which alms at exploring possible factors 
affecting electoral coordination of the pro-democracy camp in the LegCo elections, 
except the institutionalist argument and reason of ideological difference discussed in 
Chapter Two. 
This chapter would first conceptualize and operationalize the key dependent 
variable of the research, i.e. electoral coordination. Then, independent variables would 
be identified. Justification of selected independent variables would also be provided. 
In the last section of this chapter, the research method and the source of evidence 
would be discussed. 
What is Electoral Coordination? Conceptualization and Operationalization of 
Dependent Variables 
Cox (1997) defines electoral coordination as "a reduction in the number of 
competitors' (p. 5) as well as 'a selection of which competitors will survive" (p. 5).7. 
More than that, leading the opposition of a competitive authoritarian regime, 
7 To Cox (1997), in an election of an M-seats district, 'M+ 1 ' is always the most preferred number of 
candidates or lists, in order to induce the most effective strategic voting. 
33 
democrats are also expected to perform as united camp, in order to maintain the moral 
appeal of leading the opposition (Burns, 1978) and to keep being attractive to activists 
of the democratic movement (Greene, 2002). Following the latter idea, it should be 
noted that a consolidated coalition of the opposition is important for preventing the 
ruling regIme from either USIng patronage to induce people voting for them or 
dividing the opposition. It could also make the ruling regIme less able to abuse 
manipulation in the election and more able to mobilize people voting against the 
regime (Howard & Roessler, 2006). In spite of the above expected desirable outcome 
of successful coordination, intra-camp competition is inevitable under the current 
electoral system. Thus, this research adopts a broader definition of electoral 
coordination than that of Cox. It defines electoral coordination as various levels of 
cooperation of democrats aiming at maximizing the pro-democracy camp's chance of 
winning of through making consensus on electoral strategies. It mainly serves two 
functions. First, it serves to maximize the winning opportunity of democrats under the 
PR; second, it serves to promote an image of unity of the pro-democracy camp. 
To measure the opposition cohesion in competitive authoritarian regimes, which 
is part of the opposition capacity, Levitsky and Way (2003) identify the cohesion in 
three levels. 
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In cases of high cohesion, virtually major the opposition groups are organized 
into single party or coalition. In cases of medium cohesion, the opposition 
parties are fragmented but are not deeply divided along ideological, ethnic or 
other lines. The absence of deep cleavages makes it more likely that they will be 
able to unite into broad anti-authoritarian coalitions during elections or 
moments of regime crisis. In case of low cohesion, the opposition parties are 
deeply divided along ideological, ethnic, or regional lines. In such cases, the 
opposition parties often oppose each other as much, if not more, than they do 
the party in power, which seriously inhibits the formation of broad 
anti-authoritarian coalitions (pp. 9-10). 
The idea of Levitsky and Way (2003) is insightful for delineating different levels 
of electoral coordination. To fit it to the discussion of the electoral coordination, the 
concepts "single party or coalition" of high cohesion and "broad anti -authoritarian 
coalitions" of medium cohesion are pinpointed. In the comIng discussion of the 
electoral coordination, the "single party or coalition" is practiced as an organized 
coordination and willingness to follow decision for betterment of the pro-democracy 
camp as a whole, With reference to the two purposes of coordination mentioned, 
maximization of winning opportunity is a practical purpose and it is more difficult 
achieve as it involves actual trade-off to certain candidates. So Levitsky and Way's 
(2003) concept of "high cohesion" of the opposition could be applied. 
1. To minimize number of candidate lists. It serves to maximize wInnIng 
opportunity of democrats under the PR. It is the most effective direction of 
coordination. In the cases, it is to observe if number of candidate lists of 
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democrats could maintain at optimum level. 
2. To encourage inter-party vote division. It serves to maXImIze wInnIng 
opportunity of democrats under the PR. When inter-party vote division is 
done, pro-democratic votes can be utilized most effectively under the PR. 
Besides, to split candidate lists and to conduct inter-party vote division is a 
more preferred way to mInImIze the waste of votes under the largest 
remainder method. I would see whether any agreement of vote division 
among democrats was made; if they have any particular target to conduct 
inter-party vote division; and whether the agreement was successfully 
executed. More than that, practice of unilateral vote division would also be 
noted. That is, whether any candidate persuaded voters to do inter-party vote 
division without consent of other democrats; how they conducted unilateral 
vote division; whether any particular candidate was targeted. 
The second dimension focuses on the idea "broad anti-authoritarian coalition" of 
medium cohesion. Putting it to the context of electoral coordination, it concerns the 
general image of unity of the pro-democracy camp, as an united camp represents 
consolidated force against the pro-government camp, especially when the election is 
regarded as part of the democratic movement. In the coordination, the concern on 
positive image of the camp may limit the strategy of certain democrats. Yet, compared 
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with the above two, it is easier to achieve while the result is also substantial. So, under 
the whole scale of electoral coordination, the following two attributes are less 
significant than the above two. 
3. To minimize open mutual attack among democrats. It serves to maintain and 
promote a positive image of pro-democracy with image of unity. Mutual 
attack is one kind of intra-camp competition in Hong Kong style PR (Choy & 
Ma, 1999). Basically, any open criticism to other democrats which aimed at 
weakening their popular support can be regarded as mutual attack. For the 
cases, I would observe if they have any particular targets to criticize; how the 
frequency of mutual attack was; and what the main points of criticisms were. 
In more details, the intensity of mutual attacks is concerned. Low intensity 
mutual attack is mild and rare, which may not even be aware. That of 
medium intensity occupIes considerable proportion of time, and 
disagreement of the candidates could be easily notified. High intensity 
mutual attack is that dominating the election forum, and hostility between 
candidates could be easily sensed. 
4. To form united electoral platform of the pro-democracy camp, and avoid 
indirect mutual attack in their electoral platforms. It also serves to maintain 
and promote a positive image of the pro-democracy camp. Image of unity is 
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of prior importance. The point of observation is whether any united electoral 
platform was made; whether they showed strong disagreement among each 
other on the platforms. 
Based on the above operationalization of electoral coordination, it is going to see 
that, when the components "to minimize number of candidate lists" and "to encourage 
inter-party vote division" is achieved, the coordination is more inclined to show high 
opposition cohesion. Correspondingly, when these two components could not be 
achieved but another two, i.e. "to minimize open mutual attack among democrats" 
and "to form united electoral platform of the pro-democracy camp" are done, the 
coordination is more inclined to be having medium opposition cohesion. 
Identifying Independent Variables 
Determinants of the Opposition Coalition: An Unfinished Project 
This research explores factors behind the varied levels of electoral coordination, 
which is one of the most important tasks of the opposition coalition. In the research 
about the electoral outcomes of competitive authoritarian regimes, in spite of the 
observation that a strong opposition coalition leads to "liberalized electoral outcome", 
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Howard and Roessler (2006) noted that research about detenninants of the opposition 
coalition is lacking. It is still a piece of uncultivated ground. 
In order to suggest relevant independent variables of the study, implications of 
Hong Kong as a competitive authoritarian regime should be noticed. First, though 
democrats are actively participating in the LegCo election, it should also be 
emphasized that, they are far from politicians of real democratic states. In a 
competitive authoritarian regime, democrats of Hong Kong are the opposition against 
the ruling regime, and are urging for more democracy. Under this political context, the 
LegCo election is an arena of the "two-level game" (Schedler, 2002). Being the 
opposition, they run the elections to derive legal delegation of power and certain 
resources, but it is not the end. Therefore, any factors leading to change in the role of 
the LegCo election would also influence the level of coordination significantly. 
Second, while Hong Kong is an undemocratic state of which progress of 
democratization IS promised constitutionally, pro-democracy/conservative IS 
inevitably the main component of the political cleavage. Based on this cleavage, the 
agenda of pro-democracy could be justified, and more importantly, the role of the 
LegCo election as one of the arenas of contestation was also built upon the cleavage. 
In terms of election campaign, it acts as a simple issue that every democrat could 
engage In. 
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Therefore, to identify the independent variables of the study, whether they would 
affect role of the LegCo as arena of contestation is the chief concern. Here, three 
independent variables, I.e. political dissatisfaction, economIC performance, and 
prospect of democracy will be introduced. 
Political Dissatisfaction 
In a broad sense, political dissatisfaction is one of the attributes of political 
culture. For the latter, there are numerous literatures and researches on different 
dimensions, ranging from social attitude to democracy and political parties (Lau, 2000; 
Lau & Kuan, 1995) to general political orientation of Hong Kong people (Lau & 
Kuan, 2002c). Yet, for an election campaign, short term social sentiment of political 
dissatisfaction is more relevant. When there is strong political dissatisfaction against 
the ruling executive, it is expected that voters are more intended to achieve certain 
political changes through election. Also, hypothetically, strong political dissatisfaction 
enables democrats to coordinate more easily as they could attract voters and erode 
legitimacy of the executive by a simple anti-government slogan, which is the basic 
appeal of the opposition (Howard & Roessler, 2006; Step an, 1990). Also, a large 
number of voters who are strongly dissatisfied with the ruling executive means more 
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potential voters, who may not vote for the pro-democracy camp in normal situation, 
may vote for the camp. Thus, under this political atmosphere it is expected that 
democrats would be more intended to give up their radical stance and work together 
for electoral coordination (Greene, 2002, 2007) in order to capture that pool of 
median voters. In other words, strong political discontent of the public provides a 
centripetal force to facilitate electoral coordination, and the following hypothesis 
could thus be made: 
HI: There is higher level of electoral coordination under strong political 
discontent of the public. 
To measure political dissatisfaction, attributes relating to social attitude towards 
the SAR government and Beijing Central Government, and people's appraisal of the 
commonly believed core value of Hong Kong, are taken for the research. Substantially, 
the following indexes surveyed by the Public Opinion Programme would be observed: 
People's support rating of the CE; 
People's trust in the HKSAR government; 
People's trust in the Beijing Central Government; 
People's satisfaction with the current political condition; 
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People's appraisal of degree of democracy; 
People's appraisal of degree of freedom; 
People's appraisal of degree of freedom of speech; 
People's appraisal of degree of rule of law. 
Economic Performance 
In the study of democratization, it has been noticed that rapid economic crisis 
undermines support of authoritarian regimes (Huntington, 1991). On another hand, in 
a regular election, short-term economic performance influences voter's view to 
economic condition directly, especially when economic performance is the key factor 
influencing their choice to the incumbents during an election (Lewis-Beck & 
Stegmaier, 2000). In Hong Kong, it is easy to notice that Issues of economic 
performance had been increasingly important since the economic downturn in 1998, 
together with the growing problem of poverty. To the SAR government without 
legitimacy of democratic delegation, economic depression and poverty problems 
easily lead to a legitimacy crisis. To democrats, economic problems give them 
opportunity to expose a certain "dark-side" of the undemocratic government, for 
example, to appeal issues of state-business collusion to the pUblic. However, the effect 
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of economic performance on the level of electoral coordination is not as direct as that 
of political dissatisfaction. The concept of the opposition in competitive authoritarian 
regimes is built with domination of incumbent. When an economic issue overrides 
and dominates a political issue, the common platform of the opposition is weakened. 
Economic issues are indeed more complicated than a single issue of democracy, of 
which the ruling regime is always their common enemy. Indeed, the shift of Hong 
Kong's social cleavage in the early post-handover period is discussed as one of the 
factors leading to internal split of the DP (Lau & Kuan, 2000; Ma, 2001), as different 
factions of the DP had different views on the bill of minimum wage. 
To generate a relevant hypothesis of which electoral coordination is the 
dependent variable concerned, instead of looking into detailed numbers of economic 
statistical data, people's perception to the economic performance would be noted. 
H2: Strong public's dissatisfaction to economic performance weakens levels 
of electoral coordination, unless it comes together with strong political 
dissatisfaction. 
The below indexes surveyed by the Public Opinion Programme are taken into 
account: 
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People's concerned on political problems, compared with people's 
concerned on economic problems; 
People's satisfaction with the current economic condition. 
Prospect of Democracy 
In exploring factors affecting the candidate-selection procedure, Field and 
Siavelis (2008) argues that the contrast of political uncertainty between transitional 
polity and institutionalized democracy makes a difference. They posit that, political 
uncertainty in transitional polity enables greater opportunity and incentive for party 
leaders to attain larger leadership control in candidate selection, and it thus 
encourages smaller electorates. 
Considering candidate selection as part of coordination proj ect, the argument of 
Field and Siavelis (2008) brings importance of political uncertainty into consideration. 
In Hong Kong, though full democracy as target of electoral refonn is clearly stated in 
the Basic Law, it is on another hand a "protracted" one (Eisenstadt, 2000). When it is 
a constitutional requirement which apparently admits that Hong Kong is still far from 
democracy, ironically, the ruling executive has no convincing excuse to make any step 
backward. Consequently, it is always legitimate for the pro-democracy camp to ask 
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for greater progress of democratization. The point is how the PRC responds to the 
voice. There is an underlying political uncertainty of the Hong Kong political 
environment. 
Then, how to delineate the concept political uncertainty is the next point to 
explain. Indeed, the prospect of democracy could be regarded as a confirmed one no 
matter it is clearly approved or clearly vetoed. Thus, referring to Hong Kong political 
context, the political uncertainty should be closely related to attitude of the PRC, in 
terms of their positive and negative attitude to Hong Kong's prospect of democracy. 
In this research, the prospect of democracy refers to the PRC's notice about when 
could Hong Kong adopt democracy, which includes universal suffrage for selection of 
the CE and formation of the LegCo. A more substantial and confirmed time approved 
by the PRC means a more positive attitude to Hong Kong's prospect of democracy. 
On this respect, some democrats doubted if the PRC were making the decision 
sincerely. Yet, when the real intention of the PRC was out of the research area, 
people's perception of their intention is more important. There will be further 
elaboration on this concern in the following chapters. Based on this definition of 
prospect of democracy, three phases of the evolution are noted. 
1. July 1997 to April 2004: On April 2004, the SCNPC announced their 
decision which vetoed any hope of having universal suffrage for selection of 
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the CE in 2007 and the LegCo in 2008. Before the announcement was made, 
from the general interpretation of the Basic Law, there was belief among 
public that there would be universal suffrage for the selection of the CE and 
the LegCo in 2007/ 08, at least it was constitutionally possible. The point was, 
neither the PRC nor the SAR showed clear intention of having it adopted. It 
means that, before the decision was made, the PRC's attitude to the prospect 
of Hong Kong democratic development was ambiguous. 
2. April 2004 to December 2007: because of the decision made by the SCNPC 
in 2004, the common belief upon the target of democratic development was 
refuted. With the original belief broken, the schedule of Hong Kong 
achieving democracy becomes a doubt of the Hong Kong society. Before the 
SCNPC made further decision on December 2007, the PRC's attitude to the 
prospect of democracy was basically negative. 
3. Since December 2007: on December 2007, the SCNPC decided that Hong 
Kong people could elect their CE through universal suffrage on 201 7, as well 
as the LegCo on 2020. Indeed, it was the clearest timetable and declaration of 
attitude of the PRC on Hong Kong democratic development issued since the 
handover, in spite of the reasonable doubt whether the PRC was promising 
democracy sincerely. In other words, their attitude to the prospect of 
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democracy had been the most positive since December 2007. 
When prospect of democracy is negative, the level of electoral coordination is 
expected to be influenced in two ways. First, the LegCo election is more important in 
being the arena of contestation as it could prevent the ruling executive from 
integrating with other actors, and it is a powerful means for them to gain negotiation 
power to the SAR Government. Second, according to the argument of Field and 
Siavelis (2008), political uncertainty enables party leaders with greater influence in 
the coordination.8 In other words, the PRC's negative attitude to the prospect of 
democracy is expected to induce better electoral coordination. 
H3: There is higher level electoral coordination when the PRC's attitude to 
the prospect of Hong Kong's democracy is negative. 
Further Analytical Dimensions 
The above three hypotheses are based on the unique role of the LegCo election 
as an arena of contestation in a competitive authoritarian regime. It aims at exploring 
possible relation between performance of electoral coordination and the macro 
8 When the pro-democracy camp is a loose alliance of various political groups instead of particular 
political party, 'party leaders' notified by Field and Siavelis (2008) could be considered as significant 
and leading characters of the camp. 
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context of the election. Other than that, focusing on candidate's behaviour in election 
game, in Making Votes Count (1997), Cox identifies two potential factors that may 
affect level of electoral coordination, i.e. long-tenn perspective of candidates and 
value of party endorsement. Though they are not part of the literature of competitive 
authoritarian regime, they are worth regarding as part of the additional discussion. 
Long-term Perspective a/Candidates 
Cox argues that certain candidates may run in election for long-tenn perspective. 
They may enter the election not aim at winning in that particular run, but to establish 
reputation and credibility for better run next time. 
Instead of being a one-stage coordination game, in which potential entrants 
_ jostle for position in the context of well-established expectations about viability, 
it is a multi stage coordination game, in which an indefinite string of future 
elections is to be held, and expectations of viability may either be 
well-established (p. 158). 
The point of Cox is clear. Some candidates would not be bothered by the 
winning chance of the first entry, and not willing to withdraw. It means that, for those 
candidates who have long tenn prospective of their career as politicians, they are less 
willing to withdraw. To put the argument into analysis, it is reasonable to assume that 
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the first try of independent candidates and political groups is more likely to be driven 
by calculation of long-term perspective than the intention to coordinate with others. 
Thus, this research is also trying to see if fresh runners would really be hindering the 
performance of electoral coordination. 
Here, a fresh runner is defined as a candidate who either (1) never runs in 
pervious LegCo elections, no matter on behalf of political group or independent or, (2) 
comes from different constituencies. 
Value of Party Endorsement 
Next, Cox argues that, if voters could clearly define who the viable candidates 
are and who are not, strategic coordination could be conducted more easily. Then, the 
chief question is who has the "reputations for viability" (1997, p. 159). Cox suggests 
that it is a matter of value concerning party endorsement. Party endorsement works on 
voters in two ways. First, it informs voters that the candidates with endorsement 
legitimately stand for the issues and belief that the party supports. Second, use of 
party endorsement could avoid voters from splitting their votes to other candidates 
with similar ideology. So, the endorsement is attractive to candidates in the sense that, 
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To the extent that they convey information regarding the policy beliefs of 
candidates, and voters are rationally ignorant, they will carry along with them a 
certain mass of habitual followers (p. 159). 
According to him, the value of endorsement of a particular party affects the entry 
intention of candidates without the endorsement, while a successful endorsement acts 
as a "focal coordination device" to some voters (p. 159) and it directly affects the 
winning opportunity of those out of the endorsement. Following the logic, the high 
value of endorsement of a particular pro-democracy party is an incentive for other 
democrats to conduct electoral coordination with that party. 
Theoretically, the level of party identification is a useful measurement the value 
of party endorsement. Yet, party identification is too low or too unstable to be reliable 
indicator in Hong Kong (Louie 1993, 1996; Sun 1999). Also, besides the data 
gathered in the first LegCo election (Sun, 1999), similar research is lacked. With these 
concerns, the value of party endorsement is conceptualized as public support of a 
political party/ political group. And this research is going to see whether the party 
with exceptionally strong public support, if there was, induced better electoral 
coordination. 
About the source of data, though large-scale research about party identification is 
lacked, the Public Opinion Programme conducts regular surveys about popular rating 
of political groups and political parties. When the survey is conducted constantly with 
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sufficient sample size, the popular rating could be seen as measurement of the value 
of endorsement. 
Research Method 
Case study research is applied in the study. It aims at understanding the level of 
coordination of the pro-democracy camp in the four elections after the handover, i.e. 
the proposed dependent variables. As a case study research, it collects evidence and 
information from various sources including: 
TV electoral debates. It tries to generate situation of mutual attack among 
democrats from TV electoral debates of the four elections. They were held 
by three electronic media, which are the RTHK, the Cable TV and the NOW 
TV; 
Promotion leaflet and pamphlets of candidates. From the materials, 
electoral platforms of candidates, their strategies of vote division, and 
mutual attack could be demonstrated. The materials are collected from the 
sharing of Prof. Wilson Wong and Prof. Ma Ngok, the promotional election 
website of political parties and candidates, the website of the Registration 
and Election Office and Facebook of the candidates; 
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Newspaper clips. It helps to articulate chief open conflicts and disagreement 
among democrats In vanous elections. Candidates' opInIon on electoral 
coordination could also be found in newspaper clips. 
Interview with candidates. To understand the dynamics of candidates in the 
2004 LegCo elections In more details, interviews with Chu Yiu-ming, 
Andrew To and Emily Lau were conducted. 
The Public Opinion Programme. It is the main source to collect data about 
mass political culture and people's attitude to economIC condition In 
different period. Moreover, to indicate effect of social sentiment accurately, 
only first half of the years 1998, 2000, 2004 and 2008 are counted, as 
promotion and elections are mostly taken place in second half of the years. 
Also, only second half of 1997 is counted as it is the time after the 
handover. 
Research articles and literature are used as secondary source of 
information. 
Summary 
The research tends to explore possible explanations for the variation of degree of 
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electoral coordination of the pro-democracy camp. In this chapter, the dependent 
variable, i.e. level of electoral coordination, is conceptualized in the light of the three 
levels of the opposition cohesion mentioned by Levitsky and Way (2003), together 
with two core purposes of the coordination, which are to maintain and promote a 
positive image of pro-democracy with a sense of unity and to maximize the winning 
opportunity of democrats under the PR system. Then, from the literature of Field and 
Siavelis (2008), a large pool of potential of determinants is listed. Of course, not all of 
them could be directly applied. With reference to the Hong Kong political context, 
five hypotheses are generated. Also, adopting a case study method, multiple sources 
of information about the four LegCo elections after the handover will be collected. 
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Chapter 4 · 1998 & 2000 Legislative Council Elections 
This chapter serves to demonstrate the behaviour of democrats in the LegCo 
elections of 1998 and 2000. First of all, there will be a review on the background of 
the elections corresponding to the identified independent variables. Then, detail of 
each election would be gone through. 
Also, as the 1998 and the 2000 LegCo election Came very close to each other 
with similar political and economic background, they are therefore put together in this 
chapter. 
Background of Elections 
~egCo elections of both 1998 and 2000 took place in the early period of 
thepost-handover Hong Kong. The 1998 LegCo election was the first subsequent to 
the 'new stove' set up by the PRC, i.e. the Provisional Legislature, which was 
considered to be illegitimate and undemocratic. Also, several legal and political 
incidents in that period led to the tough examination of the newly adopted "One 
Country Two Systems". More importantly, Hong Kong began to experience prolonged 
and severe economic downturn in 1998. In this section, I would review the 
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background of the LegCo election 1998 and 2000, which \also demonstrates the 
independent variables introduced in the previous chapter. 
Political Dissatisfaction 
Survey shows that people's sentiment to the political environment of the early 
post-colonial period was quite ambivalent. In terms of the level of trust, both the SAR 
government and the Beijing Central government were not trustworthy to Hong Kong 
people. Their trust to the SAR government fell drastically from 52.1 of 1997 to 37.2 
of the first half of 1998. Though it increased to 41.5 in 2000, there was still significant 
difference compared to that before the handover (see Appendix 11). Moreover, 
people's trust in the Beijing Central government was at its lowest level (28.7) in 1998. 
In 2000, it increased to 31.9, but the figure was still far from satisfactory (see 
Appendix Ill) . Third, people's rating on the first CE of the SAR, Tung Chee-hwa, was 
disappointing. The rating fell from 64.8 of 1997 to 58.8 in 1998. Indeed, the poor 
leadership of Tung was a point of concern. In 2000, his rating further fell to 53.7 (see 
Appendix I). 
Even though Hong Kong people did not trust both governments and they were 
increasingly dissatisfied with the CE, we could not conclude that they were very 
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discontented to the political environment. In 1998, there were only 25% respondents 
replied that they were dissatisfied with the political condition, while there was 28.7% 
in 2000, which was also a small proportion (see Appendix IV). In the early post-
handover period, when the One Country Two Systems was just on trial, whether the 
PRC would interfere Hong Kong internal affairs was inevitably the chief concern of 
the Hong Kong society. So it is convincing to argue that, in spite of the low level of 
trust in the SAR government and the Beijing CentraL Government, plus the falling 
rating of the first CE, Hong Kong people were generally satisfied with the political 
condition mainly because the PRC could keep an attitude of non-interference towards 
Hong Kong internal affairs. 
Concerning people's appraisal of the degree of core values of Hong Kong, except 
freedom of speech9, all other three (freedom, rule of law, degree of democracy) 
showed obvious decrease after the handover. Indeed, the data was consistent with the 
above observation that the level of trust of Hong Kong people to the SAR government 
and the Central Government was low. Hong Kong people generally worried that the 
important core-value of Hong Kong would deteriorate under sovereignty of the PRC. 
More than that, certain incidents taken place after the handover were inducing people 
to think that the core-value was on the edge of diminishing. Changes of various 
9 The Public Opinion Program is no data of the item 'freedom of speech' before the handover. 
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ratings of the period is found in Appendix VI, 
About the rule of law, Chen describes the year 1999 as "the most eventful year of 
the legal history of the Hong Kong SAR" (2002, p. 75). Actually, since 1998, several 
incidents had put people's confidence of rule of law on uneasy test. In 1998, the 
decision of the Secretary for Justice of not charging Sally Aw, who was suspected of 
defrauding advertisers, aroused public to doubt the neutrality of the Secretary for 
Justice. After the saga, the survey of the Hong Kong Policy Research Institute showed 
that, people's confidence towards legal system of the SAR fell drastically from the 
rating 100.3 to 68.7 (,The Business Sector', 1999). In the same year, the controversy 
whether the criminal Cheung Tze-keung should be returned from China to Hong 
Kong for trial introduced the controversial isuue of autonomy of Hong Kong 
jurisdiction. More seriously, in 1999, the right of abode case led to the first 
interpretation of the Basic Law by the NPCSC, which refuted the original decision 
made by the CFA. The action of the NPCSC produced substantial implication that the 
Basic Law, being the mini -constitution of Hong Kong, might not be able to secure the 
function of the One Country Two Systems when the basis of legal autonomy of Hong 
Kong was so fragile. 
Experiencing the incidences, there was an obvious fall in people's appraisal of 
the degree of rule of law since the handover to 2000. In the first half of 1997, the 
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rating was 7.17, then it fell to 6.97 just after the handover. In 1998, it further dropped 
to 6.62 and it became 6.52 in 2000. 
Degree of freedom and degree of freedom of speech are other important points to 
describe. When Hong Kong was unified with another sovereignty which lacked 
freedom, preservation of freedom and freedom of speech of Hong Kong was an 
appealing issue to Hong Kong people. In the second half of 1997, people's appraisal 
of degree of freedom dropped from 7.65 to 7.31. In the early post-handover period, 
the change was to a great extent reflecting people's mistrust towards the governments. 
Then, in the coming years, though the rating did not fall obviously, some incidents 
such as government's criticism agaisnt the RTHK and the Cable TV, and the dispute 
of the Public Order Ordinance aroused public awareness on freedom and freedom of 
speech in Hong Kong. In 1998, people's appraisal of degree of freedom of speech and 
freedom were 7.02 and 7.06 respectively. In 2000, they both increased to 7.13 and 
7.32 respectively. 
Among the appraisal of the four core values, people gave the most pessimistic 
reply to the degree of democracy. After the handover, though there was the CE elected 
by the so-called representatives of Hong Kong people, formation of the provisional 
Legislature in the first year after the handover, in addition to the amended electoral 
method of the FC in the first LegCo election, gave a direct message to Hong Kong 
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people that quality of democracy was diminishing. So it was unsurpnSlng that 
people's appraisal of degree of democracy fell from 6.7 in the first half of 1997, to 
6.06 in 1998, and then 6.02 in 2000. 
Economic Performance 
The year 1998 was a beginning of a depressing economic cycle after decades of 
strong economic growth. The sharp rises of unemployment rate as well as the number 
of negative equity were dominating public opinion of Hong Kong. In 1997, the 
unemployment rate was only 2.20/0. In 1998, it climbed to 4.7% and then 6.2% in 
1998. Subject to the worsening economic environment, significant proportion of 
people regard the economic problems as the most concerned issue in 1998 (66.2%) 
and 2000 (63.3%). It was a sharp increase when compared to the time of the handover 
(40.90/0) (see Appendix V). Very consistently, in the first half of 1998, there was 
71.1 % of the population who were dissatisfied with the economic condition, which 
was a double of that during time of the handover (35.4%) and it was a significant 
majority. In 2000, there was still 63% of the population reflecting dissatisfaction to 
the economic condition (see Appendix IV). 
Since the economic downturn appeared, percentage of people dissatisfied with 
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the economIC condition showed diverged difference compared with that of the 
political condition. For instance, during the time of the handover, the difference was 
only 9.6%. Then, in the first half of 1998, the difference was 46.1 %, while they were 
360/0 in 1999 and 34.3% respectively. Indeed, the figure, together with the above 
description of mass political culture and economic performance implies that, people's 
dissatisfaction on the economic environment and poor governance did not lead to 
strong request for political reform. As shown in the figure, even though people's 
dissatisfaction on economic condition rose rapidly, there was no corresponding 
increase in the dissatisfaction of political condition. 
Prospect of Democracy 
According to Annex I and Annex 11 of the Basic Law, it was constitutionally 
possible for universal suffrage of the CE and the LegCo on 2007 and 2008 
respectively. Basically, when the Basic Law was issued in the 90's, there was a kind of 
consensus and belief among Hong Kong people that there would be full democracy in 
Hong Kong in 20071 08. In 2000, Jasper Tsang, president of the DAB, also stated that 
they were preparing for a democratic Hong Kong in 20071 08 (Radio Television Hnog 
Kong, 2000a). On the other hand, democrats were urging the executive for 
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consultation about democratic reform In 2007/ 08. The point was whether the 
executive was willing to prepare for the reform on 2007/ 08 ('Emily Lau Makes a 
Motion' , 2000). In other words, before the PRC vetoed the prospect of full democracy 
in 2007/ 08, their attitude to the prospect of Hong Kong's democratic development 
was rather blurred. 
Public Support of Pro-democratic Parties 
In early post-the handover period, the DP, the ADPL and the Frontier \vere the 
most eye-catching pro-democratic parties. In the time of low public trust to the 
government, the pro-democratic parties, being the opposition against the ruling 
regime, enjoyed good rating from Hong Kong people. Particularly, in late transition 
period, the DP was the largest party of the LegCo and was treated as flagship of the 
pro-democracy camp. However, the data shows that the DP was just enjoying rating 
which was little bit higher than that of the ADPL, the Frontier and the CTU. On early 
February 2000, partly because of the internal struggle of the DP, public support to the 
DP was even lower than that of the ADPL. So, though the DP was the largest party 
with the highest support, there was distance from saying that it was convincing 
leading actor of the camp. 
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Candidate Lists 
There was no substantial coordination for betterment of the whole camp among 
democrats in both elections of 1998 and 2000. There was also no common target 
about how many seats they had to win in the elections. Thus, in the election of 2000, 
the number of competitive candidates 10 was close to the total number of seats of the 
GC. In the 1998 election, the number of competitive candidates was even more than 
the total number of seats of the GC, as noticed in Table 4.1 and 4.2. 
Comparing the number of political groups and independent candidates running in 
the two elections, it is obvious that the situation in 1998 was contributed by the 
unusually active participation of small political groups and independents. It seems that 
there was only one less lists in 2000, yet, it was due to the strategy of the splitting of 
the list of the DP. In fact, the Citizens Party, Chong Chan-yau, the Pioneer, Ting 
Hin-wah and the 123DA only ran in the first LegCo election of the SAR, as noted in 
Table 4.3 and 4.4. 
In 1998, which was the first try of the PR, there were five lists of fresh runners. 
10 'Competitive candidates' means to candidates who were strongly expected to win in the election. In 
words of Cox (1997), they are candidates being considered as participating seriously. Here, it refers to 
candidates on the first place of candidate lists, added with those of the second place in certain 
circumstances. 
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Two of them came from the Citizens Party, a political group formed in mid-1997. 
Yum Sin-ling of the 123AD ran in the EC in 1995, and Leung Yiu-chung of the 
NWSC ran in the FC in 1995. Chong Chan-yau was the only runner in the GC 
election who was totally inexperienced. In 2000, there were two lists of fresh runners. 
They were Tsang Kin-shing who withdrew from the DP and ran as independent, and 
Leung Kwok-hung of the AFAG. 
Table 4.1 Number of Candidate Lists and Potential Candidates of The 
pro-democracy camp in the 1998 LegCo Election 
District Total no. of seats No. of candidate lists 
No. of competitive 
candidates 
Hong Kong Island 4 3 4 
Kowloon West 3 2 4 
Kowloon East 3 1 2 
N. T. West 5 7 8 
N. T. East 5 4 6 
(Total) 20 17 24 
Table 4.2 Number of Candidate Lists and Potential Candidates of The 
pro-democracy camp in the 2000 LegCo Election 
District Total no. of seats No. of candidate lists 
No. of competitive 
candidates 
Hong Kong Island 5 3 4 
Kowloon West 4 2 4 
Kowloon East 4 1 2 
N. T. West 6 5 5 
N. T. East 5 5 6 
(Total) 24 16 21 
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Table 4.3 Number of Pro-Democracy Groups/ Independents in the 1998 LegCo 
District 




Pro-Democracy Groups/ Independents Contesting 
DP, Citizens Party, Chong Chan-yau 
DP,ADPL 
DP 
N. T. West 
N. T. East 
DP, The Frontier}}, ADPL, 123DA, NWSC, Pioneer, Ting Yin-wah 
DP, The Frontier, Citizens Party, Andrew Wong 
Table 4.4 Number of Pro-Democracy Groups/ Independents in the 2000 LegCo 
District 
Hong Kong Island 
Kowloon West 
Kowloon East 
N. T. West 
N. T. East 
Electoral Platform 
Election 
Pro-Democracy Groups/ Independents Contesting 
DP, The Frontier, Tsang Kin-shing 
DP,ADPL 
DP 
DP (3), The Frontier12 , NWSC 
DP (2), The Frontier, AFAG, Andrew Wong 
Electoral platform is a basic way to observe relations among democrats in the 
elections, especially when there was no obvious inter-party coordination in the 
election. 
In the 1998 LegCo election, replying the former Provisional Legislative Council 
11 Lee Cheuk-yan was registered as having affiliation with both The Frontier and the HKCTU . 
12 Lee Cheuk-yan was registered as having affiliation with both The Frontier and the HKCTU 
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which was boycotted by most democrats, main themes of their electoral platforms 
were quite consistent. That was, most of them emphasized on the importance of 
bringing back voice of democracy to the LegCo, for instance: 
'Although all democrats were ousted from LegCo, Martin Lee pledged the 
Democratic Party would continue to be the voice of the Hong Kong people - in 
or out of office - and declared "we shall return." This hope can only be realized 
with your support in the upcoming May 24 Legislative Council elections' 
(Andrew Cheng's list) 
'Last July when the Chinese Government took over Hong Kong, all members of 
the pro-democracy movement were thrown out of the Legislative Council. With 
your support, we hope to return to the legislature' (Emily Lau's list) 
'Last year, the Democratic Party refused to join the Provisional Legislature 
because it was both illegal and undemocratic. This year, we hope to return to the 
Legislature and bring with us the voice of Hong Kong people' (Lee Wing-tat's 
list). 
If it was not about the return of democrats, it would most probably be about 
fighting for welfare of the lower class, for example, 
'We came from poor family, and we experienced hardship of lower class deeply. 
F or many years, we put all effort to involve in movement of "improving 
livelihood, promoting democracy" ... (Frederick Fung 's list) 
'Our stand can't be much clear: on frontline of protecting right of labour and 
65 
fighting for democracy, we never shrink back! What is more, we can do what 
we promise! In 1995, we proposed 16 Bills to improve welfare of labour in the 
LegCo. In result, 13 of them were deliberated in the LegCo, and 11 were 
passed' (Lee Cheuk-Yan's list) 
'In the LegCo, on issues about social welfare, voice of grass roots was always 
ignored. So, in the coming LegCo, we need an independent Councilor to bargain 
interest for the grass roots.' (Ting Hin-wah) 
In the 2000 LegCo election, without the appeal of the Provisional Legislature, 
themes of electoral platfonns were of larger varieties, but the 'anti-government 
cleavage' (Choy & Ma, 1999) introduced by the DP was still appealing, and 
discontent towards Tung's governance and government inclination to big enterprise 
was the main theme in general: 
'In order to show that he could do better than the colonial government, Tung 
Chee-Hwa began the 'hyper-active' style of governance. In the three years, there 
_were reforms in all aspects, including housing, education, civil servant, etc. 
Indeed, sufficient consultation was lacked in those over-progressive reforms. 
Interest of middle class and lower class was also ignored' (Lee Wing-tat's list). 
'Since the SAR was established, the government had been inclining to interest 
of big enterprise, enabling them to affect government policy making and 
monopolize all aspect of economy ... ' (Albert Chan's list) 
'The poor, the unemployed and the disadvantaged must speak out now before 
more harm is done under an Executive-dominated system of government which 
unfairly discriminates against the less privileged and makes an unholy alliance 
66 
with big business and other powerful interest groups' (Tsang Kin-Shing 's list). 
'We, the people, have no power. In economIC sphere, the labour-capitalist 
relation is unequal, and the former is always of weaker side. In political sphere, 
big enterprises and Jiang Zemin control the election and appointment of the 
Chief Executive. All policies are following interest of big enterprises. This is 
'One Tung Dictatorship' (Lee Cheuk-Yan's list). 
Other than criticisms against Tung's governance and the inclination towards big 
enterprises, some democrats tried to appeal electorates by their prolonged service in 
the constituency: 
'Frederick Fung and Bruce Liu have been serving Hong Kong people for more 
than twelve years. They were together with Hong Kong people during the 97 
crisis and economic recession. In the period, we never left our position. Though 
we lost in the 1998 LegCo election, we still insisted in the vision' (Frederick 
Fung's list) 
'Through the election, we are bringing voice of labour into the LegCo. We 
would urge the government to ... satisfy needs of weaker class (Lau Chin-Shek's 
list) 
In both elections, dominant themes of electoral platforms were apparent. In the 
1998 election, illegitimacy of the Provisional Legislature was emphasized and most 
democrats encouraged electorates to vote for them and to bring them back to the 
LegCo. In the 2000 election, due to the economic downturn and disappointed 
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governance of Tung's executive, which was perceived as over-inclined to interest of 
big enterprises, dominant theme of democrats was also clear, that was to speak for the 
interest of the lower class to the executive which did not stand for the people. 
Practice of Vote Division 
In the 1998 and 2000 LegCo elections, there was no intentional coordination that 
involved most pro-democracy groups like that of the 2004 LegCo election, in terms of 
both the candidate lists and vote division. Before the first LegCo election, Emily Lau 
raised concern about potential intra-camp competition which was in fact inevitable. 
Moreover, in the two elections, problems and conflicts of vote division was not only 
inter-party but also intra-party. 
Unilateral vote division 
Unilateral vote division without consensus among democrats was found in both 
elections, and that of 1998 brought loud controversy. In the election of 1998, in the 
N.T. West, the DP openly persuaded voters not to vote the ADPL and Leung 
Yiu-chung, as the former was "fence-sitting democrats" and the latter had no chance 
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to win the last seat of the constituency, and requested all votes to the DP. Though Lee 
Wing-tat explained that it was merely their analysis of the situation under the PR, they 
were still being criticized by other democrats. As a reply, Yim Tin-sang of the ADPL 
labeled them as "dictator of democracy" ('Dictator of Democracy', 1998). More than 
that, flyers of the DP also encouraged voters not to support who 'parachuted' into the 
district and did not have long record of community service. Indeed, the message was 
attacking Lee Cheuk-Yan implicitly (Choy & Ma, 1999, p. 86). 
Also, Albert Chan distributed pamphlets to electorates sayIng that certain 
democrats in the district had gained votes which were much more than they needed to 
win. Thus, in order not to waste the votes, all voters supporting the pro-democracy 
camp should vote for Albert Chan. 
In the N.T. East, Andrew Cheng of the DP distributed pamphlets in Shatin 
persuading electorates to do strategic voting by slogan "Father and daughter vote 
Andrew; mother and son vote Emily" (-@-@~~f~~1r; frJ~frJ~1r1rf~g~PY£l). However, 
Emily Lau was not informed about such strategy beforehand. And, more importantly, 
while the pamphlets were only distributed in Shatin, where foundation of Lau was, 
Cheng only promoted strategic voting to Lau's supporters but not his (Choy & Ma 
2004, pp. 159-61). 
In the 2000 LegCo election, similar story took place between Wong Shing-chi 
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and Emily Lau. First, in Northern District, pamphlets distributed by Wong 
emphasized that "There was Emily and Uncle Fat in Shain, Kar-foo in Taipo, so there 
must be Wong Shing-chi in Northern District" (1j)B3~g~P~i3. ' 3Z.~~t-;5Z , *±m~'i' 
iT ' ~t~f~{*~~wmG9§l). This promotion made people suspect that Wong was 
doing the same strategy that Cheng practiced in 1998 (,The Frontier', 2000). A few 
days later, Wong was found distributing pamphlets of "urgent appeal" in Taipo. The 
pamphlets noticed that updated opinion poll reflected that Cheng and Lau had gained 
enough votes to win; only Wong was left out. Obviously, the pamphlets urged 
electorates to vote for Wong solely. Facing the uninformed promotion of strategic 
voting again, Lau was angry with the DP, and complained to the Electoral Affairs 
Commission ('Emily Lau Complains', 2000). 
Disputes about vote-responsibility zone 
For any political party, vote division is necessary under the PR, in order to ensure 
that no vote would be wasted. The DP tried to practice internal vote division through 
allocating vote-responsibility zones to different candidates. According to this 
arrangement, candidates could only hang banners and posters, conduct door-to-door 
canvassIng, distribute pamphlets and send election mail only to their own 
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vote-responsibility zones. 
After internal discussion of the DP, distribution of vote-responsibility zones was 
as followed. New Territories West: Kwai Tsing and the islands belonged to Lee 
Wing-tat; Tuen Mun, Long Ping and the villages in Yuen Long belonged to Albert Ho; 
Tsuen Wan, central Yuen Long and Tin Shui Wai belonged to Albert Chan. New 
Territories East: Taipo, Sai Kung, Tseung Kwan 0, Ma On Shan and part of Shatin 
belonged to Andrew Cheng; the Northern District and another part of Shatin belonged 
to Wong Shing-chi. 
In this distribution, situation of Albert Chan was the most concerned Issue. 
Subj ect to the arrangement, Chan complained that it was an unfair distribution as his 
vote foundation was in the island and Eastern Tuen Mun but not Tin Shui Wan and 
Yuen Long where he did not have any connection. Also, he argued that he did not 
have enough resources to start working on local community affairs and operate 
campaign in the areas (Choy, 2002, p. 107). 
Facing the difficult environment, Chan described himself as having been left 
alone by the DP, 
It's just like that some people stabbed me in my back; let me ride on a sick 
horse. Then (the DP) asked me to fight, and said they would support me far 
behind me (' Albert Chan Sighs', 2000). 
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On top of that, he even revealed to media that somebody of the DP wanted him 
to lose the election (' Albert Chan Sighs', 2000). However, Lee Wing-tat argued that 
Chan's request of expanding his vote responsibility zone to K wai Tsing was infeasible 
and it violated the rationale of sharing vote responsibility zone (' Albert Chan Tends 
to', 2000). Of course, it is unable to prove whether there was really someone who 
wanted him to lose. However, what he said reflected that he was deeply upset by the 
arrangement of the party. 
Other than the claimed unfair arrangement, whether the candidates obeyed 
arrangement of vote-responsibility zones was another issue that is worth discussing, 
as both Albert Chan and Wong Shing-chi tried to do promotion outside their own 
vote-responsibility zones and break the vote division mechanism (Choy, 2002, p. 
110). 
Withdrawal of Tsang Kin-Shing 
Withdrawal of Tsang Kin-Shing significantly marked the disintegration of the DP 
in the 2000 LegCo election. In the 1999 DC election, Tsang led a sixteen-strong DP 
team to compete in the election on Hong Kong Island. However, Tsang lost the 
election and only six candidates of the team won. Because of this defeat, Tsang's 
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bargaining power for splitting a list in the 2000 LegCo election was weakened (Choy, 
2002, p. 105). 
Finally, Tsang decided to leave the DP to be independent candidate in the Hong 
Kong Island. Indeed, the withdrawal of Tsang brought the DP to an embarrassing 
situation. On one hand, Tsang was competitor of the DP as he might disperse 
supporters of the DP. On another hand, since both Tsang and the DP were part of the 
pro-democracy camp, it was inappropriate to attack each other openly. Thus, while 
Tsang tried to persuade electorates to do strategic voting by slogan like "Mobilizing 
the whole family to rescue Bull!" (~~*!')]~ , t~sf)(roJ4 ! ), the DP persuaded 
electorates to vote for the DP only by slogan "Mobilizing whole family, vote for the 
Democracy Party" (~~*I!@')]~ , ~:t~~±_), in order to cancel out the influence of 
Tsang's withdrawal, and to preserve the image of the pro-democracy camp at the same 
time. 
Election Forum at Mass Media 
Election forum held by electronic media is an important arena for candidates to 
present their electoral platform and debate with each other directly. For the election, 
there were two election forums held by the Cable TV and the RTHK respectively. 
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Being the first LegCo election of the SAR, unlike that in 1995, mutual attacks 
and criticisms of democrats were significant. As shown in Figure 4.1, there were 
mutual attacks among various pro-democracy candidates instead of few particular 
parties. Summary about the details of the mutual attacks, together with indicated 
intensity of each mutual attack, is found in Table 4.5. 
In the election, there was intra-camp attack in the Hong Kong Island, Kowloon 
West, N.T. East and N.T. West. In the Hong Kong Island, mutual attacked was led by 
Chong Chan-yau, an independent democrat. He tried to challenge the moral image of 
Martin Lee, by exposing that he voted in the Electoral Committee which he once 
criticized as undemocratic. Also, when Christine Loh was not able to give an accurate 
figure of the Hong Kong unemployment rate, she was teased by Chong. 
In the Kowloon West, the competition was mainly between the ADPL and the DP. 
The DP attacked the ADPL of taking part in the Provisional Legislative Council; 
while the ADPL criticized the DP that their platform ignored the interest of the lower 
class. Also, the ADPL tried to remind electorates that Lau Chin-shek of the CTU 
should be having different stance from the DP. 
In the N.T. East, direct attack was not common. Lui Yat-ming of the Citizens 
Party questioned and criticized other democrats actively. First, he asked Emily Lau if 
her stance on independence of Taiwan was promoting secession of China. Then, he 
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'advised' all other democrats not to put their personal interest above public interest. 
Obviously, the 'advice' was in fact satirising other democrats that they were raising 
flag of democracy blindly for their own interest. On another hand, in the constituency, 
Andrew Wong was questioned by Cyd Ho of the Frontier and Wong Shing-chi of the 
DP, concerning his stance of the 24-hour passenger clearance service and reason of 
occupying as chairman of the LegCo endlessly. Also, though the Frontier had a kind 
of consensus with the DP that they would not attack each other, still, Emily Lau asked 
the DP concerning scandal about nationality problem ofTse Wing-ling. Yet, her action 
was then teased by Lui Yat-ming as betraying the DP. 
In the N.T. West, the situation was more complicated. In the constituency, there 
were seven lists of the pro-democracy camp fighting for only five seats. 13 The DP 
was the common target of other democrats. Lam Chi-Ieung of the Pioneer challenged 
the DP on their stance of provision of unemployment assistance. Also, both Leung 
Yiu-chung and Ting Yin-wah criticized the DP on their unethical promotion method. 
More, candidates with lower popularity like Yim Tin-sang and Lam Chi-Ieung kept 
attacking each other (Choy & Ma, 2004, pp. 94-101). 
Reviewing the election, three points should be noted. First, hostile attack 
between the two biggest political groups, i.e. the DP and the ADPL, was appealing. 
13 The seven lists came from the DP, the ADPL, The Frontier, the 123 Democratic Alliance, the Pioneer, 
the NWSC and Ting Yin-wah (Choy & Ma, 2004, p. 95). 
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Second, at the same time, being two easily identified targets, the DP and the ADPL 
also faced attacks from other candidates. Third, candidates with low popularity were 
more intended to arouse mutual attack. 
















Table 4.5 Mutual Attacks of Democrats in Election Forum of Mass Media in 199814 
Constituency Involved Candidates Content of Mutual Attacks l . 15 ntenslty 
Hong Kong Island Chong Chan-yan and Martin Lee's view on the Medium 
DP Electoral Committee. 
Hong Kong Island Chong Chan-yan and Failure of abandoning Low 
DP Interest Rate Agreement 
Hong Kong Island Chong Chan-yan Failure of abandoning Low 
Christine Loh Interest Rate Agreement 
Hong Kong Island Chong Chan-yan Knowledge on Low 
Christine Loh unemployment situation. 
Kowloon West DPandADPL Participation in the High 
provisional Legislature; 
Representation of lower 
class. 
Kowloon East None None None 
N. T. West DP and Lam Chi-leung Stance on provision of 
unemployment assistance. 
N. T. West DP and Ting Yin-wah Problematic promotion 
method of the DP. 
N. T. West DP and Leung Problematic promotion 
Yiu-chung method of the DP. 
N. T. East Citizens Party and the Stance on independence of Medium 
Frontier Taiwan. 
Emily Lau broke consensus 
with the DP. 
N. T. East Citizens Party and all Not to put personal interest Low 
democrats over public interest. 
N. T. East The Frontier and Stance on the 24-hours Medium 
14 Video tapes ofRTHK's Election Forum of the N.T. West cannot be accessed. It is thus unable to 
evaluate intensity of mutual attack of the constituency. 
15 Intensity of mutual attack is differentiated to be three levels. Low intensity mutual attack is mild and 
rare, which even may not be aware. That of medium intensity occupies considerable proportion of time, 
and disagreement of the candidates could be easily notified. High intensity mutual attack is that 
dominating election forum, and hostility between candidates could be easily sensed. See page 13 of this 
dissertation. 
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AndrewWong passenger clearance 
servIce. 
N. T. East DP and Andrew Wong Why keep being chairman Low 
of the LegCo. 
N. T. East The Frontier and DP Nationality problem of DP Low 
member. 
N. T. East The Frontier and DP DP's view on freedom of Low 
expressIon 
In 2000, there were fewer pro-democratic political groups and independents 
running in the election, as illustrated in Figure 4.2. Though the situation was less 
chaotic, it did not mean a lower intensity of mutual attack. In election forum of the 
N.T. East, Gary Fan of the DP criticized Andrew Wong that he used to object to direct 
election of the CE and the motion of cancelling appointed seats of the DC, and also he 
used to support the abolition of the Urban Council. His participation in the Provisional 
Legislature was also being criticized by Fan. Andrew Cheng even doubted if Wong 
was part of the pro-democracy camp or part of the Rural Committee. Then, through 
questioning Leung Kwok-hung, Andrew Wong commented that 'certain' democrats 
merely gave empty slogan of democracy but nothing else. On another hand, Leung 
Kwok-hung criticized the Frontier of giving empty request of referendum for direct 
election of the CE and he doubted if they really stood for the working class as they 
supported the civil service reform which brought about labour cut of civil servant. 
In the Kowloon West, the forum of the RTHK was almost totally dominated by 
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mutual criticism between the DP and the ADPL. In the forum, the ADPL kept 
aggressively challenging the DP if they were really representing interest of working 
class and grass roots on various issues. While Lau Chin-shek was chairman of the 
HKCTU but he was on the list of the DP, the ADPL tried to demonstrate that the 
stance of the HKCTU and the DP was contradictory on the interest of the lower class. 
Because of the hostile mutual attack between the two pro-democracy parties, Jasper 
Tsang of the DAB faced almost no challenge in the forum. Similarly, in the forum of 
Cable TV, Frederick Fung of the ADPL criticized the DP of rejecting legislation of 
minimum wage, and he doubted why could the DP (James To) and the HKCTU (Lau 
Chin-shek) form one list while the latter strongly urged for the legislation. At the 
same time, J ames To criticized the ADPL of joining the Provisional Legislature and 
that betrayed the principle of democracy. 
Though there were fewer parties running in the election, similar to the election of 
1998, the DP and the ADPL was still the main rivals. Also, small groups tended to 
challenge each other like that of the Frontier and the AF AG. But surprisingly, Tsang 
Kin-shing did not attack the DP even though he disagreed with arrangement of the DP 






Figure 4.2Mutual Attack of Democrats in LegCo Election 2000 
DP 4 ... ----... ~ A. Wong 
Frontier 
~ NWSC ADPL 
AFAG K. S. Tsang 
Radical Moderate 
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Table 4.6 Mutual Attacks of Democrats in Election Forum of Mass Media in 2000 
Constituency Involved Candidates Content of Mutual Attacks Intensity 
Hong Kong Island None None None 
Kowloon West ADPLandDP Representation of interest of High 
lower class. 
Kowloon East None None None 
N. T. West None None None 
N. T. East Leung Kowk-hung Representation of labour Medium 
and The Frontier interest; 
Insistence on universal suffrage 
N. T. East DP and Andrew Participation in the Provisional Medium 
Wong Legislature; 
Insistence on pro-democratic 
stance. 
Summary 
To draw a conclusion from the 1998 and 2000 LegCo election, they are of the 
following characteristics. First of all, there was no particular cooperation among 
democrats in both elections. There was neither a proposal of minimizing candidates 
nor a merging of candidate lists, except for the Kowloon West of the 1998 election. In 
the election, there used to be a proposal of cooperation between Lee Cheuk-yan and 
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Leung Yiu-chung to make one list in the N.T. West, but it did not become reality. 
However, as they both won in the election, it gave a lesson to democrats about benefit 
of list division. 
Secondly, because of the clear social discontent to the Provisional Legislature 
and Tung's governance, electoral platfonns of candidates in both elections were rather 
consistent. In the 1998 election, bringing the pro-democracy camp back to the LegCo 
was a clear message. The idea of resisting the Tung's executive which was 
over-inclining to big enterprises was more dominant in the 2000 election. But still, to 
some other democrats, prolonged district service and speaking for lower class could 
be a more advantageous image. 
However, the consistency of electoral platfonns did not mean much hannony 
among democrats in elections. The 2000 election was especially bound by the internal 
disputes of the DP. The withdrawal of Tsang Kin-shing and some Young Turks, and 
the quarrel raise by Albert Chan, were remarkable points of un-consolidation of the 
DP as well as the pro-democracy camp. 
Forth, in electoral forum of mass media, disagreement among democrats was 
further surfaced. As shown in the case study, mutual attack in electoral forum was 
mainly among democrats who were not very famous and need to absorb un-decisive 
votes. Being kind of electoral strategy, the mutual attack was understandable. 
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However, it was undoubtedly damaging image of the pro-democracy camp as a united 
group. 
Last but not least, beside the open mutual attack In the media, implicitly, 
unilateral vote division which had no consensus among democrats was also not 
uncommon. In the N.T. East, such strategy of the DP aroused discontent from Emily 
Lau. In the Hong Kong Island, the strategy of "mobilizing whole family" utilized by 
both Martin Lee's list and Tsang Kin-Shing's list was an embarrassment of the 
pro-democracy camp. 
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Chapter 5 2004 Legislative Council Election 
In the 2004 LegCo election, a comprehensive and relatively systematic strategic 
coordination of democrats was practiced in the election and most political groups 
were involved. In this chapter, similar to the previous two, background of the election 
would be given first. Then, I would introduce the background and details of the 
strategic coordination. Before concluding this chapter, result of the strategic 
coordination would be assessed in different dimensions. 
Background of Election 
The LegCo election 2004 was held with series of political events like the 1 July 
Rallies of 2003 and 2004. Also, the second interpretation of the Basic Law by the 
SCNPC, which vetoed the chance of having democracy in 2007/ 08, aroused political 
awareness of the public. In spite of the strong outcry urging Tung Chee-hwa to resign 
in both Rallies, he was still in the seat. On another hand, with various measures 
introduced by the PRC for sake of assisting Hong Kong economy like the Closer 
Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and independent travelling, the economy 
showed sign of recovery in 2004. In a word, political and economic environment of 
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Hong Kong in 2004 was very different from that of 1998 and 2000. 
Political Dissatisfaction 
Since the Article 23 Saga and mishandling of SARS in 2003, various indexes 
concerning social content and satisfaction of the government slumped badly. In 2003, 
both people's support rating to the CE (43.2) and trust in the SAR Government (29.9) 
fell to all time low since the handover. In 2004, there was no convincing improvement 
for both indexes, as the former was 44.2 and the latter was 32.5 (see Appendix I and 
11). Moreover, the second interpretation of the Basic Law signified a worsening 
political environment. In the year, 570/0 population reflected dissatisfaction to the 
political condition. And, 9.9% population considered political issue as the most 
concerned problem, which was a double of2003 (see Appendix IV and V). 
About situation of rule of law, 2000-2004 was period with fewer controversies. 
though the Sally Aw Case had put rule of law of Hong Kong under alarm, the Chong 
Fung-yuen case could be regarded as 'restoration of the self-confidence of the Hong 
Kong courts after the "trauma" 0 f 1999' (Chen, 2002, p. 81), as the CF A successfully 
demonstrated their autonomy to reject taking NPCSC's interpretation of the Basic 
Law into consideration. 
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Though the Chong Fung-Yuen case made a page of maintaining rule of law and 
autonomy of Hong Kong legal system, it might not be as widely discussed as the 
Godfrey Nguyen case, as the latter related to violation of legal equality which was a 
more deep rooted concern. Also, the proposed legislation of Article 23 of the Basic 
Law also made people worry that certain legal concept like 'state secrets' and 
'subversion' might be transplanted from China to Hong Kong. Thus, in 2004, people's 
appraisal of degree of rule of law showed a trend of decrease from 6.62 in 2002 to 
6.43. But generally, the appraisal was stable after the obvious drop just after the 
handover. 
Not only rule of law, people's appraisal of degree of freedom of speech also 
experienced a slump to 7 in 2003, largely because of the controversy about legislature 
of Article 23 of the Basic Law. Then in 2004, the Article 23 Saga was temporarily 
over. People's appraisal of degree of freedom of speech rise to 7.24. The Teacup in a 
Storm Saga 16 was another controversy hindering further improvement of the appraisal 
in the year. Besides, similar trend could be found in the appraisal of degree of 
freedom, which was 7.1 in 2003 and 7.17 in 2004. 
About people's appraisal of degree of democracy, the poor governance of Tung 
16 Teacup in a Storm was a program of the Commercial Radio Hong Kong which broadcasted in the 
morning prime-time (7:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.). It was famous in direct and cruel criticism to 
government officials. Albert Cheng, one of the programme hosts, was named as ' the Chief Executive 
before ten'. In July 2004, the CRHK fired Cheng suddenly. As the programme was so popular that it 
brought significant advertising profit for the CRHK, so the action of the CRHK made public doubted 
that it was matter of politics, not business. 
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Chee-hwa was arousIng public's awareness of importance of democracy. The 
proposed legislature of Article 23 and government's poor handling of SARS in 2003 
even reminded people urgency of ousting the existing leaders and making a new one 
through referendum. Thus, it is not difficult to understand why their appraisal of 
degree of democracy was as low as 5.94. In 2004, without issue of the Article 23 Saga, 
the 1 July Rally of the year still attracted about 230,000 to 550,000 participants with 
the sole issue of fighting for democracy. Indeed, the second interpretation of the Basic 
Law was the chief factor that intensified public passion on the issue. In the year, 
people's appraisal of degree of democracy further dropped to 5. 71 (see Appendix VI). 
Economic Performance 
In 2002 and 2003, because of the worsening economic condition which was 
difficult to find sign of recovery ahead, there was more than 70% population who 
considered economic issue as the most concerned problem in both years. In 2004, 
with various measures from the PRC which aimed at supporting Hong Kong economy, 
Hong Kong people's concern of economic issues was alleviated. There was 63.5% 
population who considered economic issue as the most concerned one (see Appendix 
V). Also, improvement on people's dissatisfaction on economic condition was the 
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most obvious, which dropped from 73.8% of 2003 to 49% of2004. More importantly, 
2004 was the first year of which there were more people being dissatisfied with 
political condition (57%) than those who are dissatisfied with economic condition. It 
shows that, economic improvement could not directly lead to softer political request 
(see Appendix IV). Also, the drastic increase of political dissatisfaction reflects that, 
the termination of people's hope of full democracy created political dissatisfaction 
which was much severe than any policy failure. 
Prospect of Democracy 
The second interpretation of the Basic Law by the SCNPC was earthquake on 
Hong Kong's prospect of democracy. In January 2004, the SCNPC interpreted the 
Basic Law Annex I and Annex 11, concerning the strong social request for full 
democracy on 2007/ 08. According to the interpretation, the phrase "subsequent to the 
year 2007" and "after 2007" written in Annex 1 and Annex 11 of the Basic Law 
included the year 2007 (SCNPC, 2004a). Based on the interpretation, the SCNPC 
decided that, 
The election of the third Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region to be held in the year 2007 shall not be by means of 
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universal suffrage. The election of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region in the forth term in the year 2008 shall not be by 
means of an election of all the members by universal suffrage (SCNPC, 2004b). 
Also, the SCNPC stated that the ratio between the number of FC and GC would 
remain unchanged (SCNPC, 2004b). The message of the SCNPC was clear: they were 
not going to approved positive democratic development of Hong Kong shortly. 
Public Support of Pro-democratic Parties 
On late 2002, concerning legislature of Article 23 of the Basic Law, some legal 
professionals formed the A23 to promote public awareness of the issue. In October 
2003, as the Article 23 Saga was over, the A23 shifted their main concern to progress 
of democratisation and transformed to be A45. Because of the heroic action of the 
lawyers like Alan Leong, Ronny Tong, etc. during the Article 23 Sage, the A45 had 
become one of the political groups with the highest public support when it was 
formed. On August 2004, people's rating of the A45 was 51.8 while that of the DP, 
which used to be flagship of the pro-democracy camp, was 51.2.17 Ratings of both of 
them were higher than that of the ADPL (48.6) and the Frontier (45.5). On another 
hand, rating of the two labour unions, the CTU and the NWS were 51.1 and 51 
17 The first survey with the A45 included was conducted on August 2004. 
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respectively. 
Distribution of public support of pro-democratic parties in 2004 was clear. First, 
there was apparent trend of decreasing support of the DP since the handover. In fact, 
support base of all pro-democratic parties fell during the period, but the fall of the DP 
was the most severe. Second, with the fonnation of the A45, of which there were 
popular public figures with very positive image, it was no longer convincing for the 
DP to be claimed as leading party of the camp, at least in tenns of public support. It 
means that, value of endorsement from the DP was deteriorating since the handover. 
Background of Strategic Coordination 
As mentioned above, there was rapid increase of public concern and 
dissatisfaction on political problems, added with social discontent to Tung's 
governance. With the background, democrats expected a big win in the LegCo 
election. Several months before the election, scholars and democrats believed that if 
voting rate of the election exceeded 60%, the pro-democracy camp could win more 
than half seats in the election (,The Five Stars', 2004; 'The Pro-Democracy Camp 
Will be Benefited', 2004). 
More substantially, the idea of making strategic coordination was born from a 
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DC by-election in April 2003. That election was contested by three candidates who 
were from the DC, the ADPL and the DAB. While there was intra-camp competition 
between the DC candidate and the ADPL candidate for almost the same source of 
votes, the DC candidate eventually beat the DAB candidate with only nine votes. It 
means that, almost both candidates of the pro-democracy camp lose because of 
intra-camp competition. From this experience, the pro-democracy camp noticed that 
they should do better coordination for coming DC election in November 2003, 
otherwise the pro-government camp would be the largest beneficiary (Ma, 2006). 
In DC election in November 2003, the overriding principle was to 'avoid direct 
competition between candidates of the two parties in the same precinct' (Ma, 2006, p. 
119). After coordination, there were 120 DP candidates and 36 ADPL candidates 
fielded in the election, and the Frontier fielded no candidate. Among all precincts, 
there were only nine direct competitions between the DP and the ADPL. 
Election result proved that the coordination was successful. The DP candidates 
won 79.20/0 of contested seats, the ADPL won 67.6% of contested seats and the 
Frontier won 46.1 % of contested seats (Cheng, 2004, p. 742). Of the nine precincts 
there were intra-camp competitions, two of them were won by the DAB candidates 
because of failure to coordinate (Ma, 2006, p. 119). In a word, to a large extent, 
successful coordination contributed to landslide victory of the pro-democracy camp in 
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2003 DC election. 
In light of experience of the 2003 DC election, many democrats believed that, 
with strong public support towards the pro-democracy camp, strategic coordination 
was even more important in 2004 LegCo election in order to win a majority of LegCo 
seats. Having this consensus, Joseph Cheng (Professor of Hong Kong academia) and 
Chu Yiu-Ming (a clergyman) of the Hong Kong Democratic Development Network 
(HKDDN), which was a neutral organization promoting democracy, were entrusted to 
hold a liaison group to do coordination among different parties and candidates. 
Strategic Coordination and Mission of The pro-democracy camp 
Based on the objective background and experience from the DC election, aim of 
the coordination was clear. It was to achieve the greatest opportunity for the 
pro-democracy camp to win the most seats in direct election of the LegCo, and 
reducing unnecessary intra-camp competition. According to Chu, the coordination 
was backed up by a moral high-ground of enhancing negotiation power of the 
pro-democracy camp by occupying more seats in the LegCo: 
There was moral high-ground among us. If the pro-democracy camp could win 
significant proportion of seats in the LegCo, we could give more considerable 
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influence upon government policy. For instance, if we controlled more than 30 
seats in the LegCo, the government would have to treat us important and 
bargain with us in policy making. Then, we may have bargaining power for 
more progressive democratisation. With this collective goal, there was more 
convincing reason to persuade the democrats to do coordination.18 
Substantially, their target was to assist democrats to win N-l seats in all of the 
five geographical constituencies. N referred to number of seats in each district, and 
they hoped to win 25 seats through doing coordination: 
With this as the target the pro-democracy camp would support no more than 
N-1 viable candidates or lists in each constituency, since anything more than 
N-1 lists would mean over-nominations, which would be tactically unwise (Ma, 
2006, p. 121). 
Therefore, with moral high-ground of achieving greater bargaining power for 
democratisation and to win 25 seats, the chief mission of the liaison group was to 
control number of candidates and number of lists, in order to avoid vote-split and to 
use remaining votes well. The most optimistically, Chu hoped that number of 
candidates could be minimized to be about 26 ('The Pro-Democracy Camp Will Meet 
Again', 2004). 
18 Interview with Chu Yiu-Ming on 29 Mar 2007. 
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Decision-Making Mechanism of Strategic Coordination 
Basically, all democrats who were interested in running in the election needed to 
declare their interest to the liaison, together with their choice of constituency. For 
parties which had more than one candidate in a constituency, they needed to declare to 
the liaison group first. Then they had to wait for result and endorsement of the liaison 
group (Ma 2006, p. 121). If the number of applicants in a constituency exceeded N-l, 
which was the target of the liaison group, and nobody was willing to withdraw after 
meetings with the liaison group and other candidates, the liaison group would run 
opinion polls to determine the relative support levels of each potential candidate, and 
then used the polling result to asked candidates with low popular support to withdraw 
(Ma 2006: 122). Though accuracy of opinion poll was subject to various uncertainties, 
Chu believed that it was reliable to assess support level of candidates in the 
coordination.19 In detail, the liaison group nominated or ranked candidates according 
to the following order of priorities: (1) incumbents should be given first priority; (2) 
political 'stars', say, barristers of the A45, who had a good chance of getting elected; 
(3) candidates who were determined to run, with or without blessing of the liaison 
group; (4) local activists, mostly District Councilors (Ma 2006, p. 122). 
19 Interview with Chu Yiu-Ming on 29 Mar 2007. 
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Result of Strategic Coordination 
Result o/the 2004 LegCo Election 
Judging from result of the election, the coordination was a failure. In fact, voters 
did not hesitate to express their support for the pro-democracy camp by their vote in 
the election. Turnout rate the election reached 55.6% high, which was good news for 
the pro-democracy camp (Cheng, 2005, p. 139). In terms of vote share for the 
pro-democracy camp, which was as high as 60.63% (Table 5.1), the camp was really 
expected to achieve a much better result. 
Table 5.1 Vote Shares of Different Cmps in the 2004 LegCo Election 
The pro-democracy camp 
60.63% 





Yet, in spite of the statistic report which was favourable for the pro-democracy 
camp, they won only18 out of the 30 directly elected LegCo seats, and there were 
seven seats short of their target of winning 25 seats. Though the result showed that the 
camp had two seats increased for the GC, total number of seats of the GC had also 
increased from 24 to 30. In fact, as shown in Table 5.2, influence of the 
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pro-democracy camp in the LegCo was deteriorating. 
Reviewing result of the election, there is argument that merit should go to the 
PRC, as they successfully affiliated people's discontent on the veto of full democracy 
in 2007/ 08 (Pepper, 2006; Zheng & Tok, 2007). However, role of democrats 
themselves cannot be overlooked (Cheng, 2005; Ma, 2006). 
Table 5.2 Ratio of GC Seats Won by The pro-democracy camp to Total 
Number of Seats in the LegCo 
Year 1998 
Seats of the pro-democracy camp in the GC 14 
Total seat number of the GC 20 
Proportion of the pro-democracy camp (%) 70 
Source: Cheng 2005, p. 140 









Regarding target of the liaison group to win 25 seats, they planned to support no 
more than N-l candidates or viable lists in each district, in order to avoid 
over-nomination. To assess the role of the liaison group in terms of number of 
candidate lists and number of running potential candidates, it cannot be merely 
concluded that the role of the liaison group was a futile. 
On 19 June, the liaison group announced that they would nominate 25 candidates 
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for the GC of the LegCo election. 
Table 5.3 Candidates Nominated by the Liaison Group in the 2004 LegCo 
Election 
District 
Total no. of No. of nominated Name of nominated 
seats candidates candidates 
Hong Kong Island 6 4 
Yeung Sum, Martin Lee, 
Audrey Eu, Alan Leong 
Kowloon West 4 4 
James To, Frederick Fung, 
Lau Chin-shek, Cyd Ho 
Kowloon East 5 4 
Li Wah-ming, Wu Chi-wai, 
Andrew To, Bruce Liu 
Albert Chan, Albert Ho, Lee 
N. T. West 8 7 
Wing-tat, Cheung Yin-tung, 
Lee Cheuk -yan, Leung 
Yiu-chung, Vim Tin-sang 
Emily Lau, Andrew Cheng, 
N. T. East 7 6 Wong Shing-chi, Gary Fan, 
Ronny Tong, Richard Tsoi 
Only taking those having joined the coordination into account, the coordination 
result was decent. However, some democrats like Leung Kwok-Hung, Tsang 
Kin-shing, Andrew Wong, etc. did not join the coordination. This led to the difference 
between the original result of the coordination and the reality. As found in Table 5.4, 
in the Kowloon West, the Kowloon East, and the N.T. East, the number of competitive 
candidates was the same as the number of total number of seats, while action of the 
ADPL, Albert Cheng and Leung Kwok-hung was beyond intention of the liaison 
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group. In total, there were 28 competitive candidates instead of 25.20 
Among the lists of competitive candidates, there were four fresh runners. Two 
came from the A45, a new political group which was well-known after the Article 23 
saga. Albert Cheng, a famous program host, also ran as fresh runner in the election. 
Plus, Albert Chan quitted the DP and ran as independent in the election 
Table 5.4 Number of Candidate Lists and Potential Candidates of The 
pro-democracy camp in the 2004 LegCo Election 
District Total no. of seats No. of candidate lists 
No. of competitive 
candidates 
Hong Kong Island 6 3 5 
Kowloon West 4 4 4 
Kowloon East 5 3 5 
N. T. West 8 6 7 
N. T. East 7 3 7 
(Total) 30 19 28 
Table 5.5 Number of Pro-Democracy Groups/ Independents in the 2004 LegCo 
District 
Hong Kong Island 
Kowloon West 
Kowloon East 
N. T. West 
N. T. East 
Election 
Pro-Democracy Groups/ Independents Contesting 
DP, Tsang Kin-shing, A45 21 
DP, ADPL (2), Lau Chin-shek 
DP, A45, Albert Cheng22 
DP (2), HKCTU, ADPL, NWSC, Albert Chan 
Diamond-lise3, AFAG, Andrew Wong 
20 Andrew Wong, Leung Kwok-hung, Tsang Kin-shing and Albert Cheng were not nominated. At the 
same time, Gary Fan withdrew from the election in later stage. 
21 Cyd Ho, placing on the second of the list, was member of the Frontier. 
22 Andrew To, placing on the second of the list, was member of the Frontier. 
23 The Diamond-list included members of the DP, the Frontier, the HKCTU and the A45 
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Compared to the ratio of number of competitive candidates to total number of 
seats in the 1998 and 2000 LegCo election, it was difficult to say that the coordination 
was successful, in terms of nominating candidates. But still, it reflected that the 
liaison group could gain some respect from candidates. 
Another mission of the liaison group was to persuade certain potential candidates 
with little chance of winning to withdraw. In fact, it achieved not much success on 
this vision, regardless of final number of competitive candidates. Withdrawal of Ip 
Ngok-fung (HKCTU), who had less than 1 % popular support was the only successful 
example (Ma, 2006, p. 125).24 Other candidates like Tsang Kin-shing and Andrew To 
simply were not willing to withdraw. 
Electoral Platform 
In the 2003 DC election, all candidates of the pro-democracy groups and 79 
independents supported an united political platform demanding "election of the CE by 
universal suffrage by 2007, election of all LegCo seats by universal suffrage by 2008, 
abolition of appointed seats on the DC after the 2003 elections, and initiation of 
public consultation on political reforms by the government before the end of 2003" 
24 Finally, Ip Ngok-fung was in the second place of Lee Cheuk-yan's list in the N. T. West. 
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(Cheng, 2004, p. 738). Consequently, it partly led to the absolute victory of the 
democrats as it successfully tempted electorates to choose between the pro-democracy 
camp and pro-government camp (Cheng, 2004). 
However, in the strategic coordination of 2004 LegCo election, similar practice 
was complicated. Among democrats, there were various disagreements in the details 
of socio-economic Issues, such as mInImum wage, privatization of government 
service, etc. Even on the issue of whether they should seek universal suffrage in 2007/ 
08, there was an open disagreement between Emily Lau and other democrats ('Emily 
Lau Supports Democracy', 2004).25 More importantly, many democrats merely were 
not bothered to come up with any common electoral platform, and major figures of 
the pro-democracy camp did not even attend the discussion meeting (Ma, 2006).26 
Consequently, the democrats only came up with agreement on several points of 
principles: to fight for universal suffrage in 2007/ 08; to establish communication with 
the PRC government; to seek for constructive achievement rather than unreasonable 
damage; to protect the rule of law and human rights; to push for democratization, as 
well as economic development; to deliberate government policy In a responsible 
manner and, to respect market economy, but no bias In big enterprise (,The 
25 Concerned that universal suffrage in 2007/ 08 had been refuted by the PRC government, and there 
was wider consensus about universal suffrage in 2012, Emily Lau suggested that they could fight for 
universal suffrage in 2012 altogether. She believed that it was a more practical target. However, other 
democrats criticized that such suggestion betrayed principle of the pro-democracy camp. 
26 Additional information was collected from informal conversation with Prof. Ma N gok. 
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Pro-Democracy Camp Declares', 2004). Actually, except the first point, all other 
points of principle could not differentiate the pro-democracy camp from 
pro-governnaentcamp. 
In spite of the failure of the formation of common electoral platform, in order to 
observe their strategies view on each other, the electoral platform of different 
candidates is still worth investigating. The general strategy of the pro-democracy 
camp emphasized on democratization, which was different from the mainlandization 
of pro-governnaent camp (Wong, 2006). According to Wong (2006), electoral 
platforms of pro-democratic candidates could be categorized as "revitalizing a 
decaying governnaent", "the reaffirmation of the rule of law" and "the alternation of 
political settings under the domination of pro-Beijing force". Yet, their electoral 
platforms could be categorized in more details In order to know how they 
differentiated themselves from one another: 
Request for democracy/ oust the pro-government conservatives: 
Some say that, given the decision of the NPC Standing Committee in April this 
year, there is point in continuing to press for universal suffrage by 2007 and 
2008. The two marches on 1 st July have shown us that nothing is impossible if 
we are united in our fight. Let us work hand in hand (Audrey Eu's list). 
A society with justice is sustained by a democratic political system. To establish 
a society with democracy, rule of law and justice; to achieve universal suffrage 
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and better governance, it needs our effort to help the pro-democracy camp win 
more than half seats in the Legislative CounciL ... (James To's list). 
Why is it that in the 7 years of rule by Mr. Tung, despite his repeated serious 
failures, he could always escape from condemnation and criticism by LegCo at 
every crucial moment? 
This is because we have an unfair political system that nurtures politicians in 
u-turning and blindly supporting the government despite its serious failures. 
To overcome this unfair political system, universal suffrage is the ultimate 
solution. In the mean time, the only way forward is for us to unite and use all 
your votes to elect the maximum number of pro-democracy legislators, to kick 
out these politicians and to prevent them from destroying Hong Kong ... (7.1 
United Front) . 
... I am runnIng In the election agaIn, besides to sustain my stance of 
"anti-unemployment and poverty; fight for democracy; squeeze out 
pro-government party", I'm also intending to expose the fake side of James Tien. 
With support of everyone, let's fight down the awful pro-government camp, 
which is blessed by the small circle election(Leung Kwok-hung' list). 
Prolonged district contribution: 
I, Yim Tin-sang, was born in Tuen Mun. I have been serving this community 
since 1982 .... Yim Tin-sang's team was rooted in Tuen Mun. To be election 
candidate, other than to achieve the principle "30 seats in the Legislative 
Council, hope of democracy", and to enhance democratic development of Hong 
Kong, we also hope to share our experience of serving lower class and 
marginalized groups of Tuen Mun in the Legislative Council. By doing so, we 
could also contribute for other districts of New Territories West, like Tin Shui 
Wai, Tung Chung, Yuen Long, etc. (Yim Tin-sang's list). 
Since Albert Chan has been back to the Legislative Council, he put great effort 
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In improving living environment, monitoring government performance and 
requesting amendment on unreasonable policy. He previous work also includes, 
doing contribution in making law which protect interest of property owners, 
urging for construction of district facilities, widening the Castle Peak Road, 
setting up acoustic barriers the Route 5, solving noise pollution by planes, 
urging for earlier construction of community halls and libraries, etc. Chan 
operates seven district offices in New Territories West. He roots in the district, 
and serves the community (Albert Chan's list). 
Fighting for lower class welfare: 
We believe that, the CE elected by small group of people was the main source 
of difficulties which lower class facing. As the CE was elected by few people, 
what he did was inclining to big enterprise and businessmen. The collaboration 
between government and business does not only stress harder to grassroots, but 
also suppresses democratic development.... The NWSC believe that, only 
through democratic reform, we could have democratic government really of the 
people, and we could reflect grassroots opinion in the congress. Then, we could 
have policy of more reasonable resource distribution and protect people's 
livelihood (Leung Yiu-chung's list). 
Promote economIC development, create employment opportunity; regulate 
working hours, against slavery of work; legislation of minimum wage, eliminate 
shameful exploitation; legislation of antitrust law, promote fair competition ... 
(Lau Chin-shek's list). 
Preserving freedom of speech: 
... Castle of freedom of speech is collapsing one by one. To protect voice of 
people's sake and inject new energy into the LegCo, it only depends on your 
vote for us (Albert Cheng's list). 
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Protecting rule of law: 
Hong Kong is my home .... I owe everything I have to Hong Kong, especially to 
the rule of law and the environment of open and fair competition. I pledge to 
use my legal knowledge to help preserving Hong Kong's edge, to better 
scrutinize governance and to competently legislate for Hong Kong. You and I 
together can make a difference. We can give Hong Kong a fresh start (Alan 
Leong's list). 
Others, for example, 
We, Lee Wah-ming, Wu Chi-wai and Ho Wai-to, represent the Democratic Party 
to be candidates of the Kowloon East constituency .... By his own will, Mr. 
Szeto Wah is not candidate of this election. However, he promised that he would 
be leader of our promotion team and keep on doing the best contribution for 
career of Hong Kong democratic development (Lee Wah-ming's list). 
Though there was consensus among democrats who were seeking for 
democratization was their common will, they still designed the focus of electoral 
platform to be generally based on their relative strength. 
Besides, potential disputes among democrats on certain issues, i.e. legislature of 
minimum wage, attitude towards 4 June Massacre, etc., were hidden in their electoral 
platforms. For example, though Martin Lee and Young Sum did not agree with the 
legislation of minimum wage, as it may be harmful to small enterprises, they did not 
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directly put the disagreement on their platform. Rather, they alleviated their stance as 
followed, 
We promoted socio-economic policy which is rational and pragmatic .... We will 
balance social interest between lower class grassroots and middle class 
professionals .... It is a middle way which cover interest of Hong Kong people 
most comprehensively (Yeung Sum's list). 
However, there were still some exceptionals: 
Will it bring any change if the LegCo have been dominated by either 
pro-government camp or so-called the pro-democracy camp? Will it make any 
difference if the LegCo have still been controlled by those old people who don't 
willing to leave? It will let Tung Chee-hwa keep on doing favour of big 
enterprises and postponing democratic reform. The so-called the pro-democracy 
camp openly promised that they would make cooperation with the government. 
Undoubtedly, they are on side with the evil .... Hong Kong needs gutsy people 
with strong principle and dare to take action, only with whom there could be 
social change. In the past 15 years, the Bull never changes his principle,27 never 
betray Hong Kong people and never beg for communication with the Chinese 
Communist Party, who is doing humiliation to us. We must live with respect; 
protect democracy and the rule of law, so that our society can keep on stable and 
prosperous ... (Tsang Kin-shing's list). 
Albert Cheng: Tsang Kin-shing is the only candidate in the Hong Kong Island, 
who really speaks for the lower class (Tsang Kin-shing's list). 
It is a pity that the present Legislative Councilors are too gentle to the ruler. 
They do not dare to stand hard in front of the ruler. Some politicians are eager to 
give up their principle and seek for communication (Tsang Kin-shing's list). 
27 The Bull is nickname of Tsang. 
105 
If you don 't want the following people to be your representative in the LegCo -
blindly ignore the reality; to object for object; to resist for resist (Andrew 
Wong's list) 
This time, no one vote can be missed. The new cannot come if the old remain. 
The present Legislative Councilors change only the outside with the same 
inside ... (Leung Kwok-Hung's list). 
Showing from electoral platforms, certain democrats surfaced their differences 
with other democrats. Among them, Tsang was less moderate than previous election 
and his rivalry towards the pro-democracy camp was acute, although he also 
identified himself as one of the democrats. To him, the so-called the pro-democracy 
camp was indifferent from pro-government camp, as both of them were unable to 
bring any substantial change in Hong Kong democratic reform.28 Yet, while most 
democrats were intending to hide up internal disagreement, he was the only one 
surfacing his discontent. 
For the platform of Leung Kwok-hung, besides claiming certain democrats as 
"change only the outside with the same inside", it was also the only one still stating 
clearly about the motion "Stop one party dictatorship of the CCP", which was 
generally silent among democrats. Yet, his insistence of the motion became an 
28 Referring to dispute between Mainstreamers and Young Turks of the DP, the ' so-called the 
pro-democracy camp' identified to the Mainstreamers and democrats holding similar stance. 
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obstacle of making coordination with the liaison group (Ma, 2006). 
The theme of taking the remaining seat in the district was another phenomenon 
worth noticing. Electoral platforms of Frederick Fung and Bruce Liu both emphasized 
that they were contributing to fight for the forth seat of Kowloon West. For instance, 
the platform of Fung states that 'It is not impossible for the pro-democracy camp to 
get all four seats', while Liu emphasizes "to get the forth seat for the pro-democracy 
camp and oust the pro-government party." At the same time, Yim Tin-sang also 
promoted that his team was the hope for winning the eighth seat of N.T. West, as he 
persuaded that "We are not political stars, but we are willing to fight for social welfare. 
Please, the grass roots, as well as the team of Yim Tin-sang, fight for the eighth seat of 
the N. T. West." Moreover, Andrew To, Chan Ka-wai and Wu Chi-wai also utilized 
the idea of taking the remaining seat in their promotion pamphlets. 
Practice of Vote Division 
Under the Hong Kong style PR with the largest remainder method, allocating 
more candidates in the same list does not mean greater ability to capture potential vote 
share (Choy & Ma, 2004, pp. 30-4). Splitting candidate lists is thus an effective way 
to utilize vote share, but it needs very appropriate strategy of vote division. In the 
107 
strategic coordination, the liaison group tried to conduct coordination on candidate 
lists, so that wastage of vote share could be minimized, and deeper cooperation 
between different parties was resulted. 
The 'Diamond-list' in the N T. East 
Among all constituencies, collaboration of the DP (Andrew Cheng, Wong 
Shing-Chi and Shirley Ho), the Frontier (Emily Lau and Ricky Or), the A45 Concern 
Group (Ronny Tong) and the HKFTU (Richard Tsoi) to form one single list in the N. 
T. East was the most eye-catching coordination. It was named as Diamond-list, as the 
list included many significant political figures. Some democrats hoped that, the 
arrangement could concentrate pro-democratic votes on the list, and thus, with high 
voting rate, the pro-democracy camp might "secure four and hope for the fifth" (~[g 
~E.) from the list (Ta Kung Pao, 19 July 2004). Concerning the rationale behind the 
Diamond-list, Chu Yiu-ming explained as followed, 
Risk of having successful vote division was one concern leading to the idea of 
Diamond-list. Also, some candidate like Emily Lau, remaining votes of her list 
was not enough to bring one more candidate into the LegCo (if she formed 
single list). So, why shouldn't we try to add up remaining votes of hers and 
other candidates, see if it was enough to bring one more in?29 
29 Interview with Chu Yiu-Ming on 29 Mar 2007. 
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In spite of the good intention, under the PR with the largest remainder method, 
effectiveness of making Diamond-list to capture vote share was in fact doubtful. Also, 
his rationale undermined voter's willingness to do strategic voting, which had been 
affirmed in the N.T. West in the 2000 LegCo election (Choy, 2002). In fact, during the 
coordination, some scholars argued that the idea of Diamond-list was non-sense. 
Apparently, we should not exaggerate the effectiveness of the Diamond-list as a 
way to maXImIze winning opportunity SInce it was also a matter of personal 
consideration. Nevertheless, its role in creating the image of unity of the camp was 
functional. 
Proposed Diamond-list in the Kowloon East 
In early stage of the coordination, when Albert Cheng and Alan Leong had still 
not declared to run in the Kowloon East, there was discussion of forming 
Diamond-list in the constituency, by Li Wah-ming, Wu Chi-wai and Andrew To. 
However, the proposal was not achieved. 
According to Andrew To, the suggestion failed because of brutal attitude of 
the DP. 
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The liaison group used to suggest that we may form Diamond-list in Kowloon 
East constituency, which involved Alan Leong, Lee Wah-ming, Wu Chi-wai and 
I. J oseph Cheng suggested to do ranking of the list according to opinion poll, 
and I agreed. However, the DP added one condition, that was, popular support 
of Lee Wah-ming could directly carry forward to Wu Chi-wai. For example, say, 
if popular support Lee Wah-ming was 26%, and he could win with 20%, the 
remaining 6% could be directly carried forward to Wu Chi-wai, added to his 
own popular support. Then I challenged them, why was there no such practice 
in coordination of New Territories East constituency. In that constituency, 
popular support of Andrew Cheng, Wong Shing-chi and Gary Fan were counted 
separately. There was no saying that remaining popular support of Andrew 
Cheng could be carried forward directly to Wong Shing-chi, so that Wong could 
be ranked before Emily Lau. So, why should there such practice in my 
constituency? Since I strongly opposed the DP's proposal, the coordination 
finally failed. 30 
On side of the DP, they believed that there might be enough remaining votes for 
Wu to win a seat when he paired up with Li. It is simply non-sense for them to accept 
a Diamond-list proposal that diminished the chance of Wu. 
Of course, from the present point of view, whether making Diamond-list In 
Kowloon East constituency was the best option was controversial. However, it was 
obvious that the DP's insistence of carrying forward popular support was one of the 
major reasons for the failure. When the democrats (except Bruce Liu) agreed to form 
Diamond-list and do ranking according to opinion poll, the DP's initiation of securing 
party's interest sacrificed the original option that everyone had agreed with. 
30 Interview with Andrew To on 4 July 2007. 
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Inter-Party Vote Division in Hong Kong Island 
Result of inter-party vote division is an important dimension for observation of 
the degree of the overall benefit of the democrats. Vote division ofYeung Sum's team 
(all candidates from the DP) and Audrey Eu's team (Audrey Eu: the A45; Cyd Ho: the 
Frontier) in Hong Kong Island was the only case of inter-group vote division in the 
election. To divide votes equally to the two teams, they agreed on the theme "1 + 1 =4", 
which was to ask voters to vote in pairs and cast one vote for each list. They believed 
that this would generally result in an equal division of pro-democracy votes among 
the two lists. Consequently, result showed that the strategy failed. In the last few days 
before the election, many democrats of the DP worried that Martin Lee might lose as 
he was on the second place of the list. "Martin Lee is in danger" C~ T E~) became 
the dominant slogan of the DP. Finally, Yeung's list captured 370/0 of the votes while 
Eu's list gained only 210/0. Cyd Ho, who was placed the second of Eu's list, lost 
because of vote division failure (Ma, 2006, pp. 133-4). 
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Unilateral Vote Division/ The opposition to Vote Division 
In contrary to inter-party vote division, unilateral vote division reflects the 
opposite attitude of some democrats towards the overall benefit of the pro-democracy 
camp. As the vote division strategies were 'unilateral', it might cost other democrats 
for their own good. 
Among democrats, Albert Cheng showed the strongest inclination of unilateral 
vote division. In other words, he refuted all kinds of inter-party vote division. 'After 
nomination, every candidate is now my competitor, no matter if they are from the DP, 
the pro-democracy camp, the HKFTU or the DAB, they are all competitors. There is 
neither room for coordination nor vote division. I hope every vote goes to my team' 
(Ming Pao, 5 Aug 2004). He argued that, if all votes went to Lee Wah-ming's team 
and Alan Leong, his team would lose with high popular support. Thus, he raised his 
so-called vote division strategy, "Father and brother vote Albert; mother and sister 
Lee', 2004). As all knew, Cheng and To were of the same list, the so-called vote 
division only favoured his team. 
What is more interesting, in Kowloon East, both Andrew To and Wu Chi-Wai 
claimed that they were the hope of winning the remaining seat of the constituency, 
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and encouraged pro-democracy voters to support them. Andrew To used statistical 
data to convince that he was the only hope for the pro-democracy camp to win the 
forth seat of the district, and Wu Chi-Wai had no chance at all. In contrary, Lee 
Wah-Ming and Wu Chi-Wai urged pro-democracy voters to support them with the 
slogan "The whole family vote no. 1" (~*~'J!f1~ 1 5ffE). 
Similar unilateral vote division also took place in the Kowloon West. In the 
district, Frederick Fung of the ADPL promoted that he was responsible for Shum Shui 
Po while Bruce Liu of the same party was responsible for Kowloon City and 'Yau 
Tsim Mong'. Thus, they encouraged that whole family of Shum Shui Po should vote 
Fung and whole family of Kowloon City and 'Yau Tsim Mong' should vote Liu, 
through slogan like 'Shum Shiu Po residents, please mobilize the whole family with 
ADPL, the DP promoted the concept of"1 + 1 =2=4" by saying that, 
1 + 1 one voter encourages one more voter to vote the DP together; 
=2 with your effort to increase turnout rate, Chan Ka-Wai can win for the 
second seat of the DP; 
=4 together with another two lists of the pro-democracy camp, the whole 
camp can win four seats in Kowloon West and oust pro-government camp. 
Obviously, it was logically unconvincing to say that the concept of the DP was 
for sake of the pro-democracy camp. Indeed, both the ADPL and the DP were 
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indirectly encouraging voters not to vote for another party, so that the pro-democracy 
camp could win the remaining seat. 
In the N.T. East, strategy of Leung Kwok-hung was simple. His slogan "No one 
vote missed" (~~/f ~gJ;') indicated that he needed votes from all districts of the 
New Territories constituency, and he did not intend to do any kind of vote division. 
Unholy Cooperation? Undisclosed Coordination between Albert Cheng. Andrew To 
and Albert Chan 
Albert Cheng was a significant uncertainty to the coordination. He used to be 
famous commentator for popular radio program Teacup in a Storm. In 2004, he was 
fired by the radio station and the program was then ended. In the eyes of the public, it 
was a coercive action that aimed at tightening freedom of speech in Hong Kong, and 
Cheng was the victim of the action as well as hero in protecting interest of Hong 
Kong people. Because of his image and popularity, he was widely supported, and it 
was believed that he could win in any constituency. 
In August 2004, a few days before deadline of nomination, he suddenly declared 
that he decided to be one of the candidates of the LegCo election. He openly claimed 
that he participated in the election because he needed another platform to express 
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opinions of the public after he was fired (i-Cable News Limited, 2004b). 
Generally, the attitude of Cheng was not cooperative with the liaison group, as 
Chu said, 'When Cheng declared his intention, candidate lists of the pro-democracy 
camp was almost confirmed, and it was too late to do further amendment. ,31 Indeed, 
his intention of joining which constituency was fluctuating and uncertain. Since the 
declaration, he revealed that he would most probably participate in New Territories 
West and form united list with Albert Chan (,Albert Cheng Considers to Run with 
Albert Chan', 2004). Without doubt, it induced discontent from other democrats. Yim 
Tin-sang of the ADPL complained that Cheng should inform the pro-democracy camp 
about his intention earlier, such late sudden declaration merely damaged the morale of 
the camp (,Albert Cheng is Criticized for', 2004). Besides, Leung Yiu-chung of the 
NWSC also blamed that Cheng's decision made no benefit to the camp, as he would 
merely share existing votes of democrats (,Albert Cheng Considers to Run with 
Albert Chan', 2004). At the same time, Cheng also mentioned that he might 
participate in Hong Kong Island constituency and join the list of the DP, in order to 
assist Martin Lee (,Secure Seat of Martin Lee', 2004). His fluctuating intention made 
the democrats confused. 
Finally, on the last day before deadline of nomination, Cheng decided to be a 
31 Interview with Chu Yiu-ming on 29 Mar 2007. 
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candidate of Kowloon East constituency, pairing with Andrew To of the Frontier. As a 
result, the chance for Wu Chi-wai of the DP was almost eliminated. 
In spite of the uncertainty created by Cheng, Andrew To claimed that it was their 
planned strategy against the pro-government camp. 
It was strategy generated from our internal discussion. If Albert declared his 
settlement early, Chan Kam-lam and Chan Yuen-han might unit to be one list. 32 
Obviously, it threatened opportunity of democrat candidates .... To be honest, 
we could not let other democrats mow this secret. If democrats mew, 
pro-government camp would also mow. Information leakage among democrats 
11 . 33 was rea y senous. 
Apparently, to some democrats, not all democrats are trust-worthy. Therefore, 
they tended not to inform those "outsiders" about any strategy, though it was against 
the pro-government camp. 
Complaints from Being Ignored 
According to Chu, the liaison group tried to take the interests of all people 
involved into consideration. Yet, Gary Fan and the ADPL believed that their position 
is overlooked. 
Fan is active member of the 'second ladder' inside the DP. He has been District 
32 Chan Kam-Iam (DAB) and Chan Yuen-han (HKFTU) were also candidates of Kowloon East 
constituency. 
33 Interview with Andrew To on 4 July 2007. 
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Councilor of Tseung Kwan 0 since 1999. Also, he was one of the candidates in the 
2000 LegCo election, ranking the second of Andrew Cheng's list (N. T. East). During 
coordination of the 2004 LegCo election, Fan strongly opposed to the idea of fonning 
Diamond-list in the N.T. East, as he could be ranked no higher than the sixth in the list. 
It meant that he would only win if the list had won 80% or more votes (Ma 2006, p. 
124). Everybody knew it was impossible. Besides, he doubted reliability and fairness 
of the ranking based on opinion poll. Opinion poll of June showed that popular 
support of Richard Tsoi was only 0.2% higher than that of Fan, but the statistical error 
was as high as 3.1 % ('Gary Fan', 2004). He used to have intention of fonning a list of 
his own. Yet, in order to avoid making the DP in dilemma and avoid making further 
discontent from the second ladder, he withdrew from the election ('Gary Fan', 2004). 
Situation of the ADPL, a small political group of the pro-democracy camp, was 
not much better. As reflected in the electoral platfonn, situation of the ADPL was 
more or less marginalized; it meant that their bargaining power in the coordination 
was low. It could further be confinned from their actual dispute. 
Indeed, among all candidates of the ADPL, only Frederick Fung was sure to win. 
Thus, it was easy to raise disagreement against other candidates of the ADPL. For 
example, some democrats used to blame the ADPL for not concerning interest of the 
whole coordination project, as they insisted on having Yim Tin-sang's team to 
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participate in the New Territories West constituency, in spite of their fair popular 
support ('Bruce Liu Withdraws', 2004). In spite of the disagreement from other 
democrats, Vim Tin-sang was finally blessed by the liaison group. 
Actually, since February 2004, Frederick Fung had been urging that progress of 
the coordination was too slow, and the political 'stars' should confirm their settlement 
as early as possible, in order to have better coordination (,Frederick Fung is 
Dissatisfying', 2004). However, settlement of the 'stars' was still time-consuming. In 
addition, Fung complained that they were not well respected by the liaison group, 
"when we have any change, we need to consult them (the liaison group), but they only 
inform us about theirs." About the switch of Cyd Ho from Hong Kong Island 
constituency to Kowloon West constituency, Fung was even informed only two hours 
before the news publicized ('Bruce Liu Withdraws', 2004). 
In addition, position of the ADPL was passive during the coordination process. 
In the Kowloon East constituency, while Wu Chi-wai had support from the DP, 
despite of his relatively low popular support, and Andrew To was not willing to 
withdraw, state of Bruce Liu became embarrassed. Eventually, because of the message 
that Cyd Ho would run in the Kowloon West and that might threaten chance of 
Frederick Fung, Bruce Liu then switched to Kowloon West constituency in order to 
assist Fung. Nevertheless, according to the ADPL, it was for overall interest of the 
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coordination project ('Bruce Liu Withdraws', 2004). 
Finally, Cyd Ho moved back to Hong Kong Island and Alan Leong switched to 
Kowloon East. However, everything happened after the switch of Bruce Liu. 
Andrew To made the similar complaint concerning reliability of opinion poll. He 
believed that, the poll covering electorates of the whole constituency must favour 
political stars as their popularity was more evenly distributed. He argued that, 
according to the poll conducted by his team, there were 70% electorates in Chuk Yuen 
Estate supporting him, and that was fairly enough for him to gain a seat in the LegCo 
election. It meant that, he was able to win if he formed one list by himself, but the 
liaison group had no point to ask him withdraw.34 He felt that he was discriminated 
by the liaison group when he was called to withdraw. 
When I refused to form one list with Lee Wah-ming and Wu Chi-wai, Joseph 
Cheng asked me to withdraw the election. I asked him why he had right to ask 
me to withdraw, even the Chinese Communist Party had no right to ask me 
withdraw. . .. Indeed, the so-called coordination was no difference from 
negotiation of trial-societies. Who had power, who gained territory. In fact, if I 
thought I might lose, I would consider by myself. They no need to consider for 
me. Such so-called coordination did not only treat me unfair, but also suspended 
choices of my supporters in Chuk Yuen Estate.35 
34 Interview with Andrew To on 4 July 2007. 
35 Interview with Andrew To on 4 July 2007. 
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Election Forum at Mass Media 
In both election forums of the RTHK and the Cable TV, democrats of different 
parties showed high degree of discipline and mutual attack was rare, as shown in 
Figure 5.1 and Table 5.6. In the Hong Kong Island, Tsang Kin-shing made a very mild 
criticism against the DP. In most part of the RTHK forum, all lists of democrats kept 
targeting the DAB as the chief enemy. However, nearly the end the forum, Tsang 
suddenly criticized that some democrats had softened their line and begged for 
communication with the PRC, and he demonstrated that he was the only one standing 
hard for democracy and really standing for interest of working class. 
In another forum of the Kowloon West held by the RTHK, the DAB was 
common enemy of both the DP and the ADPL. It was very different from the situation 
of 1998 and 2000. The only disagreement between the latter two parties was minor. In 
the debate about whether practice of the CEPA was beneficial or harmful to 
lower-class of Hong Kong, the DP did not hesitate to criticize the ADPL of being too 
pessimistic to outcome of the CEPA. Of course, compared to the Tsang Kin-shing, 
attitude of the DP to the ADPL was much mild, especially when they were 


















C. S. Lau ADPL 
Moderate 
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Table 5.6 Mutual Attacks of Democrats in Election Forum of Mass Media in 2004 
Constituency Involved Candidates Content of Mutual Attacks Intensity 
Hong Kong Island Tsang Kin-shing and Insistence on pro-democratic Low 
DP stance. 
Kowloon West DPandADPL Different views on effect of the Low 
CEPA 
Kowloon East None None None 
N. T. West None None None 
N. T. East None None None 
N. T. East None None None 
Summary 
Spiritually, the strategic coordination of the pro-democracy camp in the election 
ought to be an encouraging experience for the camp, even though it could not be 
treated as a successful one in terms of number of seats won. Indeed, coordination is 
necessary under the PR in order to avoid the waste of votes as well as internal 
competition. For well-established political parties of conventional democratic states, it 
is mainly practiced inside the party. The DP of Hong Kong also experienced similar 
arrangement in 2000. Yet, considering the pro-democracy camp as a single unit, the 
coordination would be on an inter-group basis. 
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As mentioned, the landslide victory of the camp in the DC election of 2003 led 
them to be aware of the power of unusually strong social sentiment against the 
pro-government camp due to the intolerable government of the Tung executive and 
the Article 23 Saga. And winning a significant majority in the GC of the LegCo was 
not impossible if they could coordinate well for the election. This background paved 
what Chu Yiu-ming regarded as "moral high ground" for them to persuade democrats 
to join the coordination. After reviewing the coordination in this chapter, we could 
argue that the coordination was in fact not quite successful, especially in terms of 
controlling number of candidates by a nomination mechanism, which was their main 
task. 
As Chu Yiu-Ming said, the most cheering result of the coordination was that 
open internal quarrel and dispute among democrats was greatly eliminated. Showing 
from electoral forum of mass media, except Tsang Kin-shing and the ADPL made 
open but mild disagreement to the DP, there was no open quarrel like that in 1998 and 
2000. Really, subject to the continuous hostile attack among democrats in previous 
election, it was still a rewarding consequence for the liaison group which only had 
moral high ground and nothing substantial. 
Of course, the strategic coordination was facing some difficulties and challenges. 
Basically large parties and candidates with high popularity were better-off in the 
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coordination project, and thus led to discontent from less well-known candidates. The 
failure of forming Diamond-list in the Kowloon East is one of the examples. On 
another hand, there were candidates not intending to join the proj ect, like Leung 
Kwok-hung and Albert Cheng. Furthermore, practice of unilateral vote division was a 
difficulty that out of the liaison group's control. While the liaison group acted as agent 
of coordination against pro-government camp, candidates who thought they were 
ignored had to compete with each other toughly. 
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Chapter 6 2008 Legislative Council Election 
The LegCo election of 2008 is the forth election since the handover. Different 
from the election of 2004, it no longer played any formal strategic coordination of the 
pro-democracy camp. In contrast, it came with internal disagreements and open 
disputes among democrats. In this chapter, it would first review background of the 
election. Detailed information concerning electoral coordination of the pro-democracy 
camp in the 2008 LegCo election would be given then. 
Background of Election 
The period 2004-2008 showed an obvious change after years of depression and 
frustration. In 2005, Tung Chi-hwa, the unwelcomed CE, resigned. He was replaced 
by Donald Tsang, the original Chief Secretary, who was a typical Hong Kong civil 
servant and more accepted by Hong Kong people. With the replacement, the 
legitimacy crisis, which was partly created by the poor governance of Tung, was 
temporarily solved. In 2007, Tsang won in the CE election under competition from 
Alan Leong of the CP. It led to a so-called competitive CE election. What was more, 
on December 2007, the NPCSC clearly declared that Hong Kong people could select 
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the CE through referendum by 2017, and to make the LegCo by referendum thereafter. 
Opinion poll shows that majority of population 'accept' and 'totally accept' (72.2%) 
the decision in the NPC concerning election of the CE; and more than half of the 
population was 'confident' and 'totally confident' (59.8%) to the NPC in practice of 
full democracy according to the timetable.36 Though democrats doubted whether the 
PRC switched on green light for Hong Kong democracy sincerely, it was undeniable 
that the announcement had given a timetable for the progress of democratisation, 
which was longed requested by democrats. Last but not least, the rapid economic 
recovery after SARS alleviated social discontent on economic condition. 
Political Dissatisfaction 
The resignation of Tung and replacement of Tsang led to a rapid and impressive 
improvement on social support to the government. Following the coming of Tsang, 
people's support rating to the CE rise immediately from 47.4 to 67.4. Then, they were 
65.1, 65.5 and 58.4 in the following consecutive years (see Appendix I). Also, with 
the new CE, people's trust to the SAR government increased instantly from 32.5 to 
53.2 in 2005. In 2008, it had been increased steadily to 62.6, which was the highest 
36 Data comes from opinion poll conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies on 29 
December 2007, see website: http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/hkiaps/telpress/Press Release 7 1 2008.pdf 
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percentage since the handover (see Appendix 11). Similarly, in 2004, there was 57% 
population dissatisfied with the political condition, but in 2008, it had dropped to 
32.8% (see Appendix IV). More, in 2008, there was 4.2% population regarded 
political issue as the most concerned problem. It was a noteworthy drop compared 
with 2004 (see Appendix V). Yet, though the figures were encouraging, it was also a 
clear fact that percentage of population treating political issue as the most concerned 
problem was no longer as low as that in the early post-the handover period. Last but 
not least, in 2008, there was 54.9% population trust the Central Beijing Government. 
Indeed, the proportion was increasing very steadily since the handover, regardless of 
any controversy and incidents taken place in Hong Kong (see Appendix Ill). 
About people's appraisal of degree of rule of law, 2005 was a remarkable year 
with significant improvement of the degree, which increase from 6.43 of 2004 to 6.76. 
To a large extent, it was related to the \replacement ofElsie Leung by Wong Yan-lung, 
the Secretary of Justice in 2005. Because of his personal background and positive 
image, he quickly became the secretary with the highest rating. Also, with absence of 
controversy concerning rule of law, the appraisal increased gradually in 2006 and 
2007, which were 6.82 and 7.04. In 2008, the appraisal fell sharply from 7.04 to 6.69. 
Reviewing various issued taken place in the year, Wong's mishandling on the Peter 
Lam Case and persecution of the Citizen's Radio were contributing to the drop of the 
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appraisal ('The Citizens' Radio', 2008). Yet, the figure 6.69 was still higher than 
previous figures in which Elsie Leung was in the post. 
Concerning the appraisal of degree of freedom of speech, the appraisal was 
improving after the Article 23 Saga. In 2006, it had climbed to 7.81, which was 
all-time-high since the handover. Though some journalists argued that the government 
was becoming more capable of controlling mass media organizations and practice of 
self-censorship was more serious (Hong Kong Journalist Association, 2006, 2007), 
but compared with the open offensive comments against media taken place in the 
early post-the handover period, the former was obviously less high-profiled. In 2008, 
in spite of the white-fear against freedom of expression from the strong nationalism 
for Beijing Olympic (Hong Kong Journalist Association, 2008), the appraisal dropped 
very little, from 7.47 of 2007 to 7.37. Compared with most of the time after the 
handover, it was still a satisfactory rating. Relatively, the appraisal of degree of 
freedom kept rising since after the Article 23 Saga, from 7.1 of 2003 to 7.63 of 2008, 
which was a historical high since the handover. 
People's appraisal of degree of democracy was stable after the sharp rise in 2005. 
In the year, it increased from 5.71 to 6.2. It then kept staying at range from 6.17 to 
6.25 in the four years. In the period, there were various discussions concerning like 
debate of The Fifth Report of the Constitutional Development Task Force (2005) , 
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issue of the Green Paper on Constitutional Development (2007), and the decision of 
the SCNPC on constitutional development of Hong Kong. 
Economic Performance 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the PRC initiated a variety of measures to 
speed up recovery of Hong Kong economy after the first 1 July Rally. Effect of the 
measures was obvious. Since the first season of 2004, positive growth of GDP was 
found again, which was rapid and obvious. In 2007, the annual growth ofGDP was as 
high as 9.50/0. With the strong growth of economy, it was unsurprising to see that 
people's dissatisfaction on the economic condition had dropped significantly in 2004. 
In the year, there was 49% population dissatisfied with the economic condition, while 
it was 73.8% in 2003. In 2007, it was even so low as 18.3%. In early 2008, because of 
the threat of approaching economic depression, it rising to 34.3% (see Appendix IV). 
Similar trend could be found in the item 'people's most concerned problem'. In 2004, 
percentage of population treated economic issue as the most concerned problem 
started to drop. In 2007, it had fallen to 36.30/0 while it was as high as 70.7% in 2003. 
Yet, the same as the previous index, the percentage increased to about half population 
in 2008 (see Appendix V). 
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One more point to note, since the economic recovery in 2004, it had been very 
constant that there was larger proportion of people dissatisfied with the political 
condition than those dissatisfied with the economic condition, though it was just a 
small difference in most of the time. Even though the signal of economic depression 
had come in early 2008, and there were more people dissatisfied with the economy, 
the difference was less than 2%. 
Prospect of Democracy 
Progress of constitutional development as well as democratisation was a real 
issue for the LegCo of 2004-2008. In 2005, the SAR government issued The Fifth 
Report of the Constitutional Development Task Force which aimed at enlarging 
electoral base of the Election Committee of the CE and to satisfy the 'principle of 
gradual and orderly progress' on evolution on selection method of the CE and the 
LegCo, as noted in the Basic Law (Art. 45 & 68). However, the LegCo vetoed The 
Fifth Report, as most democrats argued that it was failed in delineating substantial 
roadmap and schedule of democratic development. Then, on July 2007, the SAR 
government issued the Public Consultation on the Green Paper on Constitutional 
Development to collect public opinion on the issue. On December 2007, based on 
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result of the consultation, the SCNPC stated that: 
... the election of the fifth Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region in the year 2017 may be implemented by the method of 
universal suffrage; that after the Chief Executive is selected by universal 
suffrage, the election of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region may be implemented by the method of electing all the 
members by universal suffrage (SCNPC, 2007). 
Compared to something like 'guideline' on progress of Hong Kong 
democratisation noted in Annex I and Annex 11 of the Basic Law. The above decision 
had provided a clear schedule that democrats had longed for. If the PRC's attitude to 
the prospect of democracy demonstrated in 2004 was negative, that shown in 2007 
was totally opposite. 
Replying the decision of the SCNPC, some democrats argued that the decision 
might not mean there would be real democracy in 201 7, as the SCNPC did not clarify 
any substance of the electoral system of 201 7. Yet, instead of guessing intention of the 
PRC, perception and reply of Hong Kong people is more important. Indeed, in spite 
of the criticism of democrats, majority of Hong Kong people thought that the PRC 
were intended to adopt universal suffrage in Hong Kong sincerely and they were 
confident in realizing the decision (HKlAPS, 2007).37 
37 According to survey conducted by the HKIAPS (2007), 69.4% population thought that the PRC 
were intended to adopt universal suffrage in Hong Kong sincerely; 59.8% population thought that the 
131 
Public Support of Pro-democratic Parties 
On March 2006, the A45 transformed to be the CP. Carrying reputation of core 
members of the A45, the CP kept being the political party with the highest rating of 
the public in the two years, except the labour unions, i.e. the CTU and NWS. In 2008, 
when rating of the DP was deteriorating, that of the CP kept at a relatively high level 
(52.4). When the CP was just formed, there was continuous public opinion ifit would 
replace the DP to be leading party of the pro-democracy camp, especially when it was 
party with six seats in the LegCo and it aimed at developing to be ruling party of 
Hong Kong with high profile ('They Are Alliance', 2006; 'The Civic Party is Formed', 
2006). Thus, in terms of the value of party endorsement, in 2008, there was sign of a 
changing leading party, and it was unconvincing to say that there was any party with 
particularly impressive social support to prove that it could convey high value of 
endorsement. 
decision could be realized. 
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Candidate Lists 
First, the 2008 LegCo election was noticed by bulk number of fresh runners. 
There were 12 lists of fresh runners in total. Five came from the LSD, a new 
established leftist party. Five came from the CP, a party formed by core members of 
the A45. On another hand, Lo Wing-Iok, previous member of the LSD and Joseph Lai, 
previous member of the DP, quitted their original parties and ran by themselves. Quite 
obviously, this background was making the situation of coordination more 
complicated. 
In early stage before the nomination period, many democrats agreed that it was 
important for the pro-democracy camp to get at least 21 seats in the LegCo, in order 
to maintain their power as significant minority in the LegCo. However, quite number 
of them revealed that they would not consider any comprehensive coordination. 
Raymond Wong of the LSD described the situation as 'climbing separately for the 
same goal' C5Lffi~w ' ~§~1J) ('Raymond Wong Becomes Chairman', 2008). 
Kam Nai-wai of the DP also said it was an election that democrats 'strike and hunt 
separately' (~§ t~~' ~ § fg~) (,The Civic Party and the Democratic Party', 2008). 
More, Audrey Eu of the CP claimed that they were willing to have cooperation but not 
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vote division (,The Civic Party and the Democratic Party' , 2008). 
In the election, the DP planned to nurture and to promote members of younger 
generation through the election. In the Hong Kong Island, Kam Nai-wai was placed in 
the first of the list while Yeung Sum, who was the incumbent, was placed the second. 
In other constituencies, the 'N+ 1 ' strategy was suggested. It means that, in addition to 
the list of incumbent, one list of younger generation candidate was introduced to 
certain constituencies. The idea of the 'N+ l' strategy gave other democrats clear 
message that the DP was not going to cooperate with them for minimizing number of 
candidate lists. In practice, in the Kowloon East, Wu Chi-wai ran with separate list, 
while Cheung Yin-tung did so in the N. T. West. 
In the Hong Kong Island, the CP conducted similar strategy like that of Yeung 
Sum adopted. Audrey Eu was placed on the second of the list while Tanya Chan, a 
new star of the CP was placed on the first. Besides, the CP actively introduced 
candidates in each constituency. So, there was Claudia Mo in the Kowloon West and 
Femando Cheung in the N. T. West. Both of them were new comers of the GC 
election. 
Plus, the LSD also planned to have their candidates in all constituencies. Besides 
Tsang Kin-shing, Albert Chan, Andrew To and Leung Kwok-hung, who had already 
had their electoral basis, the party still introduced Raymond Wong in the Kowloon 
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West to run the election. 
Due to the respective calculation of democrats in the election, the DP, the CP and 
the LSD all insisted on introducing candidates to run in all constituencies. Added with 
incumbents and some new candidates, the consequence was thus clear, as shown in 
Table 6.1 and 6.2. Number of competitive candidates in all constituencies increased, 
and at least three parties would have direct intra-camp competition in all 
constituencies. 
Table 6.1 Number of Candidate Lists and Potential Candidates of The 
pro-democracy camp in the 2008 LegCo Election 
District Total no. of seats No. of candidate lists 
No. of competitive 
candidates 
Hong Kong Island 6 6 8 
Kowloon West 5 5 5 
Kowloon East 4 4 4 
N. T. West 8 8 8 
N. T. East 7 5 5 
(Total) 30 28 30 
Table 6.2 Number of Pro-Democracy Groups/ Independents in the 2008 LegCo 
Election 
District 
Hong Kong Island 
Kowloon West 
Kowloon East 
N. T. West 
N. T. East 
Pro-Democracy Groups/ Independents Contesting 
DP, CP, LSD, Civic Act-up, Lo Wing-lok, Joseph Lai 
DP, ADPL, CP, LSD, Lau Chin-shek 
DP (2), LSD, CP 
DP (3), CP, HKCTU, ADPL, NWSC, LSD 
DP (2), LSD, CP, The Frontier 
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There were 28 candidate lists comIng from the pro-democracy camp. In the 
Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon West, the Kowloon East and the N.T. West, the 
number of candidate lists from the pro-democracy camp was the same as the numbers 
of seats In the districts. In the Hong Kong Island, there were more competitive 
candidates than total number of seats. To consider minimizing the number of 
candidate lists as one of the goals of electoral coordination, it failed obviously. 
Electoral Platforms 
Different from the election of 2004, Issues of democracy, ousting out 
pro-government camp and related values like freedom of speech was no longer the 
prior importance in 2008. Mostly, they were replaced by issues of social justice and 
interest of lower class. For example, 
A just and fair society is a vision shared by members of all generations in a 
family .... Ronny Ka Wah Tong, Tsang Kwok Fung and Ken Tsang represent 
different generations from a family, and together we shall fight for a Hong Kong 
society with fairness and justice. (Ronny Tong's list) 
We found that there is injustice and unfairness everywhere: daily consumption 
is monopolized by big enterprise, it is difficult for lower class to get rid of the 
situation, and there is government inclining to particular enterprises. Fairness 
and justice is what Hong Kong owed. It is the first time for the CP to run in the 
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N. T. West. We hope we could create a new atmosphere and establish an ideal 
society with our intelligence. (Fernando Cheung's list) 
I'm willing to fight for justice. I'm willing to fight for lower class. (Andrew To) 
In the days of serious inflation, there is widening poverty gap and more helpless 
lower class. Yet, the government is powerless in providing assistance and 
conniving enterprises to exploit consumers. Labour lacks security. Being a 
candidate came from lower class, I will carry out the following promises ... 
(Joseph Lai) 
Government policies favour one corporate in general, while a million people live 
in poverty. People in power favour some over others, and mast the problems of 
governance by spinning the media. Democratisation has been stalled. Abuse of 
police goes unchecked. Articles 23 still looms in the horizon. Our core values 
are undermined .... These must be stopped. I will stand united with Hong Kong 
people, and together we will go against all odds, we will speck in one voice and 
build a system that serves the people. (Cyd Ho) 
James To's team run for justice. (James To's list) 
Besides the socio-economic issues which were rather conventional, voices and 
idea for new generation was a new theme point to be noted: 
I do care for future of children. (Claudia Mo's list) 
Support for the new generation from the new generation. (Wu Chi-wai) 
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I promise to bring the voices of Hong Kong's youth into LegCo. (Tanya Chan's 
list) 
Wong Shing-chin and Mok Siu-Iun concern about issues of youth. The work on 
youngsters is our first targeted mission. To establish the Working Team on Youth 
Affairs of Northern District and fight for more resource on youth service. (Wong 
Shing-chi's list) 
Other than the above inclination of electoral platforms, some candidates still 
promoted depending on their relative strength and position: 
Since 1992, I have dedicated myself to serving the community in Tuen Mun, 
Yuen Long and Tin Shui Wai and maintained ward offices to meet with local 
residents regularly every week .... In 2006, I acted pro bono in the death inquest 
for victims' family members relating to the tragic deaths of 4 members of a 
family in Tin Hang Estate of Tin Shui Wai .... This is of course only an example 
of the many cases in which I intervened to render assistance to those in need. 
(Albert Ho's list) 
He made a life-saving difference in 1997 when H5Nl bird flu attacked Hong 
Kong for the first time. He is the first person to advocate the culling of all live 
poultry that rapidly put the outbreak under control. Faced with the SARS in 
2003, he made a difference by advocating self-reliance and self-help, when it 
became clear that government measures alone would not save Hong Kong. He 
visited all corners of the city to give advice, to boost morale and to allay 
anxiety .... (Lo Wing-Iok) 
Very different from the election of 2004, mutual attack among democrats in their 
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electoral platforms were not uncommon in 2008, both directly and indirectly. Among 
them, that of the LSD was the most prominent: 
Four years past, there was certain democrat with prolonged absent in the LegCo, 
and disappeared during critical moment. It is a matter of sadness of having a 
previous hero of labour movement become like this. There is another so-called 
democrat who has no stand. He used to advocate 'discussion and confrontation', 
and he lose in the 1998 LegCo election because of participating in the 
Provisional Legislature .... More than that, there are elitist democrats who used 
to running in the small-circle election, and cheating that he had opportunity to 
win. Then, they persuaded the Father of Democracy to run in the small-circle FC 
election, making a drawback of democracy. How can those ambiguous 
democrats kept cheating the electorates? (Raymond Wong's list) 
In front of social justice, we need to fight with guts. Certain LegCo members 
stop at suggesting minor amendment and shouting empty slogan.... (Tsang 
Kin-shing) 
In 1999, when I was still member of the DP, I raise a debate about whether the 
party should state fight for legislation of minimum wage in electoral platform. I 
hoped that a democratic party could take care of the working class, but the fact 
refuted my will. Nowadays, even the government is more open on the legislation. 
History shows who is right and who is wrong. (An drew To) 
On top of the above, Raymond Wong, chairman of the LSD, even justified their 
action of mutual attack by article The pro-democracy camp have No Basis of Not 
Disunited (te.J:iIlfi21f/f\j}·$fflY*i~. In the article, Wong argued that the LSD was 
criticized of damaging unity of the pro-democracy camp because they were standing 
139 
hardly on the line of social democracy and they were not willing to participate in the 
small-circle CE election, while the CP and the DP were angrily playing the 
undemocratic game designed by the authoritarian ruler. 
Not only did the LSD arouse mutual attack in their electoral platform and 
promotion, the ADPL also conducted similar practice by making criticism indirectly: 
There are so many candidates, how to choose? To choose the one you are 
familiar with: Frederick Fung has been working for the community for 30 years, 
unlike those only appear during election and talk about empty vision. (Frederick 
Fung) 
Friends of the grassroots, please really think. In the past four years, except 
making political struggle and provoking verbal battle, did the political parties, 
which were so-called representing your interest, fight for any welfare for you? 
(Stanley Chain g) 
Last but not least, the slogan of the CP "At least there is the CP" (~fft1~1§ 0-~ 
It) was also viewed as deriding other democrats. Though they did not attack other 
democrats directly, the slogan was obviously implying that the CP was the only 
reliable party among all others, including pro-democratic party. 
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Practice of Vote Division 
No More Inter-party Vote Division 
Early before the nomination period, the idea of inter-party vote division had been 
opposed by democrats. Raymond Wong worried that they would be cheated by other 
democrats ('The Pro-Democracy Camp Meets for Coordination', 2008). Audrey Eu 
emphasized that vote division was a too difficult task (,The Civic Party and the 
Democratic Party', 2008). Besides, Emily Lau warned other democrats from any 
intention of getting votes from her supporters ('Emily Lau again Blames', 2008). 
Leung Yiu-chung also yelled that there were candidates trying to capture his votes in 
each election (,The Civic Party and the Democratic Party', 2008). Very apparently, 
inter-party vote division was out of their agenda and they were generally defensive on 
issue of vote division. In the Hong Kong Island, Kam Nai-wai of the DP declared that 
they would not consider vote division (,Supporters of Anson Chan', 2008). At the 
same time, the DP was proposing the kind of vote division with the CP like that 
practiced in 2004, but it was declined by the CP, as described below. 
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Unilateral Vote Division 
In the LegCo election of 2008, unilateral vote division was still commonly found. 
Among democrats, the LSD, Li Wah-ming, Frederick Fung, Tanya Chan and Kam 
Nai-wai either persuaded voters to vote them with the whole family or advised voters 
not to do any vote division, for instance: 
'Mobilize the whole family to vote the LSD.' (LSD) 
'Mobilize the whole family to vote Li Wah-ming and Kai Ming-wah.' (Li 
Wah-ming's list) 
'Please concentrate your vote for one more term of Yeung Sum.'(Kam 
Nai-wai's list) 
'All go for no. 8.' (Tanya Chan) 
'No split voting. No division of vote. All go to Frederick Fung.' (Frederick 
Fung) 
More interestingly, in the Hong Kong Island, the DP tried to promote division of 
vote by 'one vote to the DP; one vote to the CP', so that more pro-democracy voters 
would concentrate their votes for the DP and secure the seat of Yeung Sum ('The 
Democratic Party Tries', 2008). However, the idea was not welcome by the CP. 
Audrey Eu argued that such the idea might simply repeat the result of the 2004 
election, or even worse, both the DP and the CP might only get one seat finally 
(,Stanley Ng', 2008). 
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Yet, while the CP rejected the idea of vote division of the DP, their strategy of 
vote division aroused discontent from other democrats of the Hong Kong Island. In a 
different promotion, with the slogan '100,000 Votes = 2 Seats' (+ ~~ ~1~{j\) the 
CP emphasized that they needed 100,000 votes to secure the two seats for Tanya Chan 
and Audrey Eu. In reply to the promotion strategy of the CP, Kam Nai-wai argued that 
100,000 votes were too much to secure only two seats. He worried that the strategy of 
the CP would make the DP got only one seat while the CP still got only two (' Audrey 
Eu Wants 100,000 Votes' , 2008). Besides the DP, Raymond Wong of the LSD thought 
that such strategy of the CP was dictatorial, "the CP is trying to exhaust all support. 
Audrey Eu wanted 100,000 votes, though it made Kam Nai-wai on edge of losing. It 
is very disgusting. Anson Chan asked all voters used to support her to transfer their 
support to the CP. It is very disgusting, too." ('Raymond Wong Scouts Anson Chan', 
2008) 
Not only in the Hong Kong Island, in the Kowloon East, the practice of unilateral 
vote division promoted by Alan Leong of the CP also made some democrats angry. 
Leong promoted that it was possible for the pro-democracy camp to get three seats in 
the Kowloon East if the CP could get two seats, though total number of seats of the 
district was cut from five to four. More specifically, they asked all voters who 
supported Albert Cheng in 2004 to vote the list of Leong only. In his promotion 
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materials, he considered his list and the list of Li Wah-ming as the only viable lists of 
the pro-democracy camp. His strategy implied that all other democrats were merely 
side-runners and could be ignored. Ironically, the strategy was strongly criticized by 
Albert Cheng. He commented that Leong had already secured one seat and doubted 
that Leong was only ambitious to be the top runner of the district. Thus, Cheng urged 
all supporters voted him in 2004 to transfer their vote to Andrew To of the LSD 
(,Albert Cheng Criticized Alan Leong', 2008). 
Electoral Forum in Mass Media 
In the 2008 LegCo election, the big harmony of democrats that achieved in 2004 
was not found. Instead, it was again noted by complicated mutual attack as illustrated 
in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.3. In the election, three electronic media i.e. RTHK, Cable 
TV, and NOW TV organized TV electoral forums respectively. Mutual attack was 
found in electoral forums of almost all districts in all media, except in the N. T. East. 
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Table 6.3 Mutual Attacks of Democrats in Election Forum of Mass Media in 2008 
Constituency Involved Candidates Content of Mutual Attacks Intensity 
Hong Kong Island CP and Tsang Participation in the FC Medium 
Kin-shing election; 
Monopolize support of 
Anson Chan. 
Hong Kong Island Tsang Kin-shing and Betrayal of the High 
Lo Wing-Iok pro-democracy camp. 
Hong Kong Island Lo Wing-Iok and CP Participation in the FC Medium 
election; 
Labeling of 'fake democrats' . 
Hong Kong Island Tsang Kin-shing and Support appointed member Low 
CydHo to be chairman of the DP 
Hong Kong Island J oseph Lai and Cyd Support appointed member Low 
Ho to be chairman of the DP. 
Kowloon West LSD andADPL Participation in the Low 
Provisional Legislature. 
Kowloon West LSD and CP Participation in the FC Medium 
election; 
Insistence in universal 
suffrage in the 2007/08; 
Labeling of 'ambiguous 
democrats' . 
Kowloon East LSD and CP Participation in the FC Medium 
election. 
Kowloon East LSD andDP Wrong decision of support Medium 
listing of the Link. 
N. T. West LSD and CP Participation in the FC Medium 
election. 
N. T. West LSD andDP Wrong decision of support Medium 
listing of the Link. 
N. T. East None None None 
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llong Kong Island 
Situation of mutual attack in the Hong Kong Island was rather complicated. First, 
the list of Tanya Chan and Audrey Eu of the CP was being criticized by Tsang 
Kin-shing and Lo Wing-Iok of actively participating in the small-circle FC election 
which was considered as undemocratic. They criticized the CP that their action was 
violating the moral principle of democracy. Tsang particularly emphasized that it was 
very wrong for the CP to ask Martin Lee to run in the FC election. Moreover, Tsang 
also blamed that the CP was trying to monopolize the support of Anson Chan, while 
almost all democrats had assisted her during the by-election of the Hong Kong Island 
in 2007. 
On another hand, Cyd Ho was criticized by Tsang Kin-shing and J oseph Lai for 
supporting appointed DC councilor to be chairman of the DC. What was more, Lai 
also doubted if Ho had paid enough effort in work of the DC. 
Though the CP and Cyd Ho were being criticized by other democrats, in the 
forum, they introduced the difference between democrats (1z~) and fake-democrats 
(lli ~). Without obvious target, they doubted that certain candidates pretended to be 
democrats, but they were not passionate for democracy. 
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The forth conflict was between Tsang Kin-shing and Lo Wing-lok. Tsang blamed 
Lo that he did not assist Anson Chan to run the by-election of the Hong Kong Island 
in 2007 as he lost in the primary election. Also, Tsang challenged the trust worthiness 
of Lo. According to Tsang, Lo used to approach the DAB for membership before 
joining the LSD. Then, when he had collected enough popularity from the primary 
election, he quitted the LSD and claimed to be independent. In the forum, Tsang 
described Lo as the' spy of the Chinese Communist Party. ' 
Kowloon West 
Mutual attack first appeared in the Kowloon West since Raymond Wong of the 
LSD ran in the district in the 2008 LegCo election. In electoral forums of the RTHK 
and Cable TV, he criticized other democrats by an active and aggressive manner. In 
the forum of the Cable TV, he carp Frederick Fung of hiding up the fact that he lost in 
the 1998 LegCo election because he participated in the Provisional Legislature, which 
was an undemocratic legislative branch. He criticized Fung that he was cheating 
electorates by saying that he lost in the 1998 election because too many voters thought 
that he was sure win. Also, in the forum, Wong described that most democrats only 
put democracy and criticize government on their lips but support government by votes 
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in critical moments. 
In the forum of the RTHK, Wong severely criticized Claudia Mo as well as the 
CP of aggressively participating in the FC election, which was an undemocratic one. 
And Wong argued that it was unacceptable for Ronny Tong to ask Martin Lee to run 
the FC election. When Mo objected the accusation, Wong shouted that she was lying. 
More importantly, Wong complained that the CP was trying to dominating the flag of 
democracy exclusively by monopolizing support of Anson Chan and Jimmy Lai, and 
marginalizing the LSD. 
Kowloon East 
In the Kowloon East, Andrew To of the LSD was also the chief one to arouse 
mutual attack of the pro-democracy camp. He kept attacking the DP that they used to 
support the Housing Authority to privatize their assets and the listing of The Link38 • 
While management strategy of The Link was hurting the interest of the lower class, To 
argued that the DP had made a wrong decision and should feel sorry for that. The 
attack from To provoked strong disagreement from Li Wah-ming of the DP. Li replied 
to To that many residents in the Kowloon East felt disappointed for the endless open 
38 The Link is The Link Real Estate Investment Trust. It is a listed corporation which owns and 
manages the assets sold by the Housing Authority. 
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quarrel among democrats, and urged To to stop that. On another hand, Li questioned 
To about credibility of the LSD, as Albert Chan, core member of the LSD, used to 
nominate Donald Tsang to be the CE. Also, Li commented that Chan only 
demonstrated to be radical in media, but in fact he was very friendly to government 
officials. He doubted if the attitude of Chan was consistent with the political stand of 
the LSD. 
Other than the quarrel with Li Wah-ming, Andrew To questioned if the CP could 
take public interest in the first place when they were running in the FC election so 
actively. He made the criticism with proposal of Mandy Tarn, who was member of the 
CP as well as LegCo member of the sector of Accountancy. She used to suggest that 
all Hong Kong people should declare their income for taxation through accountancy. 
To argued that, while the CP was eager for running in the FC election, they had very 
strong intention of placing interest of particular sector over public interest. 
N. T. West 
In the N. T. West, Albert Chan of the LSD made similar criticisms to other 
democrats like Andrew To did in the Kow loon East. First, he questioned F emando 
Cheung of the CP about the practice of Mandy Tarn, which was regarded as putting 
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sector benefit over public interest. At the same time, he also asked if candidates of the 
DP felt sorry for supporting listing of The Link. 
Discussion of lDemocrats with Adjectives' 
The LegCo election in 2008 was the only one that brought discussion about 
'democrats with adjectives'. In Electoral Forum of the Hong Kong Island, Cyd Ho 
and the CP indirectly titled Lo Wing-Iok as "fake democrats". Later, Audrey Eu 
further clarified her view. "I really do not know what Lo is representing. He keeps 
changing his stance, and it is difficult to accept him as part of the pro-democracy 
camp." ('Scholars Expect', 2008). 
While Audrey Eu named Lo Wing-Iok as "fake democrats", Raymond Wong 
named candidates of the CP, Frederick Fung and Lau Chin-shek as 'ambiguous 
democrats', as they could not stand hardly on principle of democracy. In his 
promotion, he emphasized that people could not let the pro-government camp win 
four seats in the Kowloon West. His words implied that Frederick Fung and Claudia 
Mo were also part of pro-government camp. Following this logic, Albert Chan made 
the point that certain democrats supported 98% bills introduced by government, so 
they were actually indifferent from pro-government camp. As a kind of reply to 
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continuous criticisms from the LSD, in an open situation, Audrey Eu said that she was 
said for certain democrats who kept arousing mutual criticisms against other 
democrats. Indeed, issue of disunity of the camp was more surfaced in this election. 
Dispute about Support of Anson Chan 
Imbalanced support of Anson Chan to democrats was another point of discontent, 
though it was a minor one. In the by-election of the Hong Kong Island in 2007, Chan 
was elected by democrats to represent them to run the election through primary 
election of the camp, while Regina Ip was regarded as representative of 
pro-government camp. Being a legitimated representative of the pro-democracy camp, 
many democrats participated to promote for Chan in the election. However, in the 
2008 LegCo election, though Chan did not run in the election, she had no intention of 
standing for the whole camp. Instead, she showed very strong inclination to the CP. 
On July 2008, Anson Chan declared that she would not run in the LegCo election. 
She said that she was going to put all effort to assist young pro-democracy politicians 
of age 25 to 45. Also, she emphasized that the pro-democracy camp needed to 
promote the young generation with new ideas, rather than leading them into the 
LegCo by reputation of incumbents. The words of Chan led the public to think that 
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she was not going to support Kam Nai-wai of the DP, who was aged 47 ('Anson Chan 
Doesn't Run Election' , 2008). 
Plus, in mid-July, Chan openly declared that she would support all 19 candidates 
of the CP to run the election. She attended promotion events of the CP and appeared 
in promotion flyers and videos of the CP to show her support. Yet, she did not reveal 
clear support to the DP, except Sin Chung-kai.39 The DP needed to persuade Chan to 
declare her support to particular candidates of the party (Ming Pao, 21 July 2008). 
Much worse, Chan did not intend to show any support to the LSD. 
Replying attitude of Chan, Raymond Wong taunted that "she was pretending to 
be honorable chairperson of the CP" ('Raymond Wong Scouts Anson Chan', 2008). 
Summary 
To sum up the LegCo election of 2008, the following points should be noted. 
It was the first election of which Tung Chee-hwa was not the CE of the SAR 
since the handover. Instead, it was held under the executive of Donald Tsang who was 
more welcome by Hong Kong people, plus the generally lighter political and 
economIC atmosphere, though people dissatisfaction to economIC situation nse 
39 But Sin did not run the election finally. 
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sharply in 2008. To the democrats, being the opposition force against the ruling 
regime, it was an unfavourable situation. Thus, it is hypothetically possible to expect 
the level of electoral coordination which was different from the previous. 
In terms of nomination of candidates, the DP, the CP and the LSD were not only 
unwilling to comprise for reducing number of lists, but also progressive nominated 
candidates in all constituencies. Consequently, only these three parties had already 
brought fifteen lists in the election. Among them, the 'seed program' of the DP was 
the most offensive against other democrats, as new blood of the DP had very strong 
incentive to capture supports of other democrats and made them on edge of losing. 
In the PR, splitting list may not mean bad strategy if vote division is conducted 
well. Inside a party, it can be practiced in a systematic way, like that of the DP in the 
2000 LegCo election. For the pro-democracy camp as loose group of political parties, 
political groups and independent democrats, it is a difficult task. In 2004, there used 
to be strategy of inter-party vote division though it was not successful. Yet, in 2008, 
such idea was obviously out of their agenda. Instead, long before the election, most 
democrats had been preparing for tough intra-camp competition which lacked 
cooperation. Indeed, themes of their political platforms were diverse and issue of 
democracy was not strongly emphasized among them. More seriously, unilateral vote 
division became a more common phenomenon. Some of the strategy even aroused 
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open discontent of other democrats. 
Mutual attack was another concern In the election. The big harmony of 
democrats in 2004 was no longer found in 2008. In the latest election, the LSD, which 
was established in 2006, acted as the chief engine of attacking other democrats in all 
constituencies. They tried to give the message that they were the only hardliners 
standing for democracy and lower class. If we say that mutual attack of the 1998 and 
2000 LegCo election was characterized by the rival between the DP and the ADPL; 
that of2008 was remarked by the aggressive action of the LSD. 
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Chapter 7 Illustration from Case Studies 
With reference to the elaboration of the four LegCo elections given in previous 
chapters, this chapter serves two purposes. First, it would give comprehensive 
observation of level of coordination of the pro-democracy camp in LegCo elections. 
Second, I would provide an overall review of the hypotheses raise in Chapter Three, 
in order to evaluate if there is any factor able to explain the varied levels of electoral 
coordination in the four LegCo elections since the handover. 
Observation of Electoral Coordination of The pro-democracy camp 
To make it simple, general observation of electoral coordination of the 
pro-democracy camp in the four LegCo elections after the handover is summarized in 
Appendix IX. 
LegCo Election 2004: Electoral Coordination of the Highest Level 
Comparing the four elections, the LegCo election of 2004 demonstrated the 
highest level of electoral coordination, as it could achieve the four purposes of 
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electoral coordination at the highest degree. First and the foremost, the election was 
the only one in which there was a centralized nomination mechanism, i.e. the liaison 
group hosted by Chu Yiu-ming and Joseph Cheng, that tried to officially nominate 
pro-democracy candidate for the election. Though the liaison group was facing 
challenges and complaints, it was undeniable that most democrats had showed their 
willingness to be regarded as a more united group through the coordination. 
Second, with strong common vision of winning more than half seats in the 
LegCo, inter-party vote division could be found in the election. Formation of the 
Diamond-list in the N.T. East was surely the most eye-catching one. It aimed at 
concentrating votes in the pro-democracy camp and avoiding waste of votes under the 
given electoral method. In the Hong Kong Island, the cooperation between the DP and 
the CP (together with Cyd Ho placing behind Audrey Eu) demonstrated a major 
example of inter-party vote division. Though both plans were failed in terms of 
election result, they still reflected intention of democrats to maximize winning 
opportunity of the camp through having deeper coordination, which was not found in 
other elections. 
Third, as mentioned by Chu Yiu-ming, one of the most significant contributions 
of the liaison group was that it eliminated open mutual attack among democrats 
successfully. In various election forums, except Tsang Kin-shing made a mild 
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criticism to Mainstreamers, open mutual attack among democrats basically 
disappeared. Instead, In all forums, democrats targeted pro-government camp as 
common enemy. 
Briefly, reviewing the work of the liaison group, it could not be regarded as a 
successful one, especially on its initial intention of minimizing number of candidates 
and another task of making united electoral platform. However, it was inarguable that 
the appearance and function of the liaison group by itself reflected positive intention 
of democrats to enhance winning opportunity of the camp through more 
comprehensive and deeper coordination. This intention was particularly distinctive 
when compared with that in the LegCo election 2008. In the latter, the DP, the CP and 
the LSD did not only show no intention of minimizing total number of candidate lists, 
instead, their placed one or more than one lists in each constituency, which resulted in 
large expansion of total number of candidate lists. 
LegCo Election 2008: The Most Disappointed Level o/Coordination 
While the LegCo election 2004 showed the deepest coordination of democrats, 
the LegCo election 2008 was full of hostility among democrats. Here, I would argue 
that level of electoral coordination in the LegCo election 2008 was more discouraging 
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than that of 1998 and 2000. 
Comparing frequency of open mutual attack between democrats in LegCo 
election 2008 and that in 1998 and 2000, it was similar. In particular circumstance 
such as the electoral forum of the Kowloon West in 2000, mutual attack between the 
DP and the ADPL even dominated the forum. Yet, content and target of the attack 
showed the difference. For the LegCo election 1998 and 2000, the rival between the 
DP and the ADPL was the most prominent mutual attack shown in TV forum, while 
the DP criticized the ADPL of joining the Provisional Legislature, and the ADPL 
challenged the DP if they were really representing grassroots. Plus, the DP also 
questioned Andrew Wong about his moderate and unclear stance on democracy, but it 
was obviously not so aggressive than towards the ADPL, as well as the opposite. Of 
course, in 1998, mutual attack among candidates of lower popularity was also 
common. But it was found in 2008, too. 
In the LegCo election 2008, the situation of open mutual attack was more 
complicated. First, in various arenas, the LSD criticized the DP, the CP and the ADPL 
very actively and aggressively. In other words, they were not targeting on particular 
parties but were trying to distinguish themselves by attacking all others. On another 
hand, though the CP claimed that they were disappointed for the endless mutual attack, 
their slogan "At least there is the CP" was obviously not an encouraging manner to 
159 
demonstrate unity of the pro-democracy camp. 
Second, in the LegCo election of 1998 and 2000, most mutual attacks were 
focusing on particular issue and position of another party. In 2000, Andrew Cheng 
asked if Andrew Wong was representing democracy or the rural committee, but it was 
not a really impressive debate. However, labels like "fake democrats" and 
"ambiguous democrats" appeared in the election of 2008. Raymond Wong also openly 
declared that the camp was disunited, and the camp had no ground of unity. In the 
study of LegCo elections of 1998 and 2000, Ma and Choy (2004) argued that though 
certain democrats disagreed with each other like the DP, they would not provoke 
strong conflict in order to maintain support of pro-democracy voters. However, in the 
election of 2008, democrats were no longer bothered to hide up any internal 
disagreement and conflicts. 
Third, though democrats had no plan of minimizing number of candidate lists in 
the LegCo election of 1998, 2000 and 2008, result of the latest election was the most 
discouraging. In terms of ratio of number of pro-democracy candidate lists to total 
number of seats, it was 0.85 and 0.67 in 1998 and 2000 respectively. In 2008, it was 
as high as 0.93. More importantly, being the first try of the PR, it was not surprising to 
find the 1998 LegCo election attracted numerous candidates from small political 
groups and civil society organizations. However, the high ratio in 2008 was really 
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matter of uncompromised among pro-democracy parties, as the three major parties 
tried to maximize their seats by placing candidates in all constituencies without any 
plan of vote division. The Seed Program of the DP also reminded democrats that the 
total number of candidate lists was out of their concern. After the 2004 LegCo 
election, Chu Yiu-ming, being the convener of the liaison group, argued that 
independents were the chief obstacles against the coordination, as they had no 
intention of cooperating with political parties.4o But the situation in 2008 refuted his 
opinion, as political parties might not intend to have cooperation either. Even though 
the election was surprisingly satisfactory, the direct and keen competition among the 
three parties could not be ignored. 
Observation on Level of Coordination: An Analytical Spectrum 
In the conceptualization of dependent variables in Chapter Three, it is suggested 
that the coordination of the pro-democracy camp mainly serves two purposes, i.e. to 
maximize winning opportunity of democrats under the PR and to promote positive 
image of pro-democracy with image of unity. As discussed, the two purposes are 
indicating different levels of the opposition cohesion in electoral coordination. The 
40 Interview with Chu Yiu-Ming on 29 Mar 2007 
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former is reflecting high the opposition cohesion as it demonstrates a highly organized 
coordination and importance of placing overall betterment of the whole camp on the 
prior position. The latter focus on general positive image of the camp, which is a 
united coalition, and it inclines to the medium opposition cohesion. Lastly, low the 
opposition cohesion could be found if the coordination is full of serious the opposition 
against each other. Based on the three levels of the opposition cohesion, an analytical 
spectrum could be articulated, as shown in Figure 7.1. 







With reference to the idea of Levitsky and Way (2003), an analytical spectrum on 
the level of electoral coordination could be identified by difference from low cohesion 
to high cohesion. The level of high cohesion implies that democrats are intended to 
regard the camp as a single party, added to the strongest intention of maximizing the 
winning opportunity of democrats under the PR. The coordination is practiced as an 
organized coalition. Whether this level is reached depends on trust and obedience of 
democrats towards decision-making mechanism that is bound to all parties. 
Empirically, it is revealed by result of the coordination like number of candidate lists, 
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practice of inter-party vote division and other cooperation. 
Here, the level of medium cohesion notifies preliminary consensus among 
democrats that they all belong to the same camp with the same political orientation. 
Although they are ideologically divided or they disagree with each other in certain 
policy issues, they could still united as anti-authoritarian alliance during election, at 
least in terms of public image. In practice, it is revealed by the intention of avoiding 
an open quarrel and conflict among democrats. 
Lastly, the level of low cohesion is characterized by the opposition against each 
other. At this level, the concept of the pro-democracy camp as a united coalition is 
either lacked or even challenged. 
Based on review of the four elections, levels of coordination of the elections 
could be positioned as followed: 
Figure 7.2 Levels of Electoral Coordination in the Four 













As shown in the above figure, the LegCo election of 2004 is the closest to level 
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of highest cohesion. The election was remarked by formation and practice of the 
liaison group, which aimed at reaching target for benefit of Hong Kong democratic 
movement. Though some democrats doubted neutrality of the liaison group, it still 
gained considerable legitimacy among democrats. The coordination led by the liaison 
group was not really successful in terms of leading the nomination. The nomination 
mechanism did not function well, too. Still, it successfully eliminated open mutual 
attack and encouraged inter-party vote division, regardless of the result. 
Compared to that of the 2004, there was lower level of coordination in 1998 and 
2000, i.e. between low cohesion and medium cohesion. Indeed, evidence shows that 
there was almost no actual cooperation among democrats in the elections. And there 
was severe disagreement between the DP and the ADPL. But still, the concept the 
pro-democracy camp was still concrete, and they did not try to show themselves 
extraordinary through criticizing all others. 
In the LegCo election of 2008, from the very beginning, democrats showed no 
intention of promoting image of a united camp. In election forums and promotions, 
direct and indirect mutual attack among democrats was hostile. Plus, in the election 
with so many candidate lists competing with each other, unilateral vote division was 
more common. It was not only found from candidates with lower popularity, but also 
practiced by those more popular like the CP. It is thus reasonable to position the 2008 
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LegCo election at the lowest cohesion. 
Factors Constitutes to the Variation of Level of Electoral Coordination: An 
Evaluation 
Political Dissatisfaction: Higher Level of Electoral Coordination under Strong 
Political Dissatisfaction? 
Compared political sentiment of the four elections, it is obvious that, some 
attributes show consistent relation with the levels of coordination. First of all, the 
"China factors" which used to be dominant in Hong Kong electoral politics (Leung, 
1996) has been declining gradually to be nearly irrelevant. Result of the survey shows 
that there was increasing proportion of Hong Kong people trusted the Beijing Central 
Government after the handover. The rising trend was clear in spite of various 
incidents happened. Even in 2004, the Article 23 Saga was still well remembered and 
the PRC had made the second interpretation of the Basic Law, people's trust in the 
Central Government was still on the up-trend. When the levels of electoral 
coordination varied in different elections, people's trust to the Central Government is 
obviously unrelated. 
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Then, the relation between levels of coordination and the three attributes of 
political culture, i.e. "appraisal of degree of freedom of speech", "appraisal of degree 
of rule of law" and "appraisal of degree of freedom" was unclear. Basically, there was 
no significant variation with the three attributes among the election periods. For the 
"appraisal of degree of freedom of speech", it is possible to sketch an improving trend. 
Though the '" appraisal of degree of rule of law" shows variation which is quite 
consistent with the levels of coordination, the absolute difference of only 0.26 is in 
fact too tiny to convince that it is a relevant attribute. Different from the "appraisal of 
degree of rule of law", a more obvious absolute difference could be found in the 
"appraisal of degree of freedom", but the movement of variation is inconsistent with 
that of the level of coordination. 
Among all attributes, "support to the CE", "trust in the HKSAR government" 
and "appraisal of degree of democracy" show the strongest and most consistent 
relation with the levels of electoral coordination. In 2004, there was the lowest public 
support to the CE, the lowest trust to the SAR government and the lowest appraisal of 
degree of democracy; while in 2008, the three attributes were nearly the highest.41 At 
the same time, the indexes of both 1998 and 2000 were better than that of 2004, while 
41 According to the figure, the supporting rating to the CE of 2008 was in fact 0.4 score lower than that 
of 1998. Yet, it could be argued by two points. First, the difference of 0.4 was actually very tiny to 
refute the relation. Also, when the support rating sharply fell in 2000, the relation is stood if the trend is 
considered. Moreover, similar relation is also found in the attribute' Appraisal of degree of rule of law' . 
However, the difference of rating among the four periods is too trivial, so it could not be discussed. 
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they were less encouragIng than that of 2008. With reference to the data, the 
hypothesis could be confirmed when it is substantiated as follow: 
The lower support rating of the eE, the higher level of coordination; 
The lower people s trust to the HKSAR, the higher level of coordination; 
The lower appraisal of degree of democracy, the higher level of 
coordination. 
Following the logic of the hypothesis, when people's support for the CE, trust in 
the HKSAR and rating of democracy are low, the cleavage of anti-government and 
pro-democracy is expected to be stronger, democrats are thus more intended to 
conduct better coordination in order to capture the significant pool of median voters, 
with simple issues of fighting for democracy and against the undemocratic executive. 
Empirically, the strategic coordination in 2004 is a typical demonstration. In the year, 
the above three independent variables had reached almost the all-time lowest point 
since the handover. There was exceptionally high proportion of population considered 
political problem as the most concerned issue. And, there were more people being 
dissatisfied with the political condition than those who were dissatisfied with the 
economic condition. It was rare in a decade after the handover. This background gave 
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what Chu Yiu-ming regarded as 'moral high ground' to raise the strategic coordination, 
which was intending to make the issue of fighting for democracy dominant and to 
minimize difference of democrats in other issues. In practice, the DP, the A45, and the 
Frontier had different stance and idea on social and political issue, but while they 
came together for the Diamond-list in the N.T. East, they needed to come up with a 
more united platform when they were in one list. Also, the liaison group put enormous 
effort to eliminate mutual attack among democrats, so that the shown internal 
difference was tiny. 
In the contrary, in 2008, people's trust in the HKSAR and appraisal to degree of 
democracy was at a remarkably high level, and their support to the CE had greatly 
recovered. The relatively soft political atmosphere deteriorated the cleavage along 
issue of democratization. In the election, democrats mainly focused on certain 
misconduct of government officials like the scandal of Leung Chin-man instead of 
democracy as the whole issue. Besides, the pool of keen supporters of the 
pro-democracy camp was also expected to contract under the political atmosphere, so 
that intra-camp competition was much tighter than that of 2004, which resulted in the 
absence of electoral coordination. 
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Table 7.1 Mass Political Culture of 1998, 2000, 2004 and 2008 
Percentage of People Percentage of People 
Support Rating of CE Trust the HKSAR Trust the Beijing Central 
Government Government 
1998 58.8 37.2 28.7 
2000 53.7 41.5 31.9 
2004 44.2 32.5 40 
2008 58.4 62.6 54.9 
Social dissatisfaction Percentage of people 
Appraisal of degree of 
with the current most concerned on 
political condition political problems 
democracy 
1998 25 2.3 6.06 
2000 28.7 2.6 6.02 
2004 57 9.9 5.71 
2008 32.8 4.2 6.25 
Appraisal of degree Appraisal of degree of Appraisal of degree of 
offreedomofspeech rule of law freedom 
1998 7.02 6.62 7.06 
2000 7.13 6.52 7.32 
2004 7.24 6.43 7.17 
2008 7.37 6.69 7.63 
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Economic Performance: Without Strong Political Discontent, Strong Public 
Dissatisfaction to Economic Performance Weakens Electoral Coordination? 
It is hypothetically arguable that, if economic discontent dominates the election 
and overrides political discontent, it is a centrifugal force to the pro-democracy camp, 
because it directs the opposition to the platform of economic issue which is more 
complicated. Yet, it is not convincing in context of the four LegCo elections. In the 
four elections, the levels of electoral coordination varied, but there was quite a 
proportion of people who regarded economic problems as the most concerned issue. 
Since the handover, there had been more than 60% population who regarded 
economic problems as the most concerned issue. In 2005, there was a sharp fall due to 
the rapid boost of the stock market. But in 2008, with the alert of economic recession, 
it was quickly up to 56% again. Apparently, there is no relation between the level of 
electoral coordination and the attribute of "percentage of people most concerned on 
economic problems." 
How about the attribute' dissatisfaction with the current economic condition'? As 
mentioned above, in the LegCo election 2004, the overriding significance of political 
discontent led to the comprehensive strategic coordination. However, the levels of 
electoral coordination in 1998, 2000 and 2008 do not find similar correlation. In 1998, 
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there was double proportion of population who were dissatisfied with the economic 
condition than those of 2008. Yet, the level of electoral coordination in 1998 was not 
as worse as that in 2008. Figure 7.3 tries to depict the relation of dissatisfaction to 
economic condition; dissatisfaction towards tj e political condition and the level of 
coordination. 
As shown in the figure, though the LegCo election 2004 practiced the highest 
level of coordination, it locates between the elections of 1998/ 2000 and 2008, along 
the axis of economic dissatisfaction. Alternatively, it further illustrates that the axis of 
political dissatisfaction is dominantly influential. While the coordination of 1998, 
2000 and 2008 were similarly disappointed, they were under a political atmosphere of 
lower dissatisfaction. Indeed, the experience of the 2008 LegCo election shows that, 
even though people's perception of the economic condition was satisfactory, 
democrats could still arouse mutual attack by other issues. In almost all constituencies, 
the LSD kept attacking the CP on running actively in the FC election. In the Kowloon 
East and the N.T. West, the LSD attacked the DP on their stance in the list of The Link. 
Also, in the Hong Kong Island, Cyd Ho was criticized of supporting an appointed DC 
member to be chairman of the council. 
In fact, the existing cases are not enough to test if the hypothesis is confirmed. 
Among the four elections, only the third one was subject to more serious political 
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dissatisfaction. But at least, it further confirms that political dissatisfaction of the 
public is more determined than economic dissatisfaction, as a centripetal force for 
better electoral coordination. 
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Figure 7.3 Economic Dissatisfaction, Political Dissatisfaction and 
Electoral Coordination 
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Prospect o/Democracy: Higher Level Electoral Coordination when the PRC's 
Attitude to the Prospect o/Democracy is Negative? 
As discussed in Chapter Three, when Hong Kong is treated as a competitive 
authoritarian regime, the LegCo election is one of the chief arenas of contestation. 
When the prospect of democracy is uncertain, this arena is more important. 
Democrats, being activists of the movement, are expected to practice better electoral 
coordination. 
In the early post- handover period, it was believed that full democracy might be 
implemented in the SAR in 20071 08, according to common and preliminary 
understanding of the Basic Law. In spite of the constitutionally possibility, the PRC 
did not clearly show their attitude to the prospect of Hong Kong democratic 
development. Yet, it was in fact the two decisions of the SCNPC concerning Hong 
Kong democratic development in 2004 and 2007 that determined prospect of 
democracy of Hong Kong in the related moment with clear inclination of their attitude. 
The former vetoed the original expectation desperately; the latter gave specific 
schedule and target for Hong Kong's path of democratization. A decade after the 
handover, four elections were held, during different moments of prospect of 
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democracy, as summed up in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3 Relation between Prospect of Democracy and Level of Electoral 











Level of Electoral Coordination 
Between low cohesion and medium cohesion 
Between low cohesion and medium cohesion 
Between medium cohesion and high cohesion 
Inclined to low cohesion 
Based on an observation of prospect of democracy, which is the background of 
electoral coordination, their relation could be clearly articulated. In the first LegCo 
election held in the first year after the handover, it was believed that there would be 
democracy in nearly a decade later and the attitude of the PRC was unclear. Looked 
into the promotion materials of democrats and compared with the idea of re-entering 
into the LegCo after being ousted by the Provisional Legislative Council, to monitor 
the undemocratic government and the rising issue about interest of lower class, 
fighting for democracy was not really a dominant message. In the LegCo election 
2000, issue of democracy was more voiced out by some democrats. Yet, it was more 
likely to demonstrate their role as democrats instead of promoting the election as part 
of the movement. At the same time, they also put other issues like the accountability 
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problem and poor governance of Tung Chee-hwa on the agenda. 
In 2004, the LegCo election had really become the arena of contestation for the 
pro-democracy camp. The contestation was not directly against the ruling executive, 
but against pro-government camp, which was mainly represented by the DAB. The 
beautiful victory of the pro-democracy camp in the DC election in late 2003 reminded 
them that, to oust pro-government camp out of the LegCo and to insist on universal 
suffrage on 2007/ 08 could be a powerful appeal to attract pro-democracy voters. The 
background directly encouraged democrats to have comprehensive coordination to 
full utilize the appeal collectively, as Chu Yiu-ming said, in the election of 2004, the 
background provided strong moral high ground for them to persuade democrats to 
join the coordination with the claim of "overall consideration" ("Ji~*}a]). However, 
despite the strong moral appeal for the coordination, the argument of Field and 
Siavelis (2008) concerning the importance of leading party in transitional polity could 
not be totally confirmed through this observation. The negative prospect of 
democracy in 2004 provided room for emergence of the liaison group. Yet, the neutral 
political body, i.e. the HKDDN, was obviously not "political leadership" that Field 
and Siavelis (2008) mentioned. We could argue that the negative prospect was 
encouraging democrats to involve in central and systematic coordination, but it did 
not mean any opportunity for emergence of political leader of any particular party. 
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Lastly, in 2008, the target of universal suffrage had been approved on 2017/ 20 
by the Central Government. Though most democrats doubted whether the Central 
Government was approving full democracy sincerely, opinion poll showed that, 
significant proportion of the population had accepted the schedule.42 Thus, inevitably, 
the value of the LegCo as arena of contestation, diminished. With absence of the chief 
political cleavage as well as centripetal force for the pro-democracy camp, they 
revealed an uncooperative attitude on planning of cooperation and vote division. 
Some of them claimed that they were short of sufficient votes and in crisis in early 
stage of the campaign. Fredrick Fung and Lee Wing-tat took an old story of their 
respective lost in 1998 and 2000 to ask voters not to do vote division no matter what 
result the opinion poll showed. Much worse, the controversy about the roadmap made 
difference between democrats. Most apparently, the LSD criticized the CP that they 
were cheating electorates when they did not clearly declare the insistence on full 
democracy in 2012 (RTHK, 2008). In the election, issues like voice of young voters, 
social justice and environmental concern rise to the agenda. Fighting for democracy 
was not the most appealing issue that could encourage democrats to have electoral 
coordination, under a certain and confirmed path of democratization. 
42 According to opinion poll conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies on 29 
December 2007, there was 72.2% population 'accepted' and 'totally accepted' the decision of the NPC 
regarding election of the CE. See website: 
http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/hkiaps/telpress/Press Release 7 1 2008.pdf 
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Further Analytical Dimensions 
Long-term Perspective of Candidates 
The argument concerning long-term perspective of candidates assumes that fresh 
runners are hindering electoral coordination of higher level, as they are making 
decision based on calculation of their own long-term perspective instead of result of 
coordination project. Though it is unable to delineate calculation of each fresh runner 
separately, we could still observe the general effect of fresh runners on the 
performance of electoral coordination. 
First of all, as shown in Table 7.4, the number of the lists of fresh runners was 
more or less similar in the four elections, despite of the varied level of coordination. 
However, we should not easily conclude that the fresh runners did no effect. Among 
the 14 lists of fresh runners in all the LegCo elections, 10 of them did either arouse 
mutual attack or practice unilateral vote division, or both. Following this vein, we 
could say that fresh runners are likely to be obstacle of electoral coordination, but 
they are not the factors leading to variation of level of electoral coordination. 
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Table 7.4 Relation between Number of Lists of Fresh Runners and Level of Electoral 
Coordination, 1998 -- 2008 
Number of Lists 
Fres h Runners 
Level of Electoral Coordination 
1998 4 Between low cohesion and medium cohesion 
2000 2 Between low cohesion and medium cohesion 
2004 3 Between medium cohesion and high cohesion 
2008 5 Inclined to low cohesion 
Table 7.5 Fresh Runners in the Four LegCo Elections of the SAR43 
Year Fresh Runner of the LegCo Election 
1998 Christine Loh (Citizens Party); Lui Yat-ming (Citizens Party),' Yum 
Sin-ling (123DA),' Leung Yiu-chung (NWSC) 
2000 Leung Kwok-hung (AFAG); Tsang Kin-shing 
2004 Alan Leong (A45); Audrey Eu (A45); Albert Cheng 
2008 Raymond Wong (LSD),' Claudia Mo (CP); Femando Cheung (CP); 
Lo Wing-lok; Joseph Lai 
Value of Party Endorsement 
Concerning the role of value of party endorsement, it is argued that political 
43 Candidates who conducted either unilateral vote division or mutual attack are italic. 
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party with exceptionally high public support enables higher level electoral 
coordination. To test the argument, the first point is, were there any party with 
exceptionally high public support since the handover? 
As shown in Figure 7.6, except the DP in the 1998, there was no party with 
exceptionally high popularity rating since the handover. And of course, being the 
largest pro-democratic party in the early time after the handover, it was natural for the 
DP to have high popularity rating. Yet, the centripetal power of the DP was not as 
high as expected. The fact is, the first LegCo election of the SAR attracted 
independent candidates and small political groups to join the game, but none to them 
intended to join the DP. 
In 2000, the independent candidates and small political groups no longer ran the 
election after failing in 1998. The total number of running political groups thus 
dropped. For the DP, the internal struggle between the Mainstreamers and Young 
Turks harmed the popularity rating of the party, but it was still treated as the leading 
party of the pro-democracy camp. Dissatisfying the internal arrangement of the DP, 
Tsang Kin-shing quitted the party and ran independently. However, he did not 
provoke mutual attack to the DP, as he tried to maintain support of pro-democracy 
voters (Choy & Ma, 2004). 
Then, in 2004, the newly established A45, which was later the CP, became the 
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party with highest popularity rating, it enjoyed the highest popularity rating since they 
\vere formed. However, compared with other pro-democratic political parties and 
political groups, it is still far from being claimed as the flagship of the pro-democracy 
camp though there was such opinion ('The Civic Party is Formed', 2006). With 
reference to the survey result, except the DP in 1998, no party could provide 
convincing value of party endorsement to function efficient electoral coordination. 
Though there was no party with exceptionally high popularity support in the four 
elections, it did not mean that there was no role of endorsement. Bringing the 
so-called party endorsement back to the idea of "reputations for viability" (Cox, 1997: 
159), the liaison group in 2004 was a case worth discussing upon their role and value 
of endorsing viable candidates. There are two points to note concerning the strategic 
coordination led by the liaison group. First, a body without direct party affiliation 
could bring more substantial value of endorsement. In the strategic coordination of 
2004, though legitimacy of the liaison group was doubted by certain democrats, they 
seldom declared their discontent to it openly, as the liaison group was representing a 
neutral body purely seeking for common good44 . 
In the early period of the LegCo election 2008, Anson Chan was potentially able 
to take up a similar role of endorsing candidates, as she was symbol of a more united 
44 In interview, Chu Yiu-ming agreed that his identity as a clergyman enable him to convince 
democrats to join the coordination. 
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the pro-democracy camp in the expenence of the by-election in 2007. But 
unfortunately, her quasi bias towards the CP provoked even more discontent from 
other democrats, blaming that she had forgot their enthusiasms during the by-election, 
and the CP tried to utilize Anson Chan for their own good exclusively. 
To sum up, basically, drawing from the observations, no political parties was able 
to be the one with a high value of making endorsement. At least, the DP was not able 
to take up the role before the A45/ CP was found. Only with extraordinary conditions 
like the unusually high public discontent to the government, a neutral body agreed by 
most democrats could take the role. 







































Erosion of Effect of Electoral System 
This research argues that, other factors would erode effect of the electoral system 
upon level of electoral coordination, when the LegCo election is regarded as arena of 
contestation for the sake of exerting pressure tonthe ruling executive. 
The above discussion finds that, attributes of strong political dissatisfaction and 
low trust in the government, in addition to the unconfirmed progress of 
democratization are the two most significant forces leading to high level of electoral 
coordination. Indeed, the strategic coordination in 2004 was not very successful in all 
dimensions; nevertheless, it demonstrated an essential difference in comparison to the 
discussion about the effect of the PR system, which was with reference to the 
elections of 1998 and 2000 (Choy, 2002). Also, in 1998 and 2000, when political 
atmosphere was lighter and political prospect was less certain than that in 2008, 
though electoral coordination in the elections was still disappointed, it was less hostile 
than the latest one. So, with the two significant independent variables suggested, the 
effect of the electoral system is actually considerable. It is not going to refute that it 
makes the pro-democracy camp more divided than the SM, but we still need to 
emphasize that the influence on the PR system is subj ect to certain overriding factors 
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Following this point, a question is tempted to ask: though the 2004 LegCo 
election found the highest cohesion of the democrats compared with another three 
elections, it still could not reach the ideal point of cohesion that indicated in the 
analytical spectrum. What is hindering the electoral coordination from high level of 
cohesion? Taking the 2004 LegCo election as reference, the research of Ma is worth 
mentioned. In the study, he argued that result of the strategic coordination was 
affected by three factors: impossibility of forming a decision making mechanism with 
substantial power; ideological differences among candidates; and personal 
consideration and rivalries of candidates (2006, pp. 128-30). It means that, other than 
the structural constraint to the decision making mechanism, agential could to a certain 
extent weaken centripetal force of strong political dissatisfaction and uncertain 
prospect of democracy. 
Mutual Attack between Parties of Similar Ideologies? 
In discussion of inter-party competition under the PR, as mentioned in Chapter 
Two, Katz (1980) argues that parties with similar platforms and ideologies would be 
having greater competition against each other, as they are competing for similar 
source for votes. Yet, the argument is questionable with reference to experience of the 
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LegCo elections 2008. 
In the election, the LSD and the CP were apparently standing for different source 
of supporters. The former stood for the grass roots, the social minorities and radicals, 
but the CP was trying to appeal the middle-class and moderates. However, in various 
platforms, the LSD targeted the CP to criticize. On another hand, the CP indirectly 
blamed the LSD of damaging unity of the pro-democracy camp. 
On a contrary, according to their platforms and standing ideologies, the DP and 
the CP should be the main competitors, especially when both of them were 
establishing to be catch-all party with a pro-democratic stance, and putting more 
attention on support of middle-class. However, in the election, they never criticize 
each other. In the Hong Kong Island, though Audrey Eu refuted the idea of the DP of 
having vote division and claimed that the CP needed 100,000 votes to secure two 
seats, which was an aggressive action against the DP, the latter only made a reply 
moderately that 100,000 might be too much for two seats. 
Similarly, in the strategic coordination in 2004, the DP and the A45 did not 
appear as competitors but more likely partners of the coordination. At the same time, 
democrats of other ideologies complained that the coordination game was dominated 
by the DP and the A45 and they were ignored. Based on the above discussion, a 
general pattern of electoral coordination of the pro-democracy camp could be briefly 
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outlined. 
Political groups/ candidates with low popularity are more intended to arouse 
mutual attack; 
Political groups/ candidates with relatively high popularity and representing 
different ideologies are intended to attack each other; 
Political groups/ candidates with relatively high popularity and representing 
similar ideology are intended to cooperate. 
Summary 
This chapter manages to generalize levels of electoral coordination of the four 
elections and to test the hypotheses suggested in Chapter Three. Instead of treating 
LegCo election of Hong Kong indifferent from that of conventional democracies, to 
study electoral behavior of Hong Kong's democrats more accurately, this research 
argues that the real situation of Hong Kong as a competitive authoritarian regime 
should be emphasized. According to the argument, the double facets of the LegCo are 
seriously considered. On one hand, it is the legislature of political institution, but its 
power is limited; on another hand, it is one of the most essential arenas of political 
contestation for people to exert pressure against the undemocratic executive and voice 
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for democratisation. On this vein, it is insufficient to regard electoral system as the 
prior factor affecting electoral coordination of democrats. Thus, this research suggests 
mass political culture, economic performance, political uncertainty and value of party 
endorsement as independent variables and tests if they have any relation with the level 
of electoral coordination. Of course, role of the electoral system is also examined. 
Taking the first four LegCo elections of the SAR as case studies, mass political 
culture and political uncertainty are witnessed as having the strongest and most 
consistent relation with the varying level of electoral coordination. For mass political 
culture, more specifically, data shows that people's support to the CE, people's trust to 
the HKSAR and appraisal to the degree of democracy. When there is strong public 
discontent to the undemocratic government regarding this three attributes, democrats 
are more intended to have better coordination in elections. 
Another variable is more or less related to the mass political culture suggested 
above. With the level of electoral coordination of the four elections compared, it 
shows that, when prospect of democracy is more uncertain, democrats are more 
intended to pursue higher level electoral coordination. Following the logic of the 
hypothesis, the variation of level of electoral coordination confirms that LegCo 
election takes role as arena of contestation and it corresponds to background of mass 
political culture as well as situation of political uncertainty. 
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Then, does the electoral system matter? As discussed above, compared with the 
election adopting the SM, the PR really brings centrifugal influence to the 
pro-democracy camp. Even in the LegCo election 2004, of which the level of 
electoral coordination was the highest among four, the electoral method still induced 
candidates like Albert Cheng (together with Andrew To) and Leung Kwok-hung not to 
follow the liaison group and to run by themselves. Here, provided that there was 
variation with level of electoral coordination in the elections, the research tries to 
explore independent variables which lead the variation, while role of the LegCo 
election as means of contestation against the undemocratic regime is emphasized. 
Chapter 8 Conclusion 
Having explored factors responsible for the variation of the level of electoral 
coordination of the pro-democracy camp, it is time to have a conclusion. In this 
chapter, key concepts of the research will be reviewed first. Then, findings of the case 
study research will be summarized. Thirdly, I would suggest implications of the 
research. Lastly, the sight for further research, together with research limitations, will 
be provided. 
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Key Concepts of the Research: A Short Review 
Undoubtedly, competitive authoritarian regime is the most important concept in 
building this research. It highlights an important dimension of Hong Kong political 
context which is overlooked. In Chapter Two, I argue that it is inadequate to regard 
Hong Kong as a democratising polity or simply borrow literature about western 
democracies to this partially democratising state (Lau & Kuan, 2000). Concerning the 
fo nn er, democratisation of Hong Kong is actually protracted and it shows no clear 
direction of moving towards a "polyarchy" (Dahl, 1971). For the latter, it is more or 
less an unconvincing assumption to regard democrats of Hong Kong as politicians of 
western democracies. Indeed, various labels like "soft authoritarianism" (So, 2002) 
and "liberal autocracy" (Lau & Kuan, 2002b) are also used to describe political 
environment of Hong Kong. In a broad sense, Hong Kong is a hybrid regime which is 
neither totally democratic nor totally authoritarian. More specifically, Hong Kong is a 
competitive authoritarian regime, while the political institution involves competitive 
election which is "real but unfair" (Levitsky & Way, 2003, p. 4). In Chapter Two, the 
"unfairness" is explained in tenns of "institutional constraints against the opposition 
from exert pressure to the executive" and "obstacles hindering the opposition from 
bringing their advantage into the election game". 
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According to Levitsky and Way (2002), in competitive authoritarian regime, 
election is one of the main arenas of contestation, other than the legislature, the 
judiciary, and media. Applying to Hong Kong, election is taken as the chief focus of 
this research. Being a competitive authoritarian regime, the LegCo election of Hong 
Kong is commonly regarded as part of the democratic movement, other than merely a 
process of the fonnation of the LegCo. Following this vein, whether the 
pro-democracy camp could utilize the arenas well through electoral coordination is a 
meaningful topic to study. 
Since the handover, the SAR has experienced four LegCo elections. Each 
election showed different degree of electoral coordination. The variation in the level 
of electoral coordination directs us to investigate what factors are leading to the 
variation. In this research, taking the four LegCo elections as case studies, I suggest 
five independent variables, i.e. political dissatisfaction, economic perfonnance, 
political uncertainty, long-tenn perspective of candidates and value of party 
endorsement, and see if any particular independent variable could show correlation 
with the dependent variable, i.e. level of electoral coordination. 
Electoral Coordination of the pro-democracy camp: Summary of the Story 
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While electoral coordination is one of the significant parts of the contestation, 
this research tries to look into the coordination of the four LegCo elections of the 
SAR from four dimensions, i.e. number of candidate lists, practice of vote division, 
mutual attack of democrats, and compromise and formation on electoral platform. 
In spite of the greater number of pro-democratic candidates in the 1998 LegCo 
election, it is studied together with that of 2000, as they share similar background of 
election. In terms of the overall level of electoral coordination, this research argues 
that, it is more encouraging than that of 2008, but still distant from that of 2004. 
Basically, there was no systematic and intentional electoral coordination in both 
elections. Candidates decided to run in the elections simply based on their estimation 
of the opportunity. Therefore, the first LegCo election of the SAR, which adopted the 
PR, attracted number of pro-democratic candidates with low popularity. Moreover, the 
candidates did not try to come up with any agreement on electoral platform. Yet, 
because of the political atmosphere with strong discontent to the Tung's governance 
and the economic condition, electoral platforms of most candidates were quite similar. 
Similarly, coordination on inter-party vote division was also lacked in both elections. 
In 1998, Leung Yiu-chung and Lee Cheuk-yan tried to run together with a single list, 
but finally they did not make it real. Rather, unilateral vote division had been found 
since the first election. The unilateral vote division practiced by the DP against Emily 
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Lau aroused strong discontent from the latter. Also, mutual attack among democrats 
should not be overlooked, especially that of the 1998 election. In the election, 
candidates with low popularity like Lui Yat-ming, Yam Sin-ling, Ting Yin-wah, etc. 
aroused mutual attack frequently. In 2000, most of them did not run the election again; 
still, mutual attack between the DP and the ADPL was eye-catching. 
Compared with the other three elections, performance of electoral coordination 
of the 2004 LegCo election is the most positive. In the election, there was the liaison 
group in charged by the HKDDN, a relatively neutral pro-democratic political group, 
to organize the strategic coordination. They tried to make most democrats involved in 
the coordination and minimize the number of candidate lists in order to avoid 
intra-camp competition. Though they failed to achieve the chief purpose, they did 
make some accomplishment in another three dimensions of the coordination. 
Elimination of mutual attack among democrats was the most appealing result of the 
coordination proj ect that should not be ignored. Indeed, the 2004 LegCo election is 
the only that mutual attack was not found. Besides, the liaison group also tried to lead 
democrats to come up with an united electoral platform like that in the 2003 DC 
election. Yet, due to various differences in their views on policy issues, the idea only 
resulted in some general principles on their stance on democracy. About the practice 
of inter-party vote division, the liaison group experienced both success and failure. 
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The Diamond-list found in the N.T. East and the cooperation between the DP and 
Audrey Eu in the Hong Kong Island were two appealing inter-party vote division 
encouraged by the liaison group, regardless of the election result. But still, the liaison 
group faced various difficulties in doing their task. For instance, Andrew To refused 
the idea of making Diamond-list in the Kowloon East as he thought that the liaison 
group was inclining to the interest of the Mainstreamers; the ADPL complained that 
the liaison group always ignored their voice and; some democrats like Leung 
Kwok-hung and Albert Cheng merely ignore the liaison group. 
While the strategic coordination of 2004 represents kind of accomplishment of 
the pro-democracy camp, the experience of 2008 is in a contrary, demonstrating 
hostility among democrats. Similar to the 1998 and the 2000 LegCo elections, 
democrats did not come up with any consensus on comprehensive electoral 
coordination In the early period. The difference is, most democrats were more 
progressive in preserving their own interest. In terms of the number of candidate lists, 
while the CP and the LSD insisted on nominating candidates in all constituencies, and 
the DP was nominating more than one list in certain constituencies, the number of 
candidate lists largely expended in the election and resulted in keen intra-camp 
competition. The keen intra-camp competition was demonstrated by another three 
dimensions of the electoral coordination. Firstly of all, long time before the election, 
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many democrats had refused to have inter-party vote division anymore. Instead, some 
of them promoted unilateral vote division more actively then before. Also, opposite to 
the situation in 2004, in the forth LegCo election, mutual attacks were found in almost 
all constituencies, mainly aroused by the LSD. More importantly, while mutual 
attacks of previous elections mostly focused on policy views of the candidates, labels 
on other democrats like "fake democrats" and "ambiguous democrats" appeared in 
2008. Last but not least, indirect mutual attack was also found in their electoral 
platform. 
After reviewing the story of the four elections, this research tries to match if 
there are any independent variables having consistent relation with the levels of 
electoral coordination in the four elections. In various studies of election in Hong 
Kong, it has been confirmed that the electoral method of the LegCo is fundamentally 
acting as centrifugal force against easy electoral coordination. This research is not 
aiming at challenging the explanation, instead, it is exploring other factors which are 
equally or more significant than the existing explanation. As demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, it is found that the electoral coordination is driven by political 
sentiment of the public and prospect of democracy. 
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Electoral Coordination Driven by Political Sentiment 
Social sentiment detennines political cleavage of particular period, and to what 
degree the LegCo election could act as arena of contestation of the time. The idea is 
confinned by the review of the four LegCo elections. When there is strong 
dissatisfaction towards the CE, lower trust in the SAR and lower appraisal to degree 
of democracy, democrats would be intended to practice higher level of electoral 
coordination. In detail, such sentiment facilitates electoral coordination in two ways. 
First, unlike the issue of complicated economic and social policy that easily led to 
difference among democrats, strong sentiment of anti-government, anti-Tung and 
pro-democracy enables democrats to focus on the political cleavage and minimize 
their difference on another. Second, strong anti-government, anti-Tung and 
pro-democracy sentiment of the public means great social expectation that urges 
democrats to challenge legitimacy of the undemocratic executive. Subject to the 
expectation, moral appeal of democrats matters. They would thus intend to maintain 
coordination that enables the opposition cohesion at relatively high level. Indeed, the 
contrast between the LegCo election in 2004 and 2008 is the best case to illustrate the 
importance of social expectation and role of moral appeal. 
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Electoral Coordination Driven by Prospect of Democracy 
In the past decade, Hong Kong experienced fluctuating prospect of democracy. 
From common expectation of having full democracy . in 2007/ 08 in early post-the 
handover period, to which had been ruined in 2004. Yet, in 2008, a specific schedule 
was given. As demonstrated in the research, the changing prospect of democracy 
directly leads to the variation of level of electoral coordination. In 1998 and 2000, 
given a common belief on the prospect of democracy with reference to the Basic Law, 
instead of focusing on fighting for democracy as the prior issue, most democrats put 
poor governance of the SAR chiefly for the campaign. Inevitably, their difference 
surfaced when they were dealing with particular social issues and economic problems. 
Then, the common belief was ruined by the PRC in 2004. The prospect became a blur, 
together with the legacy of the anti-Article 23 sentiment, the most successful 
coordination since the handover had been achieved, which was led by a neutral liaison 
body. In the coordination, most democrats were aware of the importance of making 
democracy as the chief issue, and other complicated social and economic issues were 
to a large extent put aside. In late 2007, the NPCSC announced their decision on the 
roadmap and schedule on Hong Kong's pace of democratisation. Under the certain 
prospect of democracy, relation among democrats in the coming LegCo election was 
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hostile. The most obviously, the DP, the CP and the LSD put development of the party 
more important than overall coordination of the camp that found in 2004. Also, the 
alleviated social eagerness to democracy deteriorated power of the pro-democratic 
flag. In the election, besides the unfriendly attitude to candidate nomination, their 
attitude to the decision of the NPSCS as well as the existing institution also provoked 
mutual attack easily and it had been a point for certain democrats to differentiate 
themselves from each other. Very obviously, in all LegCo elections of the SAR, there 
were democrats ran in the FC election, but only in 2008, it became a point for 
criticism. 
Research Implication and Further Discussion 
Towards the end of the thesis, role of the democrats of Hong Kong, being a 
competitive authoritarian regIme, IS a meaningful discussion. When the LegCo 
election IS part of the contestation, the democrats are politicians and activists 
simultaneously. Treating them as merely politicians, to maximize votes for their own 
party is surely their chief mission, and it is understandable for various parties and 
independents to simply maximize voters. In a contrary, regarding them as activists, 
challenging the ruling executive is their most important task, and they are expected to 
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get rid of respective calculation and come together for fruitful anticipated return when 
the goal is achieved. 
Yet, the reality is, under the political context of Hong Kong, the role of the 
democrats, the so-called the opposition, is ambivalent. To say that they are politicians, 
they cannot access to actual executive resource under the present constitutional 
structure, while politicians of western democracies do. Can they be regarded as 
activists? It is in fact doubtful if democracy is a feasible goal that they can strive for. 
Negotiation power of the pro-democracy camp is unquestionably far weaker than that 
of the PRC, and the agenda of democratisation is almost totally controlled by the 
Central Government. Of course, winning a majority in the LegCo and exert pressure 
to the ruling executive is the most they can do. 
On this vein, to what extent election could effectively be an arena of contestation 
is, to a large extent, very depending on cohesion of the democrats in the electoral · 
coordination. While Levitsky and Way (2002) put strong emphasis on the nature of 
election in competitive authoritarian regimes, together with experience of similar 
polities, how does the opposition utilise the arena is the question they merely 
overlooked. With reference to this insufficiency, this research shows that whether the 
opposition would utilize the electoral arena effectively depends on other external 
factors. At least, from the case of Hong Kong, this research argues that, in period of 
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strong social dissatisfaction and distrust to the CE and the government, together with 
negative prospect of democracy, democratisation becomes the prior issue of public 
agenda. People expect the democrats more inclining to be activists fighting for 
democracy and beat the pro-government camp through the LegCo election. People's 
attitude in the DC election of 2003 directly gave such insight to democrats and paved 
for the strategic coordination in 2004. In 2008, it was an opposite situation. The 
lightened political atmosphere and clear roadmap of democratisation diminishes 
potential for the LegCo to act as arena of contestation. In another words, the situation 
discouraged democrats from inclining to be activists. Thus, being merely politicians, 
it was not surprising to see democrats put development of their own parties on the 
first place. 
Following this perspective, the future of the political sentiment of the public and 
the prospect of democracy, that determine level of electoral coordination of democrats, 
is a crucial point to discuss, for sake of delineating power of the opposition of this 
polity in the future. First, as mentioned, on December 2007, the PRC provided the 
roadmap of Hong Kong's democratisation. Though most of the democrats doubted if 
the PRC was sincere in turning on green light for democracy of Hong Kong or it was 
merely a strategy to further protract the pace of democratisation, it was undeniable 
that the proposal of the PRC was widely accepted by the public (HKIAPS, 2007). In 
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other words, at least in eye of the public, prospect of democracy is quite positive. 
Under this context, it is reasonable to expect that intention of the democrats of having 
high opposition cohesion in electoral coordination would be low. Thus, whether they 
could utilize the election as an arena of contestation is very doubtful. 
How about the influence of political sentiment? Indeed, political sentiment of the 
2004 LegCo election is an encouraging experience to the democrats. However, it 
should also be noted that the unusually strong sentiment of political dissatisfaction in 
2004 was actually result of many factors like the rude attitude of promoting 
legislature of the Article 23, endless poor performance of the Tung's executive, and 
mishandling of SARS, etc. So, though the democrats are showing high level of 
electoral coordination under strong political dissatisfaction of the public, they are in 
fact on a passive side as they are not able to control the overall political atmosphere. 
Research Limitations and Insight for Further Research 
Being an exploratory research, it is subject to some limitations that could be 
improved when there will be further study of the issue. First of all, performance of 
democrats in terms of electoral coordination is the main theme of study. For sake of 
in-depth comparison and articulation of relation between relevant background of 
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elections and level of electoral coordination, bulk of information about the issue is 
needed. Yet, due to practical constraints to sufficient data collection45, it is unable to 
provide a fruitful full story for all the four LegCo elections. For certain part of the 
LegCo elections 1998 and 2000, it is relied on second hand source such as existing 
literature concerning the issue. 
Secondly, from comprehensive study of the four elections, by emphasising on the 
role of the LegCo as arena of contestation, this research is able to demonstrate that 
there is some relation between level of electoral coordination and political sentiment 
as well as prospect of democracy. This research tries to articulate the explanation by 
every substance found in the four elections. Of course, the story would be more fertile 
if more interviews with democrats could be conducted. For instance, with sufficient 
interviews, it is also possible to demonstrate whether the varying degree of electoral 
coordination is the result of learning from the previous election. 
Thirdly, the 2008 LegCo election is an interesting experience regarding the topic 
of electoral coordination. As mentioned in this thesis, the democrats coordinated 
badly in the election. Yet, the election result was surprisingly satisfactory. So, there 
was opinion that electorates could conduct decent vote division by themselves, though 
the candidates did not make it well. While the purpose of conducting electoral 
45 For instance, it is surprising that the RTHK cannot provide TV Forum of the N. T. West of both the 
LegCo elections 1998 and 2000, as they have missed the videotapes. 
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coordination is to maximize seats in the LegCo, the experience of the latest election 
shows that dimension of voters should not be ignored. Of course, as argued in Chapter 
Two, this research is focusing on behaviour of the democrats in the coordination 
instead of coordination result. Yet, election result of the 2008 LegCo election reminds 
us that, electoral coordination, as kind of strategy, could be considered as kind of 
dynamic between candidates and voters. 
Moreover, this research aims at exploring certain macro factors that may affect 
the level of electoral coordination of the opposition, for sake of further application 
and comparison with other competitive authoritarian regimes. Thus, though the three 
independent variables are inter-related to some extent, i.e. the changed level of 
political dissatisfaction may be result of economic performance, it is still necessary to 
separate them, for convenience of further comparative study of different competitive 
authoritarian regimes. 
Fourthly, as mentioned several times in earlier part of the thesis, Levitsky and 
Way (2002) states four major arenas of contestation of competitive authoritarian 
regimes. While this research is digging into the arena of election, discussion of 
another three is little. Indeed, the latter three arenas are also worth looking into. For 
instance, talking about judicial arena of contestation, judicial review is exactly an 
important means for the opposition to challenge the ruling executive of the SAR. 
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Besides, the media is also a crucial arena of contestation in Hong Kong. After various 
controversies like the Teacup in the Storm Saga, intemet and grassroot media are 
commonly used by the opposition to spread their idea and even to mobilize people to 
protest. With no doubt, we could depict a comprehensive picture of relation between 
the incumbent and the opposition of Hong Kong, as a competitive authoritarian 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix X Election Results of the Pro-Democracy Camp in the LegCo 
Elections 1998-2008 
Election Results of the Pro-Democracy Camp in the 1998 LegCo Election 
District No. of winners 
Hong Kong Island 3 
Kowloon West 2 
Kowloon East 2 
N. T. West 4 
N. T. East 4 
Candidates 
Christine Loh, Martin Lee, Yeung Sum 
Lau Chin-shek, James To 
Szeto Wah, Li Wah-ming 
Leung Yiu-chung, Lee Cheuk-yan, Albert Ho, 
Lee Wing-tat 
Andrew Wong, Emily Lau, Cyd Ho, Andrew 
Cheng 
Election Results of the Pro-Democracy Camp in the 2000 LegCo Election 
District No. of winners 
Hong Kong Island 3 
Kowloon West 3 
Kowloon East 2 
N. T. West 4 
N. T. East 4 
Candidates 
Martin Lee, Yeung Sum, Cyd Ho 
Lau Chin-shek, James To, Frederick Fung 
Szeto Wah, Li Wah-ming 
Leung Yiu-chung, Lee Cheuk-yan, Albert Ho, 
Albert Chan 
Andrew Wong, Emily Lau, Wong Shing-chi, 
Andrew Cheng 
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Election Results of the Pro-Democracy Camp in the 2004 LegCo Election 
District 
Hong Kong Island 
Kowloon West 
Kowloon East 
N. T. West 
N. T. East 







Martin Lee, Yeung Sum, Audrey Eu 
Lau Chin-shek, lames To, Frederick Fung 
Alan Leong, Albert Cheng, Li Wah-ming 
Leung Yiu-chung, Lee Cheuk-yan, Albert 
Chan, Lee Wing-tat, Albert Ho 
Leung Kwok-hung, Ronny Tong, Emily Lau, 
Andrew Cheng 
Election Results of the Pro-Democracy Camp in the 2008 LegCo Election 
District No. of winners 
Hong Kong Island 4 
Kowloon West 3 
Kowloon East 2 
N. T. West 5 
N. T. East 5 
Candidates 
Cyd Ho, Kam Nai-wai, Tanya Chan, Audrey 
Eu 
lames To, Raymond Wong, Frederick Fung 
Alan Leong, Li Wah-ming 
Leung Yiu-chung, Lee Wing-tat, Albert Ho, 
Albert Chan, Lee Cheuk-yan 
Leung Kwok-hung, Emily Lau, Andrew 
Cheng, Wong Shing-chi, Ronny Tong 
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